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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the preface of one of the most established textbooks “Economics” by Samuelson &
Nordhaus (1998), the authors state that the ultimate goal of economics is “to improve the
living conditions of people in their everyday life”. They further emphasise that economics
has increased its scope greatly over the past half-century. The flag of economics flies
over its traditional territory of the marketplace, but it also covers the environment, legal
studies, statistical and historical methods, gender and racial discrimination, and even
family life.” In this spirit, this dissertation thesis addresses three heterogenous topics and
aims to contribute to this noble goal by utilising recent data which has not commonly
been used in economic research yet. While being heterogenous in nature, all included
chapters address core determinants directly or indirectly influencing human well-being:
gun-related violence and its determinants, the impact of the size of the middle class on
educational outcomes as well as the eﬀect of lower costs in gaining access to remote
markets on subsequent economic activity and its spatial distribution. In order to derive
better answers to those questions, it is of utmost importance, besides the development
of a deeper understanding based on theoretical inquiry, to address the underlying issues
empirically. Therefore, the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, while also proposing
stylised models in order to motivate the empirical assessment, are focused on the analysis
of recently available as well as newly constructed data sets. The remainder of this chapter
will give a brief overview of the motivation for the included works based on the above
defined welfare perspective.
1
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Figure 1.1. Global Burden of Armed Violence (2016)1.
One of the most precious assets of every human being is their physical integrity and health.
Being explicitly included in a vast range of national constitutions, the right to physical
integrity is also guaranteed by the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (1948) issued
by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Nevertheless, this elementary human
right is constantly being neglected by private individuals as well as representatives of
state authorities. In many cases this is being done under utilisation of small arms like
handguns or rifles. According to Richmond, Cheney & Schwab (2005), the burden of
global non-conflict related firearm deaths are estimated to range from 196,000 to 229,000,
adjusted to the year 2000. This is about one fifth of the number of annual car accident
fatalities. The number of non-conflict firearm-related injuries and disabilities is suspected
1 The data for the figure was published, among others, in Mc Evoy & Hideg (2017). It has been
obtained from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/Armed_violence/Small-A
rms-Survey-DB-violent-deaths.xlsx on 04.03.2019.
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to be substantially higher. Figure 1.1 depicts per country non-conflict related firearm
casualties for the year 2016 in relation to the respective population and GDP per capita
(PPP in current $) figures2. The larger and darker a bubble is, the higher is the associated
firearm death count. The United States of America, with a death count of 10.147, are
ranking third in the international comparison in 2016. Only Brazil and Mexico show
higher numbers. By relating this number to population size and per capita income, it is
evident that the burden of firearm-related violence is especially problematic in the US.
As the figure further illustrates, countries which exhibit similar casualty rates are usually
also characterised by lower per capita incomes. It appears that in the US case, there
must be some mechanisms at play which are not related to economic development and
the associated higher rates of social conflict. In the first two months of 2019 alone, the
non profit corporation “Gun Violence Archive” recorded 2,342 deaths and 4,019 injuries3.
In monetary terms, Gani, Sakran & Canner (2017) estimate the annual financial burden
of firearm-injury related healthcare expenditure faced by the American citizens to amount
to 2.8 billion US dollars for emergency department visits alone regarding the period from
2004 - 2014. While the estimated monetary costs for urgent care alone already amount
to a sizeable figure, the impact of social well-being by the harm done is far higher. The
purpose of Chapter 2 (joined work with Bohdan Kukharskyy) of this thesis contributes
to a better understanding of the issue at hand and especially the US case in two ways.
First to improve the structure of the analysis and to provide a guiding framework for the
empirical part, a stylised theoretical model of gun-related crime is proposed. The model
relates to the economics of crime literature spearheaded by Becker (1968). Modelling
crime as a function of economic costs and benefits, Becker (1968) has received substantial
criticism. Critics argue in particular that crime can only be understood by accounting for
social factors as well4. This criticism is supported empirically by Glaeser, Sacerdote &
2 The underlying set of countries has been trimmed down for ease of presentability. It contains all
countries with more than 200 non-conflict related firearm deaths in 2016. Further countries with
populations less than 1.2 million and GDP per capita lower than 250 USD have been excluded. All
numbers are in their logarithmic form. Population and GDP per capita data have been obtained
from https://data.worldbank.org on 04.03.2019.
3 These figures have been accessed on 04.03.2019 on https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/.
4 See among others: Hirschi (1969, 1986).
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Scheinkman (1996) and Glaeser & Sacerdote (1999). Among others, those studies stress
that diﬀerences in the levels of criminal behaviour are also rooted in diﬀerences in social
norms and civic interactions. By including social variables into the model, we address
this issue. From our model, we derive the following core hypotheses: Gun-related oﬀenses
are increasing in the number of illegal guns. Firearm oﬀenses are decreasing in the level
of social capital. Thirdly, gun-related oﬀenses are decreasing in police intensity. In the
second part of the chapter, we test our core hypotheses by confronting the model with
the data. This is achieved using recently available county-level data in order to construct
a novel panel data set. This data set contains detailed information on the number of
(gun-related) oﬀenses, police intensity, proxies for the availability of illegal guns, and a
vast array of socioeconomic variables. The underlying data covers about 90% of all US
counties. Accordingly, we are able to draw a representative picture of the US Further, we
introduce a new proxy for the prevalence of illegal guns by exploiting annual information
of guns reported as stolen. Building on the works of Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1994),
Putnam (1995, 2000), we construct a proxy for social capital based on the prevalence
of religious, social and civic organisations in a given county. The empirical analyses of
chapter 2 relate to the contributions of Duggan, Hjalmarsson & Jacob (2011) and Cook
& Ludwig (2006) which both find a positive relationship between gun prevalence and
(gun) homicide rates. Chapter 2 contributes to the empirical literature in three ways: It
introduces a novel proxy for gun prevalence based on gun thefts. The empirical analyses
are extended to an almost nation-wide set of counties. And thirdly, exploiting time
variation in illegal guns we approach a causal inference with respect to the eﬀect of illegal
guns on gun-related violence.
Another key determinant of individual well-being is education. Article 26 of the “Universal
Declaration of Human Rights” (1948) states that “Everyone has the right to education.
Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.” The article
further emphasises that “Education shall be compulsory”. This claim has been solidified
by UN General Assembly (1966). The universal right to education has been reaﬃrmed by
both the UN General Assembly (1981) and the UN General Assembly (1990). While the
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former explicitly calls for the access to universal education for women, the latter does so
for children. The previous examples illustrate the importance of education from a human
rights perspective which has the ultimate goal to ensure well-being. From an economic
viewpoint there exists a multitude of channels via which the eﬀects of education on well-
being are mitigated. For example, education increases productivity and with it individual
as well as aggregate income (Lucas, 1988) and it enhances ingenuity (Romer, 1990; Strulik,
Prettner, & Prskawetz, 2013). Besides that, it further has various positive eﬀects on social
outcomes. Barro (1999) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2004) have
found it to benefit the quality of institutions and democratic processes. Further, higher
educational outcomes help avoiding social conflict5.
Figure 1.2. Human Development Report Education Index, 2013. Source: Human Development Report6.
5 See Ostby & Urdal (2011) for a review of the literature.
6 The data for the underlying figure has been obtained from http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/educat
ion-index.
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Alesina & Perotti (1996) find that higher levels of educational attainment are associated
with significantly higher socio-political stability. This nexus is especially pronounced in
the context of developing countries.
While there is obvious consent on the importance of education from both, the human
rights as well as the economic perspective, the global community - while having made
noticeable progress over the last decades - is still far from guaranteeing adequate access
to it. Figure 1.2 gives an overview on the global situation with respect to educational
attainment. It illustrates the per country score in the UN Education Index7 which is one
of the three components of the Human Development Index. Individual values lie within
the closed unit interval. As we can see, a considerable fraction of nations receive scores
below 0.75. The global mean - being 0.646 - reflects the fact that large parts of the global
population still do not have appropriate access to education.
One of the factors which have been found helpful in explaining diﬀerential educational
outcomes in previous research is a society’s share of middle class households. Chapter 3
(joint work with Klaus Prettner) addresses the question whether a larger share of middle
class households increases educational outcomes in India. In order to give a structured
picture of the argument and to guide the empirical analysis, we propose a stylised model of
the demand for education in a setting where the population is divided into three income
groups. From the model we derive the hypothesis that larger shares of middle class
households contribute to higher levels of average educational attainment. In order to test
our empirically our hypothesis, we utilise household, individual and village level data from
the Indian Household Survey 2005.
The empirical part of the chapter is based on Indian data for various reasons. While
being one of the world’s most populous nations, India is at the same time one of the most
heterogenous nation states in the modern world (Vannemann & Dubey, 2013). The main
reason is that (modern) the social hierarchy of the Indian society is based on a unique
caste system. This caste system has a lasting impact on social life and has persisted
over thousands of years. It gives the Indian society a clear and hierarchical structure
7 The index is computed based on the average adult years of schooling combined with the expected
years of schooling for children. For more detailed information, see .
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and divides society into five main groups8. In order to causally identify the impact of the
middle class share on subsequent educational outcomes, we propose to use the middle three
groups as an instrumental variable for the share of the middle class per administrative
district. With this novel approach, we are able to empirically prove that larger shares
of middle class households causally increase the average educational attainment in said
district.
Another factor often found to be of elementary importance when trying to explain (local)
diﬀerences in economic development, and with it economic well-being, are diﬀerences in
local transport costs. Figure 1.3 represents a global cost-distance model of local travel
times in hours to reach the closest urban area9. While travel times in many densely
populated areas of the world are of neglectable magnitude, considerable parts of the
world are still characterised by extensive degrees of remoteness. This is especially true
for nation states which are large in terms of surface area. As indicated by figure 1.3,
this is also true for the most spacious country, the Russian Federation. As one can easily
observe, vast parts of eastern Russia exhibit travel-times of more than eight hours for
reaching the closest urban area. Focussing on the more southern areas of said region, we
see that travel-times are considerably lower. One the one hand, this is simply due to the
fact that this region is more densely populated. On the other hand, a factor which might
also be important for both, the higher population density, but also lower travel times,
is the fact that this area is traversed by the Transsiberian Railway. Its construction is
held accountable by many for both the existence, as well as the economic viability of
settlements in eastern Russia. This impact can largely be attributed to the reduction in
transport costs stemming from it.
Transport costs are one, if not the most important determinant of access to remote markets
for material goods. Scholars attributable to the theoretical branch of economic analysis
8 The underlying definition is the structure of so-called varnas.
9 Urban area in this context is defined as a contiguously populated area with more than 50,000
inhabitants. Please refer to https://forobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/description.php for more
detailed information about the methodology.
10 The shading indicates the travel time in hours needed to reach the closest urban area. Urban is
defined as a contiguous settlement with more than 50.000 inhabitants. The data for the underlying
figure was published by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre and has been obtained
from https://forobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/ on 04.03.2019.
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appear to agree on the fact that reductions in said costs result in higher incomes and lower
susceptibility with regard to economic shocks (Donaldson, 2018). While there is consensus
in the theoretical literature, the question at hand has received little attention with respect
to empirical analysis. Chapter 4 contributes to this scarce landscape in multiple ways.
First, I construct a novel and highly localised data set of economic activity for eastern
Russia11. This data set is based on satellite pictures of local nightlight emissions. The
presence of which has been established to be a suitable proxy for economic activity by a
number of influential studies (e.g. Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin (2014), Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou (2013) and Storeygard (2016)). Due to the lack of sub-national accounts data
for the region in question, I rely on nocturnal lights emissions in order to approximate
local economic activity and its spatial distribution. This data allows me to build my
analysis on geo-localised observational units with a size of approximately 11x11km. In
doing so, I am able to propose a novel cross-section, mirroring economic activity in a part
of Russia for which - to my knowledge - there has not been any reliable data, nor any
empirical analyses so far. Locations which are characterised by low transport costs often
exhibit favourable natural endowments, as well as are benefitting from the existence of
returns to scale. Therefore it is detrimental for the quantification of the causal eﬀect of
transport cost advantages that one is able to empirically disentangle said eﬀects. The
historical context of the planning and construction of the Transsiberian Railway allows
for the implementation of an instrumental variable strategy. This enablers me to solve the
underlying endogeneity problem and furthermore, demonstrate the causal positive long-
run eﬀect of the railway on economic development in its vicinity. Further, I am able to
show that lower distances to the Railway have a causal and positive eﬀect on the spatial
agglomeration of economic activity.
11 The underlying definition of eastern Russia in this chapter is based on the units of analysis being
situated east of the 60.5 longitude line. This roughly demarcates being east of the Ural mountains.
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Chapter 2
Gun Violence in the US: Correlates and
Causes1
2.1 Introduction
It is diﬃcult to overestimate the severity of gun violence in the United States. In the period
between 2001 to 2014, the Center for Disease and Control Prevention (CDC) recorded
164,089 firearm homicides. Over the same period of time, the number of non-fatal injuries
caused by gunshots is estimated to be more than sixfold – a total of 1,002,647.2 While
these numbers are striking in themselves, the extent of gun violence in the US becomes
even more blatant in international comparisons. According to the United Nations Oﬃce
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the number of gun murders per capita in the US in
2012 was nearly 30 times higher compared to the U.K.3 Not surprisingly, the issue of gun
violence has become one of the most pertinent topics in the political and public discourse
of the United States. Unfortunately, this debate is still seldomly based on scientific
analysis of facts and empirical evidence. The current paper contributes to this discussion
by providing a large-scale investigation of the explanatory factors of gun-related oﬀenses
using novel county-level data. Moreover, our aim is to go beyond conditional correlations
and come closer towards a causal inference of the sources of gun violence in the United
States.
1 Joint work with Bohdan Kukharskyy. Published as Kukharskyy & Seiﬀert (2017).
2 Source: https://1.usa.gov/1plXBux and https://1.usa.gov/1qo12RL.
3 See https://data.unodc.org.
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide a first glance at the distribution of gun violence across US
counties over the period 2000-2010.4 More specifically, Fig. 2.1 depicts the average per
capita number of gun-caused homicides, while Fig. 2.2 displays the average per capita
number of gun-related robberies. Notably, the prevalence of gun violence varies sub-
stantially, even within individual states. The average standard deviation of gun-caused
homicides (sd = 0.020) and gun-related robberies (sd = 0.261) among counties within a
given state are comparable in size to standard deviations of the respective oﬀense type
across all US counties (sd = 0.025 and sd = 0.327, respectively).
What are the factors that can explain this variation? Although the media and press are
ripe with anecdotes on potential explanatory factors, there is no consensus on this topic
in the literature. To lend structure to this complex debate and to guide our empirical
investigation, we develop a novel theoretical model of gun-related crime. In our model, in-
dividuals diﬀer with respect to criminal inclinations, defined as the willingness and ability
to extract a booty from law-abiding citizens through unlawful behavior (e.g., robbery).
Depending on their criminal inclinations, agents decide whether to become law-abiding
Figure 2.1. Per capita number of gun-caused homicides, 2000-2010. Data source: Uniform Crime Re-
porting.
4 These figures are constructed using Uniform Crime Reporting data by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI), drawn from https://icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/57. See section 2.3.1 for
data description.
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Figure 2.2. Per capita number of gun-related robberies, 2000-2010. Data source: Uniform Crime Re-
porting.
citizens employed in the legal sector or, alternatively, become criminals and earn a living
via illegal activities. Individuals who engage in criminal activities choose whether to stay
unarmed or acquire a gun and commit firearm-related felonies. Gun acquisition is costly,
but possession of a gun has a threatening eﬀect on a victim and allows a felon to reap a
higher booty. In equilibrium, only the most criminally inclined individuals commit armed
crimes, whereas agents with low criminal inclinations act unarmed.
This simple framework allows us to analyze the eﬀects of various factors on the (per
capita) number of firearm oﬀenses in a given county. In particular, we derive the following
three key hypotheses: First, gun-related oﬀenses increase with the number of illegal guns.
Intuitively, a larger number of illegal guns in circulation decreases the costs of obtaining
an illegal weapon and, thereby, increases the expected payoﬀ from gun-related oﬀenses.
Second, firearm oﬀenses decrease with the level of social capital, broadly defined as shared
beliefs and values that contribute to a well-functioning society. In our model, social capital
shapes the distribution of criminal inclinations in a given region: Counties with a high
level of social capital have more individuals with low criminal inclinations and fewer
individuals with high criminal inclinations. Given that only the most criminally inclined
individuals commit a firearm-related crime, gun violence decreases with the level of social
capital. Third, gun-related oﬀenses decrease with police intensity. Intuitively, a higher
CHAPTER 2. GUN VIOLENCE IN THE US: CORRELATES AND CAUSES 15
police presence increases the probability of detection and, thereby, decreases the expected
payoﬀ from gun-related oﬀenses.
Although the focus of our analysis lies on explaining the causes of gun-related oﬀenses,
our theoretical framework suggests that the identified key explanatory factors – illegal
guns, social capital, and police intensity – drive the variation in total (i.e., armed and
unarmed) oﬀenses. More specifically, the model predicts that the (per capita) number of
oﬀenses in a given county increases with the number of illegal guns and decreases with
social capital and police intensity. The intuition behind these predictions draws on the
theoretical results that an armed felon commits ceteris paribus more oﬀenses compared
to an unarmed one. Hence, even though a lower number of illegal guns, a higher level
of social capital, and a higher police intensity may induce some criminals to switch from
armed to unarmed oﬀenses, the overall number of oﬀenses in a given region decreases.
To bring our hypotheses to the data, we construct a novel county-level panel dataset which
contains information on the number of (gun-related) oﬀenses, police intensity, proxies for
the availability of illegal guns, and a wide range of socioeconomic factors. Crime-related
information is drawn from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) database for the period
1986-2014. This data is collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from more
than 18,000 local law enforcement agencies and provides detailed county-level information
on the incidence of crime known to the police. With more than 90% of US counties
represented in this dataset, it adequately serves our goal of giving a comprehensive account
of crime in the United States. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only publicly available
source of information on gun violence at such a high level of disaggregation.5 Throughout
the analysis, we consider four alternative outcome variables – gun-related robberies, gun-
caused homicides, total robberies, and total homicides. We further draw from the UCR
annual information on police oﬃcers and police employees to measure police intensity in
5 Apart from a few county-level studies discussed below, the vast majority of research on this topic
has been conducted using state-level data, see, e.g., Azrael, Cook & Miller (2004), Fleegler, Lee,
Monuteaux, Hemenway & Mannix (2013), Gius (2013), Kalesan, Mobily, Keiser, Fagan & Galea
(2016), Lanza (2014) and Siegel, Ross & King (2013, 2014b, 2014a). Clearly, such an approach
cannot account for substantial within-state variation in gun violence documented in Fig. 2.1 and
2.2. Our county-level analysis allows us to explore this variation, while eﬀectively controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity across states using state fixed eﬀects.
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a given county.
This paper suggests a novel proxy for the prevalence of illegal guns.6 More specifically, we
exploit annual UCR information on gun thefts reported to police departments. Given that
stolen guns are by definition available to criminals, our proxy provides a direct measure
for the variation in the number of illegal guns in a given region. A further advantage of
our measure lies in its availability for the vast majority of counties over the entire period
of 1986-2014.
Following the seminal work by Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1994) and Putnam (1995,
2000), we approximate the level of social capital with the associational density in a given
county. To obtain a time-varying measure of associational activism, we exploit annual
data on the prevalence of religious, social and civic organizations (such as community,
parent-teacher, students’, scouting, retirement, or ethnic associations), reported by the
US Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) for the period 1986-2014. The idea
behind this proxy is that voluntary participation in (non-profit) associational activities
boosts social interaction and cooperation and, thereby, promotes the norms of reciprocity
and trust.
We start our empirical analysis by exploring conditional correlations in a cross-section
of counties. Controlling for more than a dozen alternative explanations of gun violence
(such as organized crime, criminal networks, urbanization, education, fractionalization,
poverty), as well as state fixed eﬀects, we find the per capita number of gun-related oﬀenses
to be positively correlated with the number of illegal guns and negatively correlated
with social capital and police intensity. Although these correlations are in line with our
theoretical predictions, they do not allow causal interpretation for at least two reasons:
First, the relationships may be confounded by omitted variables (such as history, political
preferences, etc.). Second, the results obtained from cross-sectional regressions are prone
to the issue of reverse causality: A large number of illegal guns may be the outcome (rather
than the source) of a higher prevalence of firearm oﬀenses. Similarly, social capital may
6 Previous studies used subscriptions to the Guns & Ammo magazine (Duggan, Hjalmarsson & Jacob
(2011)) or the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm (Cook & Ludwig (2006)) as indirect
proxies for the gun prevalence in a given county.
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‘deteriorate’ whereas police presence may increase in regions where gun-related oﬀenses
are frequent. To address both issues, we then turn to panel data analysis. This approach
allows us to account for unobservable county-specific factors using county fixed eﬀects.
Moreover, by exploiting time-lagged variation in illegal guns, social capital, and police
intensity, we move closer towards a causal inference.
Using UCR panel data for the period 1986-2014, we find a positive eﬀect of lagged gun
thefts in a given county, and negative eﬀects of lagged associational density and lagged
police intensity on the per capita number of gun-related and total oﬀenses, controlling for
state-year and county fixed eﬀects. We further document that gun thefts, associational
activism, and police intensity from any of the previous three years have a significant impact
on the contemporaneous extent of gun violence in a given county. Although this evidence
suggests that a high number of illegal guns is not merely a ‘byproduct’ of firearm oﬀenses,
it does not preclude the possibility that criminals steal a weapon in a given year to use
it in a future period. In other words, past gun thefts may still be endogenous to current
gun violence. We account for this endogeneity problem by constructing an alternative
measure of illegal guns based on gun thefts in the neighboring states. More specifically,
we calculate for each county the total value of guns stolen in all states adjacent to the
one in which a given county is located, weighted by bilateral distances and other relevant
factors. The idea behind this proxy builds on the fact that illegal guns are frequently
transported across state borders, and a higher number of gun thefts in the neighboring
states is likely to increase the number of illegal guns in a given county.7 The identifying
assumption behind this approach is that an individual county is too small to drive the
variation in gun thefts across all neighboring states over time. In other words, the total
incidence of past gun thefts across all adjacent states is plausibly exogenous to firearm
oﬀenses in a single county of the neighboring state.8 Using this alternative measure, we
provide robust evidence for the positive causal eﬀect of illegal guns on the number of gun
7 According to Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010), 30% of guns recovered in 2009 from a crime scene
in a given state were originally purchased in a diﬀerent state. Adjacent states constitute the major
source of illegal guns, see https://www.atf.gov/about/firearms-trace-data-2015.
8 We conduct a wide range of robustness checks to preclude possible violations of this identifying
assumption.
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oﬀenses.
Our theoretical model relates to the economics of crime literature, originating with the
seminal contribution by Becker (1968).9 At the heart of this literature lies the so-called
‘deterrence hypothesis’, which states that the expected utility of crime ceteris paribus
decreases in the probability of detection and in the associated penalty. Our theoretical
framework corroborates this hypothesis and contributes to the literature in three major
ways. First, it explicitly introduces gun-related illegal activities – alongside unarmed
felony – into the model. Second, assuming heterogeneity across individuals with respect
to their criminal inclinations, our framework provides for the coexistence of unarmed and
armed crime in equilibrium. Third, by linking the distribution of criminal inclinations to
the level of social capital in a given region, we derive a testable prediction regarding the
eﬀect of social norms and values on gun violence.
The latter contribution deserves further attention in light of the literature debate. The
Becker (1968) approach of modelling crime solely in terms of economic costs and benefits
has invoked some criticism from sociologists and criminologists, who argue that illegal
behavior is generally socialized and that crime cannot be fully understood without knowl-
edge of the social background from which it originates, see, e.g., Hirschi (1969, 1986).
The latter view is reinforced by the empirical evidence provided by Glaeser, Sacerdote
& Scheinkman (1996), who find that no more than 30% of the variation in crime rates
within New York City can be explained by pecuniary factors and observable local area
characteristics and assert that a major share of diﬀerences in crime rates must arise from
social norms and civic interactions, cf. also Glaeser & Sacerdote (1999).10 Our theoretical
framework aims to build a bridge between the economic view of crime along the lines of
Becker (1968) and alternative conceptions of criminal behavior suggested by sociologists.
From the empirical perspective, our paper relates to two seminal studies that use UCR
9 See Freeman (1999) and Draca & Machin (2015) for reviews of this literature.
10 Several studies establish a negative correlation between social capital (as measured by voter turnouts
or membership in civic organizations) and crime at the US state level, see Galea, Karpati & Kennedy
(2002), Kennedy, Kawachi, Prothrow-Stith, Lochner & Gupta (1998), Messner, Baumer & Rosenfeld
(2004), Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer (2001), Saegert &Winkel (2004). Using instrumental variables
approach, recent empirical contributions report a negative causal impact of social capital on crime
in Italy (Buonanno, Montolio & Vanin (2009)), Netherlands (Akçomak & ter Weel (2012)), and a
cross-section of countries (Lederman, Loayza & Menendez (2002)).
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county-level data to investigate the eﬀect of guns on (gun-related) crime. In a panel of
the 444 largest counties over the period 1980-1998, Duggan et al. (2011) find a positive
relationship between subscriptions to Guns & Ammo – one of the nation’s largest gun
magazines – and homicide rates. Using panel data for the 200 largest counties in the period
1980-1999, Cook & Ludwig (2006) find a positive correlation between the percentage
of suicides committed with a firearm – their proxy for the prevalence of guns in the
population – and a county’s homicide rate. Our contribution to this literature is threefold.
First, we suggest a novel, more direct proxy for gun prevalence based on gun thefts.
Second, we implement our analysis in a larger sample of (more than 2,500) US counties
over a longer period of time. Third, and most importantly, by exploring time variation
in illegal guns due to gun thefts in neighboring states, we move closer towards a causal
inference regarding the eﬀect of guns on gun violence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we develop a sim-
ple theoretical model of crime and derive our testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes
our dataset and presents the empirical results from the cross-section of counties (section
2.3.1) and the panel data analysis (section 2.3.2). In section 2.4, we discuss the policy
implications of our work. Section 4.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a region (county) populated by a unit measure of individuals who diﬀer with re-
spect to their criminal abilities c 2 (0, 1].11 Individuals with a higher c can ceteris paribus
extract a larger booty from law-abiding citizens. Criminal inclinations are distributed ac-
cording to the cumulative distribution function F (c), with a continuous density function
f(c).
Each individual decides whether to become a law-abiding citizen and earn his or her
living by legal employment or become a criminal and engage in illegal activities. The
compensation of law-abiding citizens is given by a constant wage rate, w > 0. Criminals
can expropriate wages from law-abiding citizens (for instance, via a robbery). Each felon
11 Throughout the paper, we use the terms ‘criminal ability’ and ‘criminal inclination’ interchangeably.
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decides upon the number of oﬀenses (robberies) x, and chooses whether to act unarmed
or to buy a gun in order to increase his booty.
Consider first the maximization problem of an unarmed criminal. The booty (b) of an
unarmed (u) felon is proportional to the number of committed oﬀenses, his criminal
ability, and the victim’s wage (income) level, i.e., bu = xcw. This booty can only be
reaped with probability (1   ), since with the inverse probability   2 (0, 1) a criminal is
detected and caught. In the latter case, a felon is charged with a monetary penalty px,
which is proportional to the number of committed oﬀenses (robbed individuals).12 For
simplicity, we assume a constant penalty rate p > 0, which can be thought of as a fine
or an imprisonment sentence imposed for a given oﬀense.13 The expected payoﬀ of an
unarmed felon can thus be expressed as:
max
x
E(⇡u) = (1   )(xcw)↵    px, (2.1)
whereby ↵ 2 (0, 1) is a constant that governs diminishing marginal utility from a monetary
booty. This optimization problem yields the maximum number of oﬀenses committed by
an unarmed felon with a criminal ability c:
xu = (cw)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
. (2.2)
Substituting for x in equation (2.1), we obtain the expected payoﬀ of an unarmed felon:
E(⇡u) =
✓
cw
p
◆ ↵
1 ↵
B( ), (2.3)
whereby
B( ) ⌘
✓
1   
 ↵
◆ 1
1 ↵
(1  ↵)↵ ↵1 ↵ (2.4)
is defined for notational simplicity. Note that B0( ) < 0 for all  ,↵ 2 (0, 1). A simple
12 Our definition of a penalty includes, but is not limited to, imprisonment or unpaid community
service, since both punishments deprive an individual of monetary earnings.
13 Assuming non-linear penalties significantly overcomplicates our analysis without changing the main
predictions.
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inspection of equations (2.2) and (2.3) reveals that both the number of unarmed oﬀenses
and the associated expected payoﬀ increase in the felon’s criminal ability (c) and in the
wage rate of law-abiding citizens (w), and decrease in the probability of detection ( ) and
in the associated penalty (p).
Consider now the maximization problem of an armed (a) criminal. Let g > 0 denote the
costs of obtaining a gun and assume that these costs are the same across all felons in a
given region. For any given number of oﬀenses, x, the booty of an armed felon with a
criminal ability c is given by ba =  xcw, whereby a constant   > 1 reflects an increase
in the payoﬀ due to the fact that victims are threatened with a gun. The maximization
problem of an armed felon can thus be expressed as
max
x
E(⇡a) = (1   )( xcw)↵    px  g. (2.5)
This optimization problem yields the maximum number of oﬀenses committed by an
armed felon:
xa = ( cw)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
, (2.6)
and the associated expected payoﬀ:
E(⇡a) =
✓
 cw
p
◆ ↵
1 ↵
B( )  g, (2.7)
whereby B( ) is given by equation (2.4). As before, the number of oﬀenses and the
expected payoﬀ increase in a felon’s criminal ability and in the wage rate of law-abiding
citizens, and decrease in the probability of detection and the associated penalty. It is also
evident from the comparison of equations (2.2) and (2.6) that xa > xu, i.e., an armed felon
commits ceteris paribus a larger number of oﬀenses. Yet, the expected payoﬀ of an armed
criminal is not necessarily higher than the expected payoﬀ of an unarmed felon because the
gain in the booty due to the gun-threatening eﬀect has to be weighted against the costs of
obtaining a gun. This tradeoﬀ can be illustrated in a diagram with c
↵
1 ↵ – a monotonically
transformed measure of an individual’s criminal inclination – on the horizontal axis, see
Figure 2.3. Both E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) linearly increase in c
↵
1 ↵ , cf. equations (2.3) and (2.7).
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Yet, E(⇡a) has a negative vertical intercept (due to g > 0) and is steeper than E(⇡u) due to
the gun-threatening eﬀect (  > 1). Figure 2.3 thus suggests the following sorting pattern:
Most criminally inclined individuals engage in armed oﬀenses, since their expect payoﬀ
is high enough to compensate the costs of acquiring a gun; individuals with intermediate
criminal abilities commit unarmed felonies; the least criminally inclined individuals –
whose expected payoﬀ from an unarmed felony E(⇡u) is smaller than the wage rate w –
become law-abiding citizens.
Figure 2.3. Sorting into legal and illegal activities.
Using equations (2.3) and (2.7), one can easily derive cutoﬀ criminal inclinations for engag-
ing in unarmed and armed oﬀenses. More specifically, equating the expected payoﬀ from
an unarmed felony with the wage rate, E(⇡u(cu)) = w, one obtains a cutoﬀ criminal incli-
nation, cu, for which an individual is indiﬀerent between becoming a law-abiding citizen
or committing an unarmed oﬀense. All individuals with c  cu are employed in the legal
sector while those with c > cu engage in illegal behavior. From E(⇡a(ca)) = E(⇡u(ca)),
we obtain the second threshold, ca, such that a felon with this criminal inclination is just
indiﬀerent between being armed or not, and all individuals with c > ca commit an armed
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(rather than unarmed) crime. Using equations (2.3) and (2.7), we obtain:
cu = w
1 2↵
↵ pB( ) 
1 ↵
↵ , ca =
✓
g
B( )( 
↵
1 ↵   1)
◆ 1
1 ↵ p
w
. (2.8)
Before we discuss the determinants of (armed) oﬀenses, a few remarks are in order. If the
E(⇡a)-line is suﬃciently flat, the equilibrium cutoﬀ ca may lie outside of the unit interval,
in which case no individual has an incentive to commit an armed oﬀense. Conversely, a
suﬃciently steep E(⇡a)-line may lead to ca < cu, in which case all oﬀenses are firearm-
related. In order to ensure that a firearm-related felony is neither a strictly dominated
nor a strictly dominant strategy of all criminals, we impose parameter restrictions on
exogenous parameters ↵,  , p, and w that fulfill
Assumption 1. 0  cu  ca  1.
Bearing in mind that the measure of individuals has been normalized to unity, the per
capita number of armed oﬀenses in a given region can be expressed as:
Na =
Z 1
ca
xaf(c)dc, (2.9)
whereby xa and ca are given by equations (2.6) and (2.8), respectively. Notice that, for
any combination of xa and ca, the per capita number of firearm oﬀenses depends on the
distribution of criminal capabilities in a given region, f(c). To investigate the eﬀect of a
society’s criminal inclination on the prevalence of firearm oﬀenses, we impose a functional
form for F (c). In what follows, we assume that criminal inclinations are distributed
according to the bounded (upper-truncated) Pareto function:
F (c) =
1    cminc  
1  cmin
, (2.10)
whereby  > 0 is the shape parameter of this distribution function, cmin > 0 represents
the lower bound of the support, and the upper bound of c has been set equal to one.
Figure 2.4 depicts the Pareto density function f(c) associated with the cumulative distri-
bution function from equation (2.10) for two values of  – a high and a low one. Lower
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values of  reflect a more criminally inclined society and vice versa. The reason for as-
suming that criminal inclinations are distributed Pareto is twofold. First, as shown in the
Online Appendix 2.5, this functional form provides a good fit to the actual distribution
of criminal activities within US states and counties. Second, given that the behavior of
this distribution function is fully characterized by a single parameter (), it allows us to
derive our testable predictions in the simplest possible manner.
Figure 2.4. Distribution of criminal inclinations.
Using equations (2.6), (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10), we establish
Proposition 1. The per capita number of armed oﬀenses, Na
(i) decreases in the costs of obtaining a gun, g
(ii) decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined, i.e., as  increases
(iii) decreases in the probability of detection,  .
Proof. See Online Appendix 2.5.
The intuition behind Proposition 1(i) can be easily inferred from Fig. 2.5. An increase in
the costs of obtaining a gun, g decreases the expected payoﬀ from an armed felony and the
E(⇡a)-line shifts downwards. As a result, the cutoﬀ ca – above which criminals are willing
to engage in a firearm-related crime – rises and the per capita number of gun-related crimes
ceteris paribus decreases. The logic behind Proposition 1(ii) is illustrated in Fig. 2.4. An
CHAPTER 2. GUN VIOLENCE IN THE US: CORRELATES AND CAUSES 25
increase in  decreases the density of the distribution function for any c   ca – where
criminals commit firearm oﬀenses. Hence, the per capita number of gun-related oﬀenses
decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined. Part (iii) of Proposition 1 results
from the interplay of two eﬀects. First, an increase in the probability of detection   reduces
the expected benefits from criminal activities for any given c, which can be illustrated as
a clockwise pivoting of E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) in Fig. 2.6. Yet, given that   > 1, the E(⇡a)-line
decreases at a higher rate (cf. equations (2.3) and (2.7)). As a result, the equilibrium cutoﬀ
ca increases (cf. equation (2.8)) and the number of individuals engaged in armed felonies
decreases. Second, a higher probability of detection implies a lower number of oﬀenses
xa per armed individual (cf. equation (2.6)). The latter eﬀect reinforces the former and
implies a lower per capita number of firearm-related oﬀenses due to an increase in the
probability of detection  .
Figure 2.5. The eﬀect of an increase in gun costs, g0 > g.Figure 2.6. The eﬀect of the probability of detection,  
0 >
 .
Before turning to the derivation of further results, it is worth pausing to briefly discuss
the generality of Proposition 1. First, it should be noted that parts (i) and (iii) hold for
any distribution of criminal inclinations and do not hinge on the specific distributional
assumption from equation (2.10). Second, assuming that F (c) is distributed Pareto, the
criminal inclination of the society can be alternatively captured as an increase in cmin
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(rather than a decrease in ). We verify in the Online Appendix 2.5 that Na rises in cmin.
This result reinforces Proposition 1(ii) and suggess that the per capita number of armed
oﬀenses decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined.
Our model can be further used to study the eﬀect of crime-related penalties p and the
wage rate w on Na. As shown in the Online Appendix 2.5, the per capita number of
armed oﬀenses decreases in p. The logic behind this result can be easily inferred from
Fig. 2.3. Due to an increase in p, both E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) pivot clockwise, yet the E(⇡a)-
line does so at a higher rate (since   > 1, cf. equations (2.3) and (2.7)). As a result,
the cutoﬀ ca shifts to the right and fewer criminals commit armed oﬀenses. Moreover,
given that xa decreases in p (see equation (2.6)), the number of oﬀenses committed by an
armed criminal ceteris paribus decreases. Both eﬀects imply a lower per capita number
of armed oﬀenses due to an increase in p. We further show in the Online Appendix 2.5
that Na increases in w. The mechanism behind this result can once again be illustrated
using Fig. 2.3. Due to an increase in w, both E(⇡u) and E(⇡a) pivot counter-clockwise,
yet the E(⇡a)-line does so at a higher rate (since   > 1, cf. equations (2.3) and (2.7)).
Hence, the equilibrium cutoﬀ ca decreases and more individuals commit armed oﬀenses.
Moreover, a higher wage rate of law-abiding citizens induces armed felons to commit a
larger number of oﬀenses xa (cf. equation (2.6)).14 Hence, the per capita number of armed
oﬀenses increases in w. Since we do not explicitly model the legal sector of the economy
and follow a very reductionist approach in modeling the penalties, we do not formulate
propositions regarding the eﬀects of w and p on Na. Nevertheless, we account for these
factors in our empirical analysis.
Thus far, we have focused on studying the determinants of armed oﬀenses. Yet, our
model can also be used to derive predictions regarding the number of total (i.e., armed
and unarmed) oﬀenses. Bearing in mind that that the measure of individuals has been
14 Note that an increase in the wage rate also raises the opportunity costs of illegal behavior, which can
be illustrated as an upward shift of the w-line. Yet, in our simple model, the decision of a criminal
whether to commit an armed vs. unarmed oﬀense is unaﬀected by the criminalâTMs opportunity
costs but rather depends on the value of the booty, the probability of detection, and the associated
punishment.
CHAPTER 2. GUN VIOLENCE IN THE US: CORRELATES AND CAUSES 27
normalized to unity, the per capita number of oﬀenses in a given region reads:
N =
Z ca
cu
xuf(c)dc+
Z 1
ca
xaf(c)dc, (2.11)
whereby xu and xa are given by equations (2.2) and (2.6), respectively, while cu and ca
are given by equation (2.8). Analyzing this expression, we establish
Proposition 2. The per capita number of oﬀenses, N
(i) decreases in the costs of obtaining a gun, g
(ii) decreases as the society becomes less criminally inclined, i.e. as  increases
(iii) decreases in the probability of detection,  .
Proof. See Online Appendix 2.5.
Note that g, , and   aﬀect N in the same direction as they impact Na in Proposition
1. The intuition behind Proposition 2(i) can be inferred from Fig. 2.5. Individuals with
criminal inclinations c 2 (ca, c0a) – who would have committed armed oﬀenses before an
increase in g – decide to engage in unarmed crime instead. Given that armed felons commit
ceteris paribus a higher number of oﬀenses compared to unarmed ones (cf. equations (2.2)
and (2.6)), the per capita number of oﬀenses decreases in the costs of obtaining a gun, g.
The logic behind Proposition 2(ii) is illustrated in Fig. 2.4. An increase in  decreases
the density of the distribution function for any c   cu – where criminals engage in crime –
and the per capita number of oﬀenses decreases.15 Lastly, one can use Fig. 2.6 to infer the
intuition behind Proposition 2(iii). Since both cu and ca increase in   (see equation (2.8)),
fewer individuals engage in criminal activities. Moreover, individuals with c 2 (ca, c0a) –
who would have previously engaged in armed felonies – switch to unarmed crime, which
further reduces the per capita number of oﬀenses due to the fact that xa > xu (cf. equations
(2.2) and (2.6)).
15 As before, this result is qualitatively unchanged if we capture an increase in the criminal inclination
of a society via an increase in cmin (rather than a decrease in ).
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As in the case of Proposition 1, it should be noted that parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition
2 do not hinge on the assumption of Pareto-distributed criminal inclinations and are
established for a general distribution function F (c). One can further show that the per
capita number of total oﬀenses N decreases in the penalty rate p. Yet, the eﬀect of the
wage rate w on N is no longer unambiguously positive. The reason behind this ambiguity
depends on the interplay of two eﬀects. On one hand, a higher income of law-abiding
citizens ceteris paribus raises the monetary booty and increases the number of oﬀenses.
On the other hand, an increase in w raises the opportunity costs of unarmed crime and
induces some unarmed felons to become law-abiding citizens. Without imposing further
restriction on model parameters, the overall eﬀect of w on N is ambiguous.
2.2.1 Hypotheses
In this section, we draw insights from the economics, sociology, and criminology literature
to map key model parameters to observable factors and, thereby, formulate our testable
hypotheses.
What determines the costs of obtaining a gun, g? According to the recent report by the
US Department of Justice (Planty & Truman (2013)), the primary source of firearms for
criminals is an illegal market (see also Cook, Parker & Pollack (2015)). Cook, Ludwig,
Venkatesh & Braga (2007) provide some insight into the underground gun market by
conducting interviews with gang members and gun dealers in the city of Chicago. One of
the key insights of this study is that the underground gun market is ‘thin’, and that the
acquisition of an illegal firearm is associated with substantial transaction (search) costs
and large mark-ups over legal prices. A standard economic analysis of such a market
would imply that the costs of obtaining an illegal gun are decreasing in the supply of
illegal guns. We thus maintain the following functional relationship:
g = f(illegal guns
 
).
How do we map the criminal inclination of a given county (1/) to the data? Philoso-
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phers such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill have long emphasized
the role of moral sentiments such as guilt, shame, and remorse in shaping moral behavior
and, in particular, an individual’s willingness to commit a crime.16 Recent theoretical
contributions by Bénabou & Tirole (2006, 2011), Funk (2006) and Weibull & Villa (2006)
study these aspects by explicitly introducing social norms into the models of crime, see
McAdams & Rasmusen (2007) and van der Weele (2012) for reviews of this literature.
Since the seminal contributions by Coleman (1988), Coleman & Coleman (1994) and Put-
nam et al. (1994), Putnam (1995, 2000), sociologists and political scientists generally refer
to the shared values and eﬀective norms that evoke those sentiments and, thereby, prevent
a person from committing a crime as ‘social capital’.17 As discussed in the introduction,
ample empirical evidence suggests that social capital has a crime-deterring eﬀect. Based
on this evidence, we assert that  – an inverse measure of a society’s criminal inclination
– is a positive function of social capital:
 = f(social capital
+
).
Next, consider the probability of detection,  . Arguably, this probability is primarily a
function of police intensity. Since the seminal contribution by Levitt (1997), economists
have suggested several strategies to identify the causal eﬀect of policing on crime deter-
rence, see Nagin (2013) and Draca & Machin (2015) for reviews of this literature. Among
the most convincing approaches, is the usage of terrorist attacks or alerts as an instrument
for exogenous (re-)allocations of police resources. In such a quasi-experimental setting,
several contributions find a robust positive eﬀect of police intensity on crime deterrence
in many cities, including Buenos Aires (Di Tella & Schargrodsky (2004)), the District
of Columbia (Klick & Tabarrok (2005)), London (Draca, Machin & Witt (2011)), and
Stockholm (Poutvaara & Priks (2006)). In view of this evidence, we treat   as a positive
16 The role of remorse and mental anguish in a criminal’s moral dilemma is succinctly summarized
in Dostoevsky’s “Crime and Punishment”: “If [a thief] has a conscience, he will suﬀer for his delin-
quency. That will be his punishment – as well as the prison.”
17 According to Coleman & Coleman (1994), social capital is the set of relationships that support
eﬀective norms “[...] that inhibit crimes in a city, make it possible for women to walk freely outside
at night and for old people to leave their homes without fear.”
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function of police intensity:
  = f(police intensity
+
).
Above-mentioned inquiries merely suggest functional dependencies of the model parame-
ters, g, , and  . Combining these relationships with our results derived in Propositions
1 and 2, we expect a positive eﬀect of illegal guns and a negative eﬀect of social capi-
tal and police intensity on the per capita number of armed (Na) and total (N) oﬀenses
(henceforth, summarized as N(a)):
N(a) = f(illegal guns
+
, social capital
 
, police intensity
 
). (2.12)
Before turning to the empirical implementation of our hypotheses, it is worth pausing to
discuss some potential concerns with our analysis. First, our model is admittedly very
simple. In particular, it does not allow law-abiding citizens to (legally) acquire firearms
in order to protect themselves from oﬀenders.18 Given that oﬃcial county-level data on
legal gun ownership are, to the best of our knowledge, not available, we do not formulate a
hypothesis regarding the impact of legal guns on the relative prevalence of firearm oﬀenses
in the first place.19 Nevertheless, our empirical analysis considers indirect proxies for legal
gun ownership suggested in the literature (see footnote 6). Moreover, to the extent that
the stock of legal guns in a given county is determined by state-specific gun control laws,
we account for this potential confounding factor using state fixed eﬀects.
Second, one can rightly argue that illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity aﬀect
N(a) via more than one model parameter. What are the potential alternative channels?
For instance, one might assert that social capital has a positive eﬀect on the probability
of detection,  . Intuitively, members of communities with pronounced civic participation
are more likely to report crimes to the police, bring disputes to the attention of courts
18 The eﬀect of legal gun ownership on crime is highly debated in the literature. Lott & Mustard (1997)
and Bronars & Lott (1998) argue that a higher prevalence of firearms among law-abiding citizens
might reduce crime. Yet, several more recent empirical studies have shown that the “more guns, less
crime” hypothesis does not hold empirically, see, e.g., Duggan et al. (2011) and Ayres & Donohue
(2003).
19 In Kukharskyy & Seiﬀert (2016), we study the eﬀect of legal gun ownership on crime using novel
state-level data.
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and law enforcement agencies, and engage in public surveillance. Yet, given that the
prevalence of firearm oﬀenses, is decreasing both in  and   (see Propositions 1 and
2), this alternative channel reinforces the predicted negative eﬀect of social capital on
N(a). Furthermore, one can argue that police intensity is associated with a higher cost
of obtaining a gun, g.20 Given that the relationship between g and N(a) is inversely
proportional, the predicted eﬀect of police intensity on the per capita number of (gun-
related) oﬀenses remains negative. One might also hypothesize a negative relationship
between the prevalence of illegal guns and the probability of detection and/or deterrence,
 . Intuitively, if a civilian observes a suspicious activity or an act of violence, he or she is
generally less likely to intervene the higher the chances of encountering an armed felon.
Yet, once again, given that   negatively eﬀects N(a), this alternative channel would only
reinforce our predictions.
Third, one can certainly envision arguments for why the above-mentioned explanatory
factors may aﬀect N(a) in the opposite direction to the one predicted by equation (2.12).
For instance, one can argue that a higher level of social capital increases trust among
felons, advances the emergence of criminal networks, and, therefore, increases gun violence
in a given region. We take these (and other) objections seriously and include proxies for
criminal networks, organized crime, as well as a wide range of alternative explanatory
factors into our regressions. On balance, we believe that our theoretical model provides
a helpful roadmap for the directionality of the eﬀects and proceed with the empirical
analysis.
2.3 Empirical Implementation
The structure of our empirical investigation is as follows. In section 2.3.1, we study in a
cross-section of counties conditional correlations between the per capita number of oﬀenses
and the key explanatory variables – illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity. To
come closer towards a causal inference of these eﬀects, we turn to panel data analysis in
section 2.3.2. In each section, the main focus lies on studying the determinants of gun-
20 Cook et al. (2015) provide some anecdotal evidence for this claim.
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related oﬀenses, i.e., testing Proposition 1. However, we also consider the eﬀects of illegal
guns, social capital, and police intensity on total (i.e., armed and unarmed) oﬀenses, as
suggested by our Proposition 2.
2.3.1 Cross-Section Analysis
Data and Econometric Specification
Our primary source of information on (gun-related) crime in the US is the Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) data by the United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (n.d.) (FBI). This database provides detailed information on crime known
to the police, collected from more than 18,000 local law enforcement agencies (LEAs).
With more than 90% of counties represented in the database, UCR meets fairly well its
goal of providing an overall view of criminal activities in the US21 Due to the fact that
this database is publicly available, it has become the workhorse tool in empirical studies
of crime, see, e.g., Glaeser & Sacerdote (1999), Duggan et al. (2011), Cook & Ludwig
(2006), Cook et al. (2007).22 In the following, we provide a brief description of the key
variables of interest and relegate the detailed discussion of the (step-by-step) construction
of these variables to the Online Appendix 2.5. Summary statistics for the main estimation
samples are provided in Table 2.A.1.
The UCR database is structured under the following four key categories: (a) Oﬀenses
Known and Clearances by Arrest (OKCA), (b) Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR),
(c) Law Enforcement Oﬃcers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA), and (d) Property Stolen
and Recovered (PSR). We use the first two datasets to construct our dependent variables
and draw a range of right-hand side variables from the latter ones. All four datasets are
available on an annual basis for the period 1986-2014. We exploit the entire timespan in
the panel analysis and consider annual averages over the period 2000-2010 in the cross-
21 Due to diverging data collection methodologies, information for Florida, Illinois (except for Cook
county, Chicago), and a few individual counties from other US states is oftentimes missing, see
Fig. 2.1 and 2.2.
22 See, however, Maltz (1999) for a detailed discussion of the limitations of this data. We summarize
the main caveats of the UCR data further below and suggest adequate empirical strategies to account
for these limitations.
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section. Using the correspondence provided by the US Department of Justice, we map
the LEA-level data to individual counties – the unit of observation in our analysis.23
At the highest level of abstraction, the issue of gun violence has two dimensions – non-
lethal and lethal. We approximate the former aspect using information on gun-related
robberies from the UCR’s OKCA database. More specifically, we take (the log of) the
per capita number of gun-related robberies in a given county as our first key dependent
variable (henceforth, GunRobberies). This outcome variable is well-suited for the analysis
of the predictions of our economic model of crime.24 Using OKCA, we further construct
a measure of TotalRobberies, defined as the per capita number of total (i.e., armed and
unarmed) robberies in a given county.
To capture the second, lethal dimension of gun violence, we use UCR’s SHR data. This
database reports, among other things, the type of weapon and the circumstance under
which a homicide was committed. During the construction of our baseline measure of
homicides, we exclude all circumstances indicating an accident (such as ‘gun cleaning’,
‘child playing with gun’, etc.), negligence (e.g., ‘child killed by babysitter’), or law en-
forcement killings (‘felon killed by police’, ‘suspected felony’, etc.).25 We then calculate
the (log of the) per capita number of firearm-caused homicide incidents in a given county
(henceforth, GunHomicides) and the (log of the) per capita number of total homicide in-
cidents (henceforth, TotalHomicides).26 To be clear, our theoretical framework does not
explicitly encompass (gun-caused) homicides. Yet, one can envision a simple extension
of the model in which a gun-related robbery results in the (probabilistic) discharge of
the firearm. In such a model, the number of (gun-caused) homicides in a given county
would be a positive function of illegal guns and a negative function of social capital and
police intensity. However, due to the fact that, in reality, some murders are committed
by ordinary citizens for non-economic reasons (such as hatred and animosity), we expect
23 We choose a slightly higher level of aggregation due to unavailability of control variables at the
LEA-level.
24 Information on usage of guns in other ‘economic’ oﬀenses (such as burglary or larceny) is unavailable.
25 See Online Data Appendix 2.5 for the full list of excluded categories.
26 A homicide incident is an event in which one or more persons are killed at the same place and time.
Measures of GunHomicides and TotalHomicides based on the victim count yield similar results,
available upon request.
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a weaker eﬀect of factors such as probability of detection or the prevalence of illegal guns
on (gun-caused) homicides compared to (gun-related) robberies.
Our baseline econometric specification for the cross-section of counties (c) reads:
N(a)c =  1IllegalGunsc+ 2SocialCapitalc+ 3PoliceIntensityc+ Xc+⇢s+"c, (2.13)
whereby N(a)c 2 {GunRobberiesc,GunHomicidesc,TotalRobberiesc,TotalHomicidesc} is
the (log of the) average per capita number of a given oﬀense type in 2000-2010, Xc is a
vector of county-level controls, ⇢s denotes state fixed eﬀects, and "c is the error term.27
Our theoretical model predicts a positive estimate  ˆ1 > 0, and negative estimates  ˆ2 < 0
and  ˆ3 < 0, see equation (2.12).
We suggest a novel measure for the number of illegal guns based on gun thefts reported
in the UCR’s PSR database. More specifically, we utilize the annual information on the
value of firearms stolen in a given county and take (the log of) the average value in 2000-
2010 as our cross-sectional proxy for the prevalence of IllegalGuns. Unfortunately, this
database does not provide information on the quantity or type of stolen guns. However, it
is known from the National Crime Victimization Survey that the vast majority of stolen
guns are handguns, see Langton (2012) and Zawitz (1995). Given that the price range for
revolvers and pistols is fairly narrow, we believe that our value-based measure provides a
good approximation for the number of illegal guns.
We approximate the level of social capital with the associational density, calculated us-
ing annual data from the US Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) for the
period 1986-2014. More specifically, we draw from the CBP information on the number
of and employment by “religious, grantmaking, civic, professional, and similar organiza-
tions”, classified according to the 813 code of the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS).28 Examples of establishments falling into this category are community
and ethnic organizations, parent-teacher associations, human rights organizations, and
27 To simplify the notation, we drop the county-subscript c henceforth.
28 In 1998, the CBP changed the industry classification from the Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), whereby religious, social, and
civic organizations were classified under the SIC code “86” in the period 1986-1997.
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religious and charitable organizations. More than 80% of employment associated with the
NAICS code 813 is accounted for by the two more narrowly defined NAICS codes: 8131
(“religious organizations”) and 8134 (“social and civic organizations”). Since information
on the NAICS code 813 is available for a larger number of counties, we use it for the
construction of our baseline proxy, but consider the two more disaggregated codes in the
robustness checks. We construct four alternative measures of SocialCapital (all expressed
in terms of natural logarithms): (i) employment by the organizations classified under
the NAICS code 813 over the total employment in a given a county, (ii) employment
by the organizations classified under the NAICS code 813 per capita, (iii) the number
of establishments classified under the NAICS code 813 over the total number of estab-
lishments in a given county, (iv) the number establishments classified under the NAICS
code 813 per capita. We use the first measure as our baseline proxy for social capital and
consider the other three measures in the robustness checks. The idea behind approximat-
ing social capital with the associational density builds on the seminal work by Putnam
et al. (1994), Putnam (1995, 2000), who shows that participation in associational activ-
ities boosts interaction and cooperation between community members and promotes the
norms of reciprocity and trust. The advantage of our measure compared to alternative
proxies suggested in the literature (such as voluntary blood donations or voter turnouts)
is that it exploits oﬃcial data from the US Census and is therefore characterized by a
high degree of validity and consistency. It is additionally well-suited for the ensuing panel
data analysis since this measure is available on an annual basis for the vast majority of
US counties over the entire period of 1986-2014. In the cross-sectional analysis, we take
the (log of the) associational employment density averaged over 2000-2010 as our measure
of SocialCapital.
Information on police intensity is drawn from the UCR’s LEOKA database. For each
LEA, the LEOKA database reports, among other things, the number of police oﬃcers
and police employees per 1,000 population. To construct our baseline measure of police
intensity, we calculate for each year the weighted average of the police oﬃcers rate across
all LEAs of a given county with weights being the fraction of a county’s population served
CHAPTER 2. GUN VIOLENCE IN THE US: CORRELATES AND CAUSES 36
by a given LEA.29 In the cross-sectional analysis, we take (the log of) the police oﬃcers
rate averaged over 2000-2010 as our proxy for PoliceIntensity.
The choice of variables for the vector of controls is motivated by our theoretical model,
the public debate on this issue, and related empirical findings. Our model suggests that
the per capita number of (gun-related) oﬀenses depends positively on the wage rate of
law-abiding citizens w. As a proxy for w, we use (the log of) a county’s per capita
Income averaged over 2000-2010, collected from the US Census’ Small Area Income and
Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) database.30 Poverty may force citizens into illegal behavior
and, potentially, compel them to acquire guns in order to raise the associated booty.
To account for this potential confounding factor, we draw from the SAIPE database
information on the percentage of a county’s population living below the poverty line
and take (the log of) this value averaged over 2000-2010 as a measure of Poverty. We
further control for IncomeInequality, measured as (the log of) a county’s Gini coeﬃcient,
as reported by the 2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
To control for the overall level of crime, we draw from the UCR’s OKCA information
on the total number of oﬀenses across all crime categories and take (the log of) this per
capita number averaged over 2000-2010 as our measure of CrimeRate. As mentioned in
the previous section, one might be concerned that the level of social capital merely reflects
the prevalence of criminal networks and organized crime. To account for this alternative
explanation, we construct the following two control variables using the UCR’s SHR data.
OrganizedCrime is calculated as (the log of 0.001 plus) the average share of ‘gangland
killings’ and ‘juvenile gang killings’ in the total number of homicide incidents by county
in 2000-2010. CriminalNetworks is constructed as (the log of 0.001 plus) the average share
of homicides committed by more than one person in total homicides in 2000-2010.
Several recent contributions suggest a positive link between a society’s fractionalization
and conflict, see, e.g., Arbatli, Ashraf & Galor (2015) and reference therein. This re-
29 The reason for using weighted averages derives from the fact that some small LEAs may have
high police oﬃcers rates due to the surveillance of correctional facilities, and simple averages would
potentially overstate the police intensity in a given county. However, the results are very similar
when we consider non-weighted averages.
30 This data is drawn on an annual basis from https://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/statec
ounty/data/.
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lationship might be particularly pronounced in one of the most diverse countries in the
world – the United States. We consider two diﬀerent measures of fractionalization – eth-
nic (EthnicFrac) and racial (RacialFrac). The former measure is constructed as follows.
Using 2006-2010 ACS information on the country of birth of the foreign-born US pop-
ulation, we calculate for each county the share s of ethnic group e stemming from one
of the 108 distinct countries of origin. We then aggregate these shares to a Herfindahl
index, EthnicFrac = ln
⇣
1 PEi=e s2i⌘, whereby higher values of this index represent a
higher ethnic fractionalization in a given county.31 Furthermore, using information on
racial composition of counties from the US Decennial Census 2010, we calculate for each
county the share (s) of a racial group (r) – ‘Black or African American’, ‘White Ameri-
can’, ‘Hispanics’, ‘American Indian or Native Alaskan American’, ‘Asian American’ and
‘Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander’ – in a county’s population and aggregate
these shares to a Herfindahl index, RacialFrac = ln
⇣
1 PRi=r s2i⌘, whereby higher val-
ues of this index represent a higher racial fractionalization in a given county. We also
include the (log of the) percentage of AfricanAmerican population in a given county as
an additional control variable and verify that our results are robust to controlling for the
prevalences of other racial groups.
To account for a possible eﬀect of educational attainment on the willingness of individuals
to commit a (gun-related) oﬀense, we control for Education, constructed as the (log of
the) percentage of over-25 years old citizens with at least a high school degree, as reported
by the 2006-2010 ACS. To control for the potential impact of urbanization on the costs of
obtaining a gun (g) and the probability of detection ( ), we draw from the 2010 US Census
Urban and Rural Classification information on the fraction of a county’s population living
in urban areas and take the log of this variable as our measure of Urbanization. We further
control for the (log of the) percentage of children (6-17 years old) living in a SingleParent
household, drawn from the 2006-2010 ACS.
Administrative information on legal gun ownership at the county level is, unfortunately,
31 In using the Herfindahl method to construct a measure of fractionalization, we follow Alesina, De-
vleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003) and Fearon (2003). Our results are virtually
unchanged if we capture fractionalization using standard deviations.
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unavailable. Azrael et al. (2004) and Cook & Ludwig (2006) approximate the access
to guns with the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm. The idea behind this
measure is that, if the willingness to commit a suicide is equally distributed across regions,
a higher fraction of firearm suicides in total suicides reveals a higher gun ownership in a
given region. Following this approach, we use data on suicides from the Center for Disease
and Control Prevention (CDC) to control for LegalGuns, constructed as the (log of the)
share of suicides committed with a firearm in 2004-2010.32
Recall from the previous section that the number of (gun-related) oﬀenses depends nega-
tively on the penalty rate, p. Given that the responsibility for criminal law and criminal
justice in the US is shared between the federal and state governments, we control for
state-specific diﬀerences in criminal laws using state fixed eﬀects, included in all regres-
sions.
OLS Estimations
Table 2.1 reports the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions specified in
equation (2.13) with GunRobberies as a dependent variable. As can be seen from columns
(1) and (2), GunRobberies are positively correlated with the number of IllegalGuns and
negatively correlated with the level of SocialCapital, respectively. The coeﬃcient of Poli-
ceIntensity in column (3) is negative but not significant. However, it becomes significant
after controlling for a county’s per capita income, poverty rate and income inequality in
column (4). All three key explanatory variables – illegal guns, social capital, and police
intensity – remain fairly robust in size and significance after including a range of additional
control variables in columns (5)-(7). In line with the model’s predictions, GunRobberies
are positively correlated with the number of IllegalGuns and negatively correlated with
SocialCapital and PoliceIntensity. The number of gun robberies per capita also tends
to be higher in richer and more unequal counties, which have a high (organized) crime
32 This data is drawn from https://wisqars.cdc.gov:8443/cdcMapFramework/. We also verify that our
results are robust to controlling for subscriptions to Guns&Ammo magazine – an alternative proxy
for gun prevalence suggested by Duggan et al. (2011). Given that information on Guns&Ammo
subscriptions is available only for a small subset of counties, we do not include this proxy in our
baseline regressions but provide the results upon request.
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rate and a strong prevalence of criminal networks, are racially fragmented, and have a
high fraction of African American population and single-parent households. In contrast,
counties with a high level of urbanization and education seem to have a lower number of
gun robberies per capita. The coeﬃcient of determination in our preferred specification
in column (7) suggests that our main explanatory variables, the extensive list of controls,
and state fixed eﬀects jointly explain about two-thirds of the cross-sectional variation in
gun-related robberies in the US In column (8), we further control for the prevalence of
legal guns, which reduces our sample by half. All three key explanatory variables remain
robust and highly significant. The positive coeﬃcient of LegalGuns suggests that the
number of per capita gun robberies is higher in counties with a higher prevalence of legal
guns.
Next, we rerun the above-mentioned regressions using GunHomicides as a dependent
variable, see Table 2.A.2 in Appendix. Throughout specifications, GunHomicides are
positively and highly significantly correlated with the number of IllegalGuns. Apart from
column (8), in which the sample is reduced by half, the negative coeﬃcient of SocialCapital
is also highly significant. The coeﬃcient of PoliceIntensity is throughout negative but
not significant after including the full set of controls. The lack of significance can be
rationalized by the above-mentioned fact that homicide crimes are oftentimes perpetrated
“in the heat of moment” and may not be aﬀected by the probability of detection. The
coeﬃcients of control variables are comparable to the ones reported in Table 2.1.
Having explored the correlates of GunRobberies and GunHomicides, we now rerun our
regressions using TotalRobberies and TotalHomicides as dependent variables. Table 2.2
presents the results of our preferred specification with state fixed eﬀects and the full set
of controls from column (7) of Table 2.1.33 In line with our theoretical predictions, per
capita robberies and homicides are positively correlated with IllegalGuns and negatively
associated with SocialCapital and PoliceIntensity.
In summary, the evidence presented so far is generally consistent with our theoretical pre-
dictions: The number of (gun-related) oﬀenses is positively associated with the number
33 Since the estimates of control variables are similar to the ones from Table 2.1, we do not report them
for brevity.
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Table 2.1. Cross-section estimates: Correlates of gun robberies.
Dep.variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)GunRobberies
IllegalGuns 0.226*** 0.255*** 0.266*** 0.198*** 0.054** 0.081*** 0.058*** 0.072***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
SocialCapital -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.162*** -0.134*** -0.149***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035)
PoliceIntensity -0.036 -0.075*** -0.051** -0.067*** -0.051*** -0.070***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Income -0.122*** 0.082*** 0.153*** 0.096*** -0.205***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038)
Poverty 0.424*** 0.176*** 0.086* 0.068 -0.125*
(0.055) (0.050) (0.048) (0.060) (0.073)
Inequality 1.499*** 1.196*** 1.062*** 0.643*** 0.395
(0.239) (0.221) (0.207) (0.221) (0.276)
CrimeRate 0.560*** 0.437*** 0.517*** 0.678***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045)
OrganizedCrime 0.157*** 0.142*** 0.129*** 0.065***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
CriminalNetworks 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.012*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
EthnicFrac 0.007 -0.013 -0.013
(0.035) (0.034) (0.049)
RacialFrac 0.112*** 0.085** 0.072
(0.036) (0.036) (0.046)
AfricanAmerican 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.303***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Education -0.370*** -0.269**
(0.094) (0.113)
Urbanization -0.048*** -0.046***
(0.004) (0.011)
SingleParent 0.140** 0.659***
(0.061) (0.089)
LegalGuns 0.139**
(0.055)
Observations 2,499 2,479 2,477 2,477 2,284 2,264 2,264 1,221
R-squared 0.344 0.366 0.369 0.423 0.575 0.642 0.663 0.860
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (2.13) with GunRobberies as a dependent variable. All specifications
include state fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level,
respectively.
of illegal guns and negatively related to the level of social capital and police intensity in
a given county. Yet, these conditional correlations should not be interpreted as indicative
of causal relationships for two main reasons. First, even though we control for a wide
range of alternative explanations and state fixed eﬀects, there may be other (unobserv-
able) country-specific factors that confound this relationship. For instance, the historical
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Table 2.2. Cross-section estimates: Correlates of total
robberies and total homicides.
Dependent variable
TotalRobberies TotalHomicides
IllegalGuns 0.034* 0.178***
(0.018) (0.019)
SocialCapital -0.079*** -0.041**
(0.020) (0.021)
PoliceIntensity -0.027* -0.005
(0.016) (0.017)
Observations 2,383 2,448
R-squared 0.868 0.619
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (2.13) with
TotalRobberies and TotalHomicides as dependent vari-
ables. All specifications include state fixed eﬀects and full
set of controls from column (7) of Table 2.1. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
incidence of slavery in a given county might explain both a low level of social capital (see
Nunn & Wantchekon (2011)) and a high prevalence of gun-related crime. Second, the re-
sults presented above are prone to the issue of reverse causality. Consider for instance the
link between illegal guns and gun violence. It is possible that criminals seize a gun from an
armed victim in the course of a firearm oﬀense, making gun thefts merely a ‘byproduct’ of
gun-related oﬀenses. Moreover, criminals may undertake armed oﬀenses in order to steal
additional guns, in which case a high prevalence of gun thefts is the outcome (rather than
the source) of frequent firearm oﬀenses. Likewise, a low level of social capital may be
both the cause and the outcome of gun violence: Individuals in counties with a low level
of trust may be more likely to pull the trigger, but the level of social capital itself may
deteriorate due to frequent firearm oﬀenses. Lastly, police intensity is likely to increase as
(gun-related) oﬀenses in a given region become more frequent. This type of endogeneity
works against the predicted negative eﬀect of police intensity and might provide a further
potential explanation behind the weak statistical significance of PoliceIntensity in Tables
2.2 and 2.A.2.
To address the concerns related to the omitted variable bias and reverse causality, we
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turn to panel data analysis. This approach allows us to account for unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of a county using county fixed eﬀects. Moreover, by exploiting
time-lagged variation in illegal guns, social capital, and police intensity, we move closer
towards a causal inference.
2.3.2 Panel Data Analysis
The baseline econometric specification in this section takes the following form:
N(a)ct =  1IllegalGunsc,t 1+ 2SocialCapitalc,t 1+ 3PoliceIntensityc,t 1+⇢c+⇢st+ Xct+"ct,
(2.14)
where N(a)ct 2 {GunRobberiesct,GunHomicidesct,TotalRobberiesct,TotalHomicidesct} in
county c and year t, and IllegalGunsc,t 1, SocialCapital c,t 1, and PoliceIntensityc,t 1 cap-
ture, respectively, illegal guns, associational density, and police intensity from the previous
period t   1.34 We conduct our analysis for the period 1986-2014, whereby the starting
year of the panel is determined by the availability of data on associational density from
the CBP. County-specific fixed eﬀects ⇢c account for time-invariant characteristics of a
county (such as geography or history) as well as factors that are relatively stable over
time (e.g., urbanization). Year fixed eﬀects ⇢t control for aggregate time-specific shocks.
In an even more stringent specification, we include state-year fixed eﬀects ⇢st, which eﬀec-
tively control for all time-varying state-specific factors, such as gun legislation or criminal
laws. Our vector of time-varying county-level controls, Xct includes CrimeRatect, In-
comect, and Povertyct, whereby all variables are defined by analogy to section 2.3.1.35
In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the county level to adjust for within-
county correlation over time. To simplify the notation, we drop the county-subscript c
34 All variables are defined as in section 2.3.1, apart from GunHomicidesct and TotalHomi-
cidesct, which are constructed as ln(0.001 + per capita number of armed oﬀenses) and ln(0.001 +
per capita number of total oﬀenses), respectively. The reason for adding a small constant (0.001)
lies in the fact that most counties feature zero (gun-related) homicides in a given year and these
observations would be omitted in the logarithmic specification.
35 Data on CrimeRatect in 1993 is missing in the UCR database. In our baseline analysis, we replace
CrimeRatec1993 by an average of CrimeRatec1992 and CrimeRatec1994. Our results are robust to
dropping this year.
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henceforth.
Table 2.3 reports the panel estimates from equation (2.14) with GunRobberies t as a de-
pendent variable. The eﬀects of the key explanatory factors are in line with our theoretical
predictions: Smaller number of gun thefts (IllegalGuns t 1), higher associational density
(SocialCapital t 1), and higher police intensity (PoliceIntensity t 1) in period t  1 are as-
sociated with fewer gun robberies in period t. As can be seen from column (3), these
eﬀects are robust to controlling for crime rate, per capita income, and poverty in a given
period.36 The sign of the coeﬃcients of control variables can be well rationalized in terms
of our theoretical model. If one were to interpret the crime rate in a given county as
a measure for this county’s criminal inclination (the inverse of the parameter  in the
model), the negative coeﬃcient of CrimeRatet is in line with our Proposition 1(ii). The
positive coeﬃcient of Incomet is consistent with the positive eﬀect of w on Na predicted
by our model. Lastly, the positive coeﬃcient of Poverty t suggests that poverty may force
citizens into illegal behavior and, potentially, compel them to acquire guns in order to
raise the associated booty (parameter   > 1 in our model). Controlling for state-year
(rather than year) fixed eﬀects in column (4) slightly reduces the size of the coeﬃcients
of control variables but leaves the estimates of our key explanatory variables virtually
unchanged.
Before introducing the robustness checks from columns (5) and (6), it is worth pausing to
briefly discuss the limitations of the UCR data (see Maltz (1999) for a detailed discussion).
The main caveat of the UCR panel data is its unbalanced nature. For instance, consecutive
observations on GunRobberies for the period 1986-2014 are available only for one-third
of the counties. The reason for missing values is twofold. First, states may have oﬀense
definitions that are incompatible with UCR definitions, leading to data being submitted
but not accepted.37 Second, some law enforcement agencies (LEAs) may withdraw from
the UCR program for a certain period of time. If LEAs discontinue reporting to the UCR
due to factors related to the explanatory variables, our estimates presented so far may be
36 Our results are fairly unchanged if we include lagged values of the control variables into the regres-
sions.
37 For instance, complete data for Illinois have not been included in the UCR since 1985 because the
Illinois statutory definition of sexual assault is inconsistent with the UCR definition of rape.
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Table 2.3. Panel estimates: Gun robberies.
Dep.variable: OLS WLS
GunRobberiest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IllegalGunst 1 0.090*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.042*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.071*** -0.048*** -0.051***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.073*** -0.068***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
CrimeRatet 0.607*** 0.600*** 0.579*** 0.601*** 0.562***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Incomet 0.235*** 0.170*** 0.245*** 0.264***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.062) (0.062)
Povertyt 0.227*** 0.174*** 0.101** 0.106**
(0.038) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes no no no
State-year FE no no no yes yes yes
IMR no no no no yes yes
Observations 43,009 42,907 42,773 42,761 40,268 40,268
R-squared 0.766 0.784 0.785 0.800 0.799 0.804
Note: The table reports panel estimates of (variations of) equation (2.14) with GunRobberiest
as a dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. IMR
represents inverse Mills ratios. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
prone to the sample selection bias. To account for this potential bias, one has to bear in
mind two possible ways through which non-reporting by LEAs can manifest itself in our
county-level analysis. First, if none of the LEAs in a given county submits reports to the
UCR in a given year, information on gun-related oﬀenses in this county-year is missing.
Second, if some of the LEAs of a given county fail to submit their reports to the UCR, our
measure of gun-related oﬀenses – constructed as the sum of gun-related oﬀenses across
all reporting LEAs – understates the actual prevalence of gun violence in this county.
We deal with the above-mentioned data limitations by implementing the following two
adjustments of our baseline empirical specification.
First, we correct for a potential sample selection bias due to missing county-year ob-
servations by testing the sample selection model, cf. Wooldridge (2010). More specif-
ically, for each year in the period 1986-2014, we estimate the following Probit model:
Pr(y = 1|x) =  (x ), whereby the binary dependent variable y is equal to one if Gun-
Robberies t in a given county is positive and zero otherwise, and x is a vector of controls
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containing state fixed eﬀects and the following list of county-level variables. To account
for the fact that non-reporting to the UCR is most pronounced for smaller and rural coun-
ties (see Lynch & Jarvis (2008) and Maltz (1999)), we control for (the logs of) a county’s
population and per capita income in a given year, as well as the degree of urbanization in
2000-2010.38 To account for the possibility that missing county-level observations might
arise due to a high level of crime in a given period, we further control for the (log of)
per capita arrests in a given year, constructed using UCR County-Level Detailed Arrest
and Oﬀense Data.39 From these Probit regressions, we obtain county-year-specific inverse
Mills ratios (IMRs),  ˆct and include them, as well as their interaction with year dummies,
into our econometric specification from equation (2.14). As can be seen from column (5)
of Table 2.3, this robustness check does not materially aﬀect the estimates of our key
variables of interest.
Second, to account for potentially endogenous sampling of LEAs and to correct for het-
eroskedasticity in county-year error terms, we rerun our regressions using weighted least
squares (WLS), see Solon, Haider & Wooldridge (2015). More specifically, we exploit
UCR information on the number of citizens under the jurisdiction of a given LEA to cal-
culate for each county-year the fraction of the population served by reporting LEAs and
use these population shares as weights in the WLS regressions. As can be seen from col-
umn (6) of Table 2.3, the WLS estimates of our key explanatory variables remain highly
significant and are virtually unchanged in size compared to the OLS coeﬃcients. The
estimates from columns (4)-(6) suggest that a one percent decrease in illegal guns, a one
percent increase in social capital, or a one percent increase in police intensity in period
t  1 decreases gun-related robberies in period t by roughly 0.03, 0.05-0.07, and 0.07-0.09
percentage points, respectively.
Next, we rerun the regressions reported in Table 2.3 using GunHomicides t as a dependent
variable. As can be seen from column (3) of Table 2.A.3, all three coeﬃcients of interest are
in line with our theoretical predictions and are highly significant, controlling for year and
38 Yearly estimates of urbanization are, unfortunately, not available.
39 This data is drawn from https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/35019 and it is
available for almost the entire set of counties in the period of 1986-2014.
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county fixed eﬀects, as well as a county’s crime rate, per capita income, and poverty rate.
However, the negative coeﬃcient of PoliceIntensity t 1 loses significance after controlling
for state-year (rather than year) fixed eﬀects in column (4). In column (5), we correct
for the potential sample selection bias by including inverse Mills ratios (as well as their
interaction with year dummies) into our specification. Following the approach described
above, we obtain these IMRs from the Probit model: Pr(y = 1|x) =  (x ), whereby
the binary dependent variable y is equal to one if GunHomicides t in a given county is
positive and zero otherwise, and x is a vector containing state fixed eﬀects and controls
for a county’s population, per capita income, urbanization, and per capita arrests. The
coeﬃcients of IllegalGuns t 1 and SocialCapital t 1 remain highly robust (both in terms of
size and significance) to this sample selection correction, cf. column (5). Moreover, these
estimates are virtually unchanged if we rerun our regressions using WLS instead of OLS,
cf. column (6) of Table 2.A.3.
In what follows, we conduct further robustness checks of our econometric specification
from equation (2.14) using GunRobberies t as a dependent variable.40 Recall that our
baseline measure of social capital is constructed as the fraction of a county’s employment
by religious, civic, and social organizations (classified under the NAICS code 813) in the
total employment of a given county. In columns (1)-(5) of Table 2.4, we rerun regressions
from column (4) of Table 2.3 using alternative measures of SocialCapital. In columns (1)
and (2), we zoom into this measure by considering the fraction of a county’s workforce
employed by religious organizations (NAICS code 8131), and by civic and social organi-
zations (NAICS code 8134), respectively.41 In contrast to the previously used measures,
constructed as the ratio of associational employment in total employment, the proxy for
social capital in column (3) is defined as the per capita employment by religious, civic, and
social organizations. Instead of employment-based proxies utilized so far, columns (4) and
(5) consider two establishment-based measures: The former is constructed as the ratio
40 We focus henceforth on GunRobberiest as a dependent variable since it is most suitable to test the
predictions of our theoretical model of economic crime. However, all robustness checks yield similar
results for GunHomicidest as an outcome variable.
41 In the period 1986-1997, religious organizations are classified by the CBP under the SIC code 866,
while civic and social organizations correspond to the SIC code 864.
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of NAICS 813 establishments in the total number of establishments in a given county,
while the latter is defined as the per capita number of NAICS 813 establishments in a
given county. Regardless of the employed definition, the coeﬃcients of SocialCapital t 1
are negative and significant at least at the 5% level. In column (6) of Table 2.4, we utilize
an alternative definition of police intensity. Instead of measuring PoliceIntensity as the
per capita number of police oﬃcers, this column employs a broader proxy based on the
per capita number of police employees. The coeﬃcient of PoliceIntensity t 1 is negative,
highly significant, and comparable in size to the one reported in Table 2.3.
Table 2.4. Panel estimates: Gun robberies, alternative measures for explanatory variables.
Dep.variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)GunRobberiest
SocialCapital t 1 (empl., religious) -0.072***
(0.020)
SocialCapital t 1 (empl., social&civic) -0.024**
(0.011)
SocialCapital t 1 (empl., per capita) -0.061***
(0.015)
SocialCapital t 1 (est., ratio) -0.123***
(0.033)
SocialCapital t 1 (est., per capita) -0.138***
(0.031)
PoliceIntensityt 1 (employees) -0.084***
(0.024)
Observations 40,105 25,278 42,792 43,820 43,820 42,761
R-squared 0.808 0.856 0.800 0.797 0.797 0.800
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (2.14) with GunRobberiest as a dependent variable. All
specifications include state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as the full set of covariates from Table 2.3. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level,
respectively.
Next, we return to our baseline measures of social capital and police intensity and consider
longer lags of the key explanatory variables. As can be seen from Table 2.3, IllegalGuns,
SocialCapital, and PoliceIntensity from period t 3 continue to have a significant eﬀect on
GunRobberies in period t. The significance of IllegalGuns and PoliceIntensity eventually
vanishes as one increases the lags to four or five years, yet SocialCapital continues to have
a significant eﬀect on GunRobberies t even after five years. The latter finding is line with
a large body of literature suggesting a long-lasting impact of social capital on various
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socio-economic outcomes, cf., e.g., Algan & Cahuc (2010, 2014) and Guiso, Spienza &
Zingales (2010).
Table 2.5. Panel estimates: Gun Robberies, longer lags.
Dep.variable: Lags
GunRobberiest n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
IllegalGunst n 0.025*** 0.012** 0.011* 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SocialCapital t n -0.039** -0.053*** -0.038** -0.033**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
PoliceIntensityt n -0.085*** -0.055** -0.030 -0.051*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 40,895 39,288 37,615 35,827
R-squared 0.803 0.807 0.810 0.814
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (2.14) with
GunRobberiest as a dependent variable. n = 2, ..., 5 represents the
number of lagged periods. All specifications include state-year and
county fixed eﬀects, as well as the full set of controls from Table
2.3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
In summary, we have established robust relationships between gun-related oﬀenses and
lagged values of gun thefts, social capital, and police intensity in line with our theoretical
predictions. Do these relationships allow for causal inference? Consider first the eﬀect of
social capital. Since it is unlikely that associational density in period t   n (n = 1, .., 5)
increases in expectation of lower gun robberies in period t, it is reasonable to assert
that SocialCapital t n is exogenous to GunRobberies t. The issue of reverse causality is
potentially more pronounced in case of police intensity since employment of police oﬃcers
in a given year may be driven by the anticipation of higher gun robberies in subsequent
years. However, this potential endogeneity would introduce a positive comovement of
PoliceIntensity t n and GunRobberies t, which would work against the predictions of our
model. Thus, if we find a strong negative association between PoliceIntensity t n and
GunRobberies t in our estimates, the true eﬀect of police intensity may be even stronger.
Lastly, consider the eﬀect of gun thefts. Regressing GunRobberies on the lagged values of
IllegalGuns, we exclude the possibility that firearm thefts in a given period are merely a
byproduct of firearm oﬀenses in this period. However, the evidence presented so far does
not yet imply a causal eﬀect of illegal guns since criminals may steal a gun in a given year
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with an intention to use it at some future time. In other words, IllegalGuns t n may be
endogenous to GunRobberies t. To account for the potential issue of reverse causality, one
needs a time-varying measure of illegal guns that is exogenous to gun oﬀenses in a given
county and year.
We suggest that firearms stolen in neighboring states are likely to provide this sort of
variation. More specifically, to approximate the prevalence of illegal guns in year t and
county c from state i, we construct the following alternative county-level measure of
IllegalGunsAct ⌘ ln
 X
j
IllegalGunsjt · `jc
!
, (2.15)
whereby IllegalGunsjt is the value of firearms stolen in state j 6= i adjacent (A) to state i,
and `jc denotes the likelihood that a stolen gun from state j reaches county c.
The idea behind this measure is illustrated in Figure 2.7, using Jeﬀerson county (c) from
the Pennsylvania state (PA) as an example. According to tracing reports of the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, among those guns that were originally
purchased in a diﬀerent state than the one in which they were recovered, the vast majority
stems from contiguous states.42 Hence, county c from state i (PA) is likely to receive a
fraction of guns stolen in adjacent states j (in Fig. 2.7: Ohio (OH), West Virginia (WV),
Virginia (VA), Maryland (MD), Delaware (DE), New Jersey (NJ), and New York (NY)).
Is this alternative measure of illegal guns exogenous to gun oﬀenses in a given county?
Clearly, a criminal from county c may steal a gun from a neighboring state in period
t   1 to conduct a firearm oﬀense in this county in period t. However, our identifying
assumption is that (the mass of criminals from) a single county is too small to drive the
variation in gun thefts across all adjacent states over time,
P
jIllegalGuns
j
t . We thus
assert that IllegalGunsAc,t n is plausibly exogenous to GunRobberies t. Nevertheless, we
conduct a range of robustness checks to preclude possible violations of our identifying
assumption.
How do we approximate the likelihood of county c from state i to ‘import’ a stolen
42 See, e.g., https://www.atf.gov/about/firearms-trace-data-2015.
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Figure 2.7. Illegal gun flows from contiguous states to a given county (c).
gun from a contiguous state j? Since county-level tracing data are, to the best of our
knowledge, unavailable, we resort thereby to findings from state-level studies. In a recent
contribution, Knight (2013) uses gun tracing data for the year 2009 from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to estimate the determinants of gun
traﬃcking between states in a gravity-like setting.43 He finds that distance between a pair
of states decreases the likelihood of illegal gun imports from a given source state, with
the estimated elasticity of  0.514. For our county-level analysis, we calculate the nearest
distance between the borders of county c and state j, djc.44 Using data from Knight (2013),
we further calculate the share of guns sji , originally purchased in state j and recovered in
state i, in the nationwide amount of illegal guns traced back to state j. Arguably, a higher
sji reflects a higher likelihood of county c from state i to import an illegal gun from state
j. Furthermore, Knight (2013) shows that stricter gun regulations in a source state, as
43 For a given destination state, these data report the number of guns recovered in 2009 from crime
scenes that were successfully traced to a given source state. Data for other calendar years are,
unfortunately, unavailable.
44 Our results are fairly unchanged if we consider distance measures based on centroids (rather than
borders).
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measured by a unit increase of the Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010) index (henceforth
MAIG), reduce the likelihood of illegal gun ‘exports’ from this state by an average of
 0.102.45 Based on this information, we construct for each county the following score:
`jc ⌘ (MAIGj) 0.102 · sji · (djc) 0.514.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the logic behind this measure, using the afore-mentioned Jeﬀerson
county (c). Consider the volume of guns stolen in the Ohio (OH) state in year t, Illegal-
GunsOHt . These firearms are less likely to be ‘exported’ to other states the stricter the gun
laws in Ohio, MAIGOH . Among those firearms that travel across state borders, fraction
sOHPA goes to Pennsylvania, on average. Due to the risk associated with transportation of
illegal firearms, the amount of guns imported from Ohio is less likely to reach a given
county c, the greater distance between this county and OH, dOHc .46
Table 2.6 presents the results of the econometric specification from equation (2.14) with
lagged values of gun thefts in the contiguous states, IllegalGunsAt 1 as an additional ex-
planatory variable. As can be seen from column (1), IllegalGunsAt 1 has a positive and
highly significant eﬀect on GunRobberies t, controlling for state-year and county fixed
eﬀects, as well as CrimeRatet, Incomet, and Poverty t. Adding IllegalGuns t 1, SocialCap-
ital t 1, and PoliceIntensity t 1 in column (2), the coeﬃcient of IllegalGunsAt 1 marginally
decreases in size but remains significant at the 5% level. The estimated elasticity of
GunRobberies t with respect to IllegalGunsAt 1 suggests that a one percent increase of gun
thefts in adjacent states in the previous period increases a county’s gun robberies in the
current period by roughly 0.05 percentage points.
Our identification strategy regarding the eﬀect of IllegalGunsAt 1 is built upon the as-
sumption that an individual county is too small to drive the (lagged) variation in gun
45 This index varies between 0 and 10, whereby each point represents one the following ten gun regu-
lations: ‘Straw purchase liability’, ‘Falsifying purchaser information liability’, ‘Background check fail-
ure liability’, ‘Gun show checks’, ‘Required purchaser permit’, ‘Local discretion to deny carry per-
mits, ‘Misdemeanor restrictions’, ‘Required reporting of lost or stolen guns’, ‘Local discretion over
gun regulations’, ‘Dealer inspections’.
46 Our definition of `jc does not include gun regulations specific solely to the recipient state since they
do not aﬀect the elasticity estimates in our log-log specification. However, we verify that our results
are robust to constructing the `jc measure based on bilateral diﬀerences in gun laws across states.
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Table 2.6. Panel estimates: Gun robberies, illegal guns from adjacent states.
Full sample Exclude 10% of counties with the largest Excl. all
Dep.variable: Population CrimeRate Urbanization Income above
GunRobberiest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IllegalGunsAt 1 0.059*** 0.050** 0.056** 0.046** 0.056*** 0.052** 0.056**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
IllegalGunst 1 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.072*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.057***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.086*** -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.064** -0.090*** -0.062**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Observations 56,131 42,397 35,346 35,913 35,924 41,595 30,117
R-squared 0.783 0.800 0.750 0.752 0.755 0.802 0.723
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (2.14) with GunRobberiest as a dependent variable. Illegal-
GunsAt 1 is defined in equation (2.15). All specifications include state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as the full
set of controls from Table 2.3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. *, **, *** indicate
significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
thefts across all adjacent states over time. Although this condition is likely to hold in
general, one cannot rule out the existence of a few counties that violate our identifying
assumption. Arguably, these are populous counties with a high degree of criminal activ-
ity, urbanization, and per capita income for which the identifying assumption may not
be fulfilled. In columns (3)-(7), we conduct a range of robustness checks to ensure that
our results are not driven by those counties. More specifically, in column (3), we exclude
the top decile of counties with the largest population.47 In column (4), we exclude the
top decile of counties with the highest CrimeRate. In column (5), we exclude the top
decile of counties with the largest degree of Urbanization. To ensure that a high level
of potential booty in a given county does not attract armed criminals from neighboring
states, we exclude the top decile of counties with the highest per capita Income in column
(6). Finally, in column (7), we exclude all of the above. Throughout specifications, the
coeﬃcient of IllegalGunsAt 1 remains positive and significant. In summary, the evidence
presented above suggests that a higher number of illegal guns in a given period (originat-
ing either from a given county or from adjacent states) has a robust positive eﬀect on a
county’s gun robberies in the subsequent period.
47 We verify that our results are robust to consideration of alternative thresholds.
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Having explored the causes of gun-related oﬀenses, we now rerun our baseline regressions
using TotalRobberies t and TotalHomicides t as dependent variables. Table 2.7 reports the
estimates of equation (2.13) with state-year and county fixed eﬀects, as well as controls
for CrimeRatet, Incomet, and Poverty t. In line with our theoretical predictions, Illegal-
Guns t 1 increases while SocialCapital t 1 and PoliceIntensity t 1 decrease TotalRobberies t.
In case of TotalHomicides t, all coeﬃcients have the predicted sign but only IllegalGuns t 1
and SocialCapital t 1 are significant. Overall, the evidence provides strong support for our
theoretical predictions.
Table 2.7. Panel estimates: Total robberies and total homi-
cides.
Dependent variable
TotalRobberiest TotalHomicidest
IllegalGunst 1 0.013*** 0.042***
(0.003) (0.009)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.025** -0.062**
(0.012) (0.029)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.102*** -0.068
(0.022) (0.056)
Observations 52,785 64,556
R-squared 0.850 0.426
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (2.13) with
TotalRobberiest and TotalHomicidest as dependent vari-
ables. All specifications include state-year and county fixed
eﬀects, as well as the full set of controls from Table 2.3. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county
level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, re-
spectively.
2.4 Policy Implications
To formulate policy implications of our work, it is instructive to recall the optimization
problem of an unarmed (u) and armed (a) criminal presented, respectively:
max
x
E(⇡u) = (1   )(xcw)↵   pux , max
x
E(⇡a) = (1   )( xcw)↵   pax  g. (2.16)
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In what follows, we discuss a range of mechanisms that can be applied by policymakers
to reduce the number of gun-related, Na and total oﬀenses, N , given by equations (2.9)
and (2.11), respectively.
Consider first the penalty rate p. While in our baseline model p was assumed to be the
same for armed and unarmed criminals (cf. equations (2.1) and (2.5)), policymakers can
potentially impose larger penalties for an armed crime, pa > pu, see equation (2.16). In
fact, the clause of pa > pu is already enshrined in the 18 US Code Â§924(c) of the US
federal criminal law: “[...] any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug traﬃcking crime [...], uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such
crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of
violence or drug traﬃcking crime (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”48 Nevertheless, the implementation of this
clause constitutes a major challenge for legal authorities since a “few statutes have proven
as enigmatic as 18 US Code Â§924(c)”, cf. judge Gorsuch (2015). To illustrate the eﬀects
of an introduction (and implementation) of a higher gun-related penalty rate, let pa ⌘  pu,
whereby   > 1 denotes an increase in the punishment for any given oﬀense due to the
fact that a criminal is armed. Figure 2.8 depicts the predicted eﬀect of an increase in
  on the equilibrium sorting of criminals into armed and unarmed activities. A larger
cutoﬀ ca – above which individuals engage in gun-related crime – immediately implies a
lower per capita number of gun-related oﬀenses, Na. It should be noted that an increase
in the punishment for a firearm-related crime,   is not a ‘free lunch’, since some criminals
– those with c 2 (ca, c0a) in Fig. 2.8 – may either switch from a gun-related to unarmed
oﬀenses or substitute guns with another type of weapon (such as knives, brass knuckles,
etc.). However, as long the ‘threatening eﬀect’ of these alternative weapons (parameter
  in our model) is smaller compared to guns, the number of oﬀenses conducted by those
criminals will be smaller (cf. equations (2.2) and (2.6)). Hence, the overall number of
48 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/924.
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oﬀenses N is expected to decrease in  . Moreover, given that these alternative weapons
are associated with a significantly lower risk of a fatal injury, it is reasonable to assert that
the overall number of homicides will decrease due to an increase in the firearm-related
punishment  .
Figure 2.8. The eﬀect of an increase in gun-related penalties,  0 >  .
Second, and related, lawmakers should consider increasing the penalties for possessing
and/or carrying an illegal (loaded) gun, even if this gun has not yet been used in further-
ance of a crime. From a theoretical perspective, this sanction implies the same eﬀects as
an increase in  , with an additional benefit of the prevention of potential (lethal) crimes.
Currently, penalties for an illegal possession of firearms diﬀer widely across states.49 For
instance, possession of a firearm without a permit in the state of New York is punishable
by up to one year in prison, a fine of up to $1,000, or both.50 On the other side of the
spectrum, illegal possession of firearms in Arkansas is generally punishable by a fine of
up to $500 and a jail sentence of up to 90 days (see Arkansas Statutes Â§5-73). In view
of substantial personal and social costs of illegal guns (Cook & Ludwig (2006)), policy-
49 See, e.g., https://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/rpt/2012-R-0345.htm.
50 Possession of a loaded firearm without a permit outside of a person’s home is punishable by up to
15 years imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum of 3.5 years (see N.Y. Penal Law Â§Â§ 265.01,
265.03, 265.20).
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makers are urged to reconsider whether penalties like the latter constitute an appropriate
punishment for the possession of an illegal firearm.
Our theoretical model predicts a negative eﬀect of the costs of obtaining a gun (g) on the
per capita number of armed (Na) and total (N) oﬀenses. Using the number of illegal guns
as (an inverse) proxy for the costs of obtaining a gun, our empirical analysis provides
strong evidence for these predictions. Before formulating recommendations concerning
containment of illegal weapons, it is worth pausing to delineate the pervasiveness of il-
legal guns in the US According to the recent report by the US Department of Justice
(Langton (2012)), roughly 1.4 million firearms (an annual average of 232,400) were stolen
during burglaries and other property crimes over the period of 2005-2010. At least 80%
of these stolen firearms had not been recovered at the time the National Crime Victim-
ization Survey was conducted. Clearly, these numbers only provide a sense of the lower
bound of illegal guns in circulation, since a significant fraction of weapons enter the ille-
gal gun market via straw purchasing, falsifying purchaser information, failing to conduct
background checks, etc., see Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2010). What can be done to
increase a criminal’s costs of obtaining an illegal gun, g? First, policymakers can increase
g by targeting the major source of illegal weapons – gun traﬃckers and illegal gun deal-
ers. A negative incentive in the form of higher penalties for the sale and transportation of
illegal weapons might be a viable option in this context. Second, one may also consider
designing positive incentives (e.g., monetary rewards) for whistle-blowers of illegal gun
dealers. This mechanism is likely to decrease trust between sellers and buyers of illegal
firearms and, thereby, increase the costs of obtaining an illegal weapon. Third, by tight-
ening the laws on storage of legal weapons, policymakers may prevent some firearms from
being stolen and, thereby, reduce the number of illegal guns in circulation. A pioneering
policy recently established in the District of Columbia (D.C. Code Ann. Â§7-2507.02(a))
might serve as an example in this context: “[...] each registrant should keep any firearm in
his or her possession unloaded and either disassembled or secured by a trigger lock, gun
safe, locked box, or other secure device”. Fourth, policymakers should consider introduc-
ing a nationwide law which would require individual gun owners to report lost or stolen
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firearms to law enforcement agencies.51 This law plays a crucial role in combatting straw
purchasing since, if a straw buyer is identified through gun tracing, such a requirement
would prevent him from evading responsibility by claiming that the crime gun was stolen
from him in the first place.
Lastly, according to our model, gun violence can be reduced by decreasing criminal in-
clinations in a given society. In view of our empirical findings of a robust negative eﬀect
of associational density (civic, social and religions organizations) on the prevalence of
gun-related oﬀenses, governmental support of associational activism may serve as a tool
in combatting gun violence. Yet, a close collaboration between policymakers, sociologists,
and criminologists is required in developing further concrete strategies for building social
capital. Social programs like Cure Violence (Ceasefire-Chicago) or Boston Gun Project
(Operation Ceasefire) are suitable case studies in this context.52 The objective of these
programs is to prevent shootings involving youth by changing social norms and ‘codes of
the street’ with the help of social workers specifically trained for this goal. Several evalua-
tions of these projects report statistically significant reductions in gun-related killings and
provide anecdotal evidence for the change in gun-related social norms (such as using a
gun to settle a dispute) in program sites.53 Yet, further empirical assessments of these and
other programs, as well as further research on the matter of social capital accumulation,
is needed to better understand the eﬀect of social capital on gun violence.
2.5 Concluding Comments
We present a simple model of crime in which criminals decide whether to act unarmed
or commit firearm-related felonies. This model suggests that gun-related oﬀenses in a
given county increase with the number of illegal guns and decrease with social capital and
51 In 2016, only 10 states and the District of Columbia have such regulations in place, see https://smar
tgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-owner-responsibilities/reporting-lost-or-stolen-firearms/.
52 See Kennedy, Braga & Piehl (2001), Slutkin, Ransford & Decker (2015), and https://cureviolence.o
rg/.
53 See Braga, Kennedy, Piehl & Waring (2001), Braga, Kennedy, Waring & Piehl (2001), Braga &
Pierce (2004), Butts, Roman, Bostwick & Porter (2015), Delgado, Blount-Hill, Mandala & Butts
(2015), Henry, Knoblauch & Sigurvinsdottir (2014), Skogan, Hartnett, Bump & Dubois (2008),
Picard-Fritsche & Cerniglia (2013), and Webster, Whitehill, Vernick & Curriero (2012).
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police intensity. Combining detailed panel data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
with various socioeconomic variables, we find empirical support for these predictions. To
identify the eﬀect of illegal guns, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in illegal gun
supplies due to gun thefts in adjacent states. The evidence provided in this paper suggests
that illegal guns increase while social capital and police decrease firearm oﬀenses.
To approximate the number of illegal guns, this paper exploits variation in gun thefts.
Clearly, a firearm can only be stolen if it was acquired in the first place. Consideration
of legal and illegal guns in a unified framework and empirical implementation of its pre-
dictions will certainly enhance our understanding of the issue of gun violence. Given that
such an investigation would go beyond the scope of the current paper, we relegate it to
future research.
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Appendix
2.A Appendix Tables
Table 2.A.1. Summary statistics for main estimation sample.
Variables N mean sd min max
Cross-section:
GunRobberies 2,264 -2.090 0.938 -4.685 1.508
IllegalGuns 2,264 9.753 1.298 5.345 15.732
SocialCapital 2,264 -3.831 0.553 -8.513 -2.267
PoliceIntensity 2,264 0.677 0.682 -2.501 3.813
Income 2,264 6.841 1.095 1.595 10.865
Poverty 2,264 2.627 0.391 1.043 3.661
IncomeInequality 2,264 -0.838 0.079 -1.082 -0.468
CrimeRate 2,264 3.461 0.568 0.087 5.418
OrganizedCrime 2,264 -6.097 2.063 -6.908 5.902
CriminalNetworks 2,264 -3.042 3.122 -6.908 4.754
EthnicFrac 2,264 -0.412 0.478 -4.044 0.000
RacialFrac 2,264 -1.496 0.792 -4.065 -0.349
AfricanAmerican 2,264 -3.398 1.586 -6.873 -0.171
EducationLevel 2,264 3.538 0.223 2.241 3.996
Urbanization 2,264 2.699 3.341 -6.908 4.605
SingleParent 2,264 -1.192 0.304 -2.873 -0.263
GunHomicides 2,222 -4.263 0.927 -7.136 -0.848
TotalRobberies 2,383 -1.610 1.276 -5.899 2.798
TotalHomicides 2,448 -3.761 0.832 -6.827 -0.489
LegalGuns 1,221 2.072 0.468 -0.429 3.452
Panel:
GunRobberies 42,761 -2.023 1.121 -5.599 3.168
IllegalGuns 42,761 9.910 1.899 0.000 17.113
SocialCapital 42,761 -3.807 0.438 -9.716 -1.646
PoliceIntensity 42,761 0.498 0.356 -2.520 3.121
CrimeRate 42,761 3.633 0.551 -1.029 6.183
Income 42,761 6.335 1.066 1.264 9.670
Poverty 42,761 2.648 0.431 0.531 4.045
SocialCapital (empl., religious) 40,105 -4.176 0.465 -8.223 -1.743
SocialCapital (empl., social&civic) 25,278 -5.724 0.784 -9.385 -3.076
SocialCapital (empl., per capita) 42,792 1.831 0.560 -3.855 4.255
SocialCapital (est., ratio) 43,820 -3.015 0.370 -5.892 -1.725
SocialCapital (est., per capita) 43,820 0.064 0.387 -2.928 1.723
PoliceIntensity (employees) 42,761 0.847 0.389 -2.146 4.139
GunHomicides 64,556 -5.346 1.864 -6.908 0.010
TotalRobberies 52,785 -1.256 1.158 -4.981 4.211
TotalHomicides 64,556 -4.766 2.011 -6.908 0.262
IllegalGunsA 42,397 11.646 1.282 3.006 16.452
Note: The table reports summary statistics for the main estimation samples used
in Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, 2.A.2, and 2.A.3.
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Table 2.A.2. Cross-section estimates: Correlates of gun homicides.
Dep.variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)GunHomicides
IllegalGuns 0.091*** 0.122*** 0.152*** 0.317*** 0.248*** 0.242*** 0.210*** 0.191***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032)
SocialCapital -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.108*** -0.091*** -0.098*** -0.077*** -0.006
(0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.045)
PoliceIntensity -0.094*** -0.027 -0.012 -0.017 -0.008 -0.003
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Income 0.219*** 0.457*** 0.475*** 0.382*** 0.137***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.049)
Poverty 0.876*** 0.747*** 0.695*** 0.552*** 0.366***
(0.057) (0.053) (0.054) (0.067) (0.093)
Inequality 1.095*** 0.808*** 0.758*** 0.734*** 0.863**
(0.248) (0.228) (0.228) (0.247) (0.353)
CrimeRate 0.191*** 0.172*** 0.257*** 0.445***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.058)
OrganizedCrime 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 0.075***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
CriminalNetworks 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
EthnicFrac -0.037 -0.051 -0.118*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.063)
RacialFrac -0.067* -0.053 -0.007
(0.040) (0.041) (0.059)
AfricanAmerican 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.161***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029)
Education 0.047 0.220
(0.106) (0.145)
Urbanization -0.042*** -0.068***
(0.005) (0.014)
SingleParent 0.168** 0.423***
(0.067) (0.115)
LegalGuns 0.270***
(0.070)
Observations 2,263 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,244 2,222 2,222 1,206
R-squared 0.318 0.337 0.342 0.458 0.547 0.561 0.578 0.722
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (2.13) with GunHomicides as a dependent variable. All specifications
include state fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level,
respectively.
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Table 2.A.3. Panel estimates: Gun homicides.
Dep.variable: OLS WLS
GunHomicidest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IllegalGunst 1 0.072*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
SocialCapital t 1 -0.160*** -0.181*** -0.182*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.079***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
PoliceIntensityt 1 -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.047 -0.065 -0.045
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
CrimeRatet 0.328*** 0.325*** 0.355*** 0.346*** 0.321***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026)
Incomet 0.341*** -0.057 0.270** 0.314***
(0.083) (0.088) (0.105) (0.105)
Povertyt 0.350*** 0.112 0.075 0.094
(0.066) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080)
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes no no no
State-year FE no no no yes yes yes
IMR no no no no yes yes
Observations 65,806 64,748 64,574 64,556 62,499 62,499
R-squared 0.389 0.393 0.394 0.425 0.419 0.423
Note: The table reports panel estimates of equation (2.14) with GunHomicidest as a dependent
variable. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level. IMR represents inverse
Mills ratios. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1, 5, 10%-level, respectively.
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2.B Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider first the proof of parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 1. Taking the first-order
derivative of (2.9) with respect to g yields N 0a(g) =  c0a(g)xa(ca)f(ca) < 0, whereby the
sign of this derivative follows immediately from the fact that c0a(g) > 0. Similarly, diﬀeren-
tiating (2.9) with respect to  , we obtain N 0a( ) =  c0a( )xa(ca)f(ca)+
R 1
ca
x0a( )f(c)dc < 0,
whereby the sign of this derivative results from c0a( ) > 0 and x0a( ) < 0, cf. equations
(2.8) and (2.9).
Consider next the proof of Proposition 1(ii). Plugging the density associated with the
cumulative distribution function from equation (2.10) in (2.9) and integrating the resulting
expression, we obtain
Na =
cmin
1  cmin
1  ↵
↵  (1  ↵)
⇣
1  (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵
⌘
( w)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
. (2.5.17)
Diﬀerentiating Na from equation (2.5.17) with respect to  yields after simplification:
N 0a() =  
cmin(1  ↵)( w)
↵
1 ↵
⇣
1  
 
↵
p
⌘ 1
1 ↵
((1 + )↵  )2(1  cmin)2
·X,
whereby
X ⌘ (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ ((↵  (1  ↵))(ln(cmin)  (1  cmin) ln(ca)) + ↵(1  cmin))  ↵(1  cmin)
  ln(cmin)(↵  (1  ↵)).
Note that N 0a()  0 if and only if X   0. To assess the sign of X, we take the first-order
derivative of X with respect to cmin and obtain X 0(cmin) =   cmin · Y , whereby
Y ⌘ ↵ (1 ↵) ↵cmin (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ (cmin((↵  (1  ↵)) ln(ca)  ↵) + ↵  (1  ↵)) .
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To show that Y   0, we take the first-order derivative of Y with respect to ca:
@Y
@ca
=  (↵  (1  ↵))
2
1  ↵ (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵  1 · Z , Z ⌘ 1  cmin(1   ln(ca)).
Note that Z is (weakly) decreasing in cmin for all ca 2 [0, 1]. That is, if Z   0 for
the highest possible cmin = ca, Z   0 holds a fortiori for all cmin  ca. Evaluating Z at
cmin = ca yields Z|cmin=ca = 1 ca(1  ln(ca)). Given that @Z|cmin=ca@ca = 2c 1a ln(ca) < 0,
if Z|cmin=ca   0 for the highest possible ca = 1, Z|cmin=ca   0 holds a fortiori for all ca  1.
Evaluating Z|cmin=ca at ca = 1 yields Z|cmin=ca=1 = 0. Since Z   0 for all permissible
parameter values, we have Y 0(ca)  0. Hence, if Y   0 for the highest possible ca = 1,
we have Y   0 for all ca  1. Evaluating Y at ca = 1 yields Y |ca=1 = 0. Since Y   0 for
all permissible parameter values, we have X 0(cmin)  0. Hence, if X   0 for the highest
possible cmin = 1, X   0 holds a fortiori for all cmin  1. Evaluating X at cmin = 1 yields
X|cmin=1 = 0. We thus have shown that N 0a()  0 for all parameter values, whereby
the sign of this first-order derivative is strict (rather than weak) if cmin < ca < 1. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1(ii).
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of cmin on the per capita number of armed oﬀenses. Diﬀeren-
tiating Na from equation (2.5.17) with respect to cmin yields:
N 0a(cmin) =
2c 1min
(1  cmin)2
( w)
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
·⌦, where ⌦ ⌘ 1  ↵
↵  (1  ↵)
⇣
1  (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵
⌘
.
Note that the sign of N 0a(cmin) is determined by the sign of ⌦. If ↵ (1 ↵) > 0, we have
⌦ > 0, since 1 ↵↵ (1 ↵) > 0 and (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ < 1. Conversely, if ↵   (1  ↵) < 0, we have
⌦ > 0, since 1 ↵↵ (1 ↵) < 0 and (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ > 1.54 We thus have established N 0a(cmin) > 0.
DiﬀerentiatingNa from equation (2.9) with respect to p, we obtainN 0a(p) =  c0a(p)xa(ca)f(ca)+R 1
ca
x0a(p)f(c)dc < 0, whereby the sign of this derivative results from c0a(p) > 0 and
x0a(p) < 0, cf. equations (2.8) and (2.9). Similarly, taking the first-order derivative of
Na with respect to w yields N 0a(w) =  c0a(w)xa(ca)f(ca) +
R 1
ca
x0a(w)f(c)dc > 0, whereby
54 For the ‘knife-edge’ case of ↵ (1 ↵) = 0, the sign of N 0a(cmin) is undetermined, cf. also Na from
eq. (2.5.17).
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the sign of this derivative results from c0a(w) < 0 and x0a(w) > 0, cf. equations (2.8) and
(2.9).
Proof of Proposition 2
DiﬀerentiatingN from equation (2.11) with respect to g yieldsN 0(g) =  c0a(g)f(ca)[xa(ca) 
xu(ca)] < 0, whereby the sign of this derivative follows from the fact that c0a(g) > 0, see
equation (2.8), and xa(c) > xu(c) for any given c, cf. equations (2.2) and (2.6). This
implies Proposition 2(i). To prove Proposition 2(iii), we diﬀerentiate N from equation
(2.11) with respect to   and obtain:
N 0( ) =
Z ca
cu
x0u( )f(c)dc+
Z 1
ca
x0a( )f(c)dc c0u( )xu(cu)f(cu) c0a(g)f(ca)[xa(ca) xu(ca)] < 0,
whereby the sign of this derivative results from x0u( ) < 0, x0a( ) < 0, c0u( ) > 0, c0a( ) > 0,
and xa(c) > xu(c) for any given c, cf. equations (2.2), (2.6), and (2.8).
Using the definition of Pareto distribution from equation (2.10), the per capita number
of total oﬀenses can be expressed as:
N =
cmin
1  cmin
1  ↵
↵  (1  ↵)
⇣
 
↵
1 ↵   (ca)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵ ( 
↵
1 ↵   1)  (cu)
↵ (1 ↵)
1 ↵
⌘
w
↵
1 ↵
✓
1   
 
↵
p
◆ 1
1 ↵
,
whereby cu and ca are given by equation (2.8). Following the approach described in
Appendix 2.5, we prove that N 0() < 0. This implies Proposition 2(ii) and completes the
proof of Proposition 2.
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2.C Distribution of Criminal Activities in the US
To draw assumptions about the behavior and functional form of f(c), we use incident-level
data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) by the UCR.55 More
specifically, we exploit the Property Segment of this data which contains information on
the dollar value of property stolen in a given incident. In the most recent year available,
2014, the UCR recorded 3,766,167 incidents of property theft in the US, with the minimum
value of $0, maximum value of $100,000,350 and the mean of $1,154. Figure 2.C.1 depicts
the density of incidents with stolen property worth less than $10,000. Apart from the
‘spikes’ clustered around the round numbers of 500, 1000, 1500, etc., the density in this
range appears to be non-increasing in its support.56
Figure 2.C.1. Histogram of the value of property stolen by incident in the US in 2014.
In the following, we show that the actual density of incidents of property theft in the US
can be approximated by a Pareto distribution. For a discrete Pareto-distributed random
variable, X, the tail distribution (survival) function is given by
Pr[X   x] =
⇣xmin
x
⌘
, x   xmin,  > 0,
where xmin is the lower bound of the support and  is the shape parameter of this function.
If X is indeed distributed Pareto, the relationship between the frequency of theft and the
value of stolen property in log-log coordinates should be linear, with the slope equal to
55 These data are publicly available at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/128.
56 These spikes can be attributed to the rounding errors in cases of the unknown true value of the
stolen property.
CHAPTER 2. GUN VIOLENCE IN THE US: CORRELATES AND CAUSES 66
 .57 To assess this relationship, we tabulate the data in fourteen successive bins, having
the width increasing by one unit on the logarithmic scale.58 Figure 2.C.2 plots the log
frequency of incidents within each bin against the logarithmized mean dollar value of
those incidents. The red line depicts the fitted linear relationship between these variables
and the associated OLS results are presented in the top right corner. A high linear fit
(R2 = 0.979) suggests that the actual distribution of US crime can be well approximated
with a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter of  = 1.171.
Figure 2.C.2. Binned distribution of the dollar value of property stolen in the US in 2014.
We repeat this exercise for all US states available in the NIBRS database (see Table
2.A.4), as well as individual counties (Table 2.A.5 presents exemplary the results for the
state of Massachusetts), whereby N , R2, and  represent the sample size, linear fit, and
the shape parameter, respectively. Generally high R2 suggest that the Pareto distribution
provides a good fit to the actual distribution of criminal activities across US states and
counties. Moreover, notice from Table 2.A.5 that the dispersion of criminal activities (as
measured by the parameter ) varies substantially across counties that belong to the same
state, despite the shared state-specific criminal law. In the main text, we attribute this
variation to diﬀerences in social capital.
57 To see this, note from the definition of the Pareto distribution that d log f(x)/d log x =  .
58 In our benchmark analysis, we do not consider incidents of stolen property worth less than $200
(i.e., set xmin ⌘ 200). In most US states, these incidents are classified as misdemeanors or “petty
theft” and the associated data entries in this range are likely to be subject to the above-mentioned
measurement errors.
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Table 2.A.4. Distribution of criminal activities across US states.
State N R2  State N R2 
Alabama 3,426 0.953 0.778 Montana 38,646 0.938 0.984
Arizona 16,286 0.928 1.063 Nebraska 18,253 0.950 1.034
Arkansas 140,359 0.957 1.158 New Hampshire 38,268 0.960 0.911
Colorado 221,778 0.937 0.980 North Dakota 23,256 0.919 0.996
Connecticut 62,364 0.951 0.964 Ohio 373,845 0.976 1.113
Delaware 49,868 0.946 1.059 Oklahoma 45,230 0.910 1.016
DC 1,756 0.941 1.175 Oregon 81,955 0.955 1.016
Idaho 46,434 0.920 0.816 Pennsylvania 3,055 0.953 0.778
Illinois 12,162 0.949 0.977 Rhode Island 33,265 0.934 1.001
Indiana 2,031 0.858 0.678 South Carolina 267,509 0.955 1.143
Iowa 91,573 0.939 1.057 South Dakota 20,124 0.952 0.884
Kansas 104,144 0.953 1.063 Tennessee 365,586 0.966 1.139
Kentucky 133,787 0.957 1.039 Texas 171,967 0.945 1.058
Louisiana 21,863 0.935 0.996 Utah 114,265 0.950 1.038
Maine 10,670 0.934 1.029 Vermont 12,445 0.942 1.073
Massachusetts 144,788 0.965 1.011 Virginia 281,899 0.968 1.121
Michigan 301,047 0.942 1.166 Washington 306,601 0.930 1.169
Mississippi 11,310 0.943 0.943 West Virginia 42,090 0.965 1.001
Missouri 55,817 0.912 1.112 Wisconsin 94,442 0.933 1.138
Table 2.A.5. Distribution of criminal activities across counties in Massachusetts.
County N R2  County N R2 
Barnstable 6,048 0.928 0.884 Hampshire 3,322 0.937 0.862
Berkshire 3,237 0.966 0.797 Middlesex 30,114 0.925 0.901
Bristol 16,774 0.950 0.958 Nantucket 384 0.965 0.583
Dukes 156 0.962 0.533 Norfolk 11,511 0.962 0.888
Essex 15,827 0.944 0.965 Plymouth 10,115 0.934 0.820
Franklin 1,530 0.934 0.931 Suﬀolk 4,381 0.898 0.974
Hampden 18,550 0.942 1.057 Worcester 22,476 0.944 1.035
2.D Data Appendix
All crime-related measures in our paper are constructed using Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) data by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).59 This data is available at the
level of law enforcement agencies (LEAs). We map all LEAs to US counties using the 2012
Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk by the US Department of Justice.60 In
the following, we detail the construction of the main dependent and independent variables
obtained from the UCR data.
GunHomicides and TotalHomicides are constructed using the UCR’s Supplementary
59 This data is publicly available at https://icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/57.
60 This crosswalk is available at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/00366. In our
baseline analysis, we drop observations from Alaska and Hawaii.
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Homicide Reports (SHR) database. The SHR lists all known homicide incidents that took
place in a given year on the area monitored by a given LEA and provides information
on the circumstance under which a given homicide was committed. During the construc-
tion of our baseline measure of (gun-caused) homicides, we excluded the following list
of circumstances indicating an accident, negligence, or killing of the (suspected) felon:
‘victim shot in hunting accident’, ‘gun-cleaning death - other than self’, ‘children playing
with gun’, ‘other negligent handling of gun’, ‘all other manslaughter by negligence’, ‘felon
killed by police’, ‘felon killed by private citizen’, ‘all suspected felony type’. We further
excluded rare circumstances that are hard to rationalize with our theoretical model, such
as ‘child killed by babysitter’, ‘institutional killings’, ‘sniper attack’, and ‘abortion’. Us-
ing SHR information on the type of the oﬀender’s weapon, we identify all homicides that
were committed by one of the following firearm types: ‘handgun – pistol, revolver’, ‘ri-
fle’, ‘shotgun’, ‘firearm, type not stated’, and ‘other gun’. We then calculate the yearly
sum of gun-caused and total (i.e., gun-caused and gun-unrelated) homicides by LEA and
aggregate this information to county-level data using the above-mentioned LEA Identi-
fiers Crosswalk. Using US Census annual county-level population data, we construct our
proxies for the per capita number of GunHomicides and TotalHomicides.
GunRobberies and TotalRobberies. These measures are constructed using the UCR’s
Oﬀenses Known and Clearances by Arrest (OKCA) database, which reports, among other
things, the ‘actual number of gun robberies’ (ACT NUM GUN ROBBERY) and the
‘actual number of total robberies’ (ACT NUM ROBBERY TOTL). Both variables are
reported at the LEA-level on a monthly basis. The challenge behind aggregating this
information to county-level annual measures lies in the fact that OKCA codifies both zero
and missing values as “0”. Following the methodology delineated in the UCR codebooks,
we distinguish missing (gun-related) robberies from “true” zeroes using information on
‘grand total of all actual oﬀenses’ (ACT # ALL FIELDS). This process involves several
steps: First, we exploit information on the latest month reported in the yearly return
(NUMBER OF MONTHS REPORTED), to replace zero values in the ensuing months
with missing values. However, information on the latest reported month (say, November)
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does not necessarily imply that all preceding (eleven) months are included in the reports
(see UCR codebooks). To identify missing observations in the preceding months, we
calculate in the second step the average monthly number of grand total oﬀenses in a
given LEA/year and replace this LEA’s “0”-values as missing if the monthly average lies
above a certain threshold. During the construction of our baseline measures, we set this
threshold equal to 15. That is, if the average monthly number of grand total oﬀenses in a
given LEA is larger than fifteen, we treat this LEA’s zero values as missing.61 Third, we
identify LEAs that report oﬀenses quarterly, semiannually, or annually and replace “0”-
values in the non-reporting months as missing. Having distinguished missing values from
true zeroes in grand total oﬀenses, we replace all zero monthly values in gun-related and
total robberies with missing values if a LEA’s grand total oﬀenses in the respective month
is missing. Missing monthly values in gun-related and total robberies are then replaced
by the averages in the respective category across all months reported by a LEA in a
given year. Monthly gun-related and total robberies are summed up to annual LEA-level
data, which, in turn, is aggregated to annual county-level data using the LEA Identifiers
Crosswalk. Using yearly population data from the US Census, we construct our proxies
for the per capita number of GunRobberies and TotalRobberies in a given county-year.
IllegalGuns . Our proxy for the number of illegal guns is constructed using the UCR’s
Property Stolen and Recovered (PSR) database, which reports, among other things, the
value of firearms stolen in a given month in the area monitored by a given LEA. In the
raw PSR data, both zero and missing values are coded as “0”. However, the PSR database
contains twelve dummy variables (STATUS) which indicate whether information in a given
month was reported or not. Missing monthly values in stolen firearm value are replaced
by the average value of stolen firearms in a given year and the annual LEA-level data is
aggregated to the county level using the LEA Identifiers Crosswalk.
PoliceIntensity . Our measures of police intensity are constructed using the UCR’s
Law Enforcement Oﬃcers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA) database. For each LEA/year,
the LEOKA reports the number of police oﬃcers per 1,000 population (OFFICER RATE
61 Since the above-mentioned threshold is chosen arbitrarily, we run a wide range of unreported ro-
bustness checks to ensure robust to considering alternative thresholds.
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PER 1,000 POP) and the number of police employees per 1,000 population (EMPLOYEE
RATE PER 1,000 POP).62 To construct our baseline measure of police intensity, we
calculate for each year the weighted average of the police oﬃcers rate across all LEAs of
a given county with weights being the fraction of a county’s population served by a given
LEA. In the robustness checks, we consider the weighted average rate of police employees
as an alternative proxy for police intensity in a given county.
62 In years 1981-82, 1985-89, and 1995-96, these rates are reported per 10,000 population. The reported
values of police oﬃcers and employees in those years are multiplied by 10 for consistency. Due to
the fact that the reported values of police oﬃcers and employees in 1990 are exceptionally high
(oftentimes exceeding the preceding years by the factor of thirty) we replace these values in 1990 by
an average of the years 1989 and 1991.
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Chapter 3
The Size of the Middle Class and Educational
Attainment: Theory and Evidence from the
Indian Subcontinent1
3.1 Introduction
The Industrial Revolution in Europe entailed an array of socio-political changes that
transformed the basis of material wealth and political influence from landownership to-
wards ingenuity and entrepreneurship. Representatives of this new kind of influential
individuals predominantly belonged to the urban middle class. The formerly ruling class
of landowners lost most of their influence both economically and politically (Doepke &
Zilibotti, 2008; Galor, Moav, & Vollrath, 2009). Doepke & Zilibotti (2008) stress that
this fundamental change in the basis of wealth is largely attributable to diﬀerences in
the preference structures across social classes. The constituents of the land-owning class
are seen as exhibiting a poor work ethic, a low preference for saving, and inadequate
entrepreneurial and innovative skills. By contrast, the members of the new aﬄuent so-
cial class of industrialists are held to be diligent and exhibiting a more future-oriented
preference structure.
One channel by which diﬀerences in time preference rates exert an influence at the macroe-
conomic level is the savings behaviour of individuals. The more impatient individuals
1 Joint work with Klaus Prettner. Published as Prettner & Seiﬀert (2018).
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are, the less they save and the weaker is aggregate physical capital accumulation, one of
the sources of growth over the medium run (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Diamond, 1965;
Koopmans, 1965). Another – probably even more important – channel is education, i.e.,
foregoing current consumption in favour of accumulating human capital, often of the sub-
sequent generation (Galor & Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005, 2011). Since substantial educational
investments are often made early in life, whereas the benefits of these investments accrue
later or even to the next generation, societies with relatively large shares of middle class
households that are relatively patient should exhibit a high level of average educational
attainment.
There are many diﬀerent pathways by which education exerts positive economic and social
eﬀects. Education raises the productivity of workers and has spillover eﬀects in team
production (Lucas, 1988); education fosters the creation of new ideas, in the historical
context mostly by tinkerers and in modern times by means of targeted research and
development of highly educated scientists (Romer, 1990; Strulik, Prettner, & Prskawetz,
2013); and education has numerous beneficial eﬀects on socio-economic development, for
example, on institutions and on democratization (Barro, 1999; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004). Especially in the context of a conflict-prone country such
as India, higher levels of average education seem to have a pacifying eﬀect on societies
(see Ostby & Urdal, 2011, for an overview of numerous contributions supporting this
finding). For example, Alesina & Perotti (1996) show that socio-political instability is
significantly reduced by higher levels of education in a panel of 71 countries over the
time-span from 1960 to 1985; Tadjoeddin & Murshed (2007) find an inverted U-shaped
relationship between average years of education and social conflict in Indonesia; and in a
panel-analysis of 125 countries over the years 1960 through 1999, Collier (2004) finds that
higher levels of male educational attainment are associated with significantly lower levels
of conflict risk. Given the many beneficial eﬀects of education, it is therefore of utmost
importance for less developed countries to understand its central determinants.
As previous research has found support for the hypothesis that a larger share of the mid-
dle class fosters education and industrialisation in Europe, this channel should obviously
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Figure 3.1.1. Cross-Sectional Plots of Educational Attainment versus Share of Middle-Class in Indian
villages (2005).
not be ignored when assessing the evolution of developing countries towards modern, in-
dustrialised economies. As Figure 3.1.1 clearly shows, there exists a significantly positive
correlation between middle class shares and average educational attainment in Indian
villages. We see this as an indication that, especially in the context of educational at-
tainment, the share of middle class households appears to play a similarly important role
in developing economies in general – and India in a narrower sense – as it did in the
Industrial Revolution in Europe.
In this contribution, we develop a stylised model of the demand for education in a society
that is divided into three income strata. Households decide between the consumption of
necessary goods, investments in the education of the subsequent generation, and spending
on luxury goods. Since poorer households spend a substantial part of their income on
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subsistence needs, while richer households spend a non-negligible part of their income
on luxury goods, the share of income that is spent on education tends to be the highest
for members of the middle class. We show that in this setting, a higher proportion of
middle class households in the society has the potential to induce higher levels of average
educational attainment.
In order to empirically test the impact of middle class shares on average educational at-
tainment, we use Indian household survey data which entails detailed information about
education, income, and caste membership. To start oﬀ our empirical assessment, we exam-
ine the cross-sectional conditional correlation between the share of middle class households
and average educational attainment in Indian villages/neighbourhoods (henceforth: vil-
lages). While the results from the simple OLS estimations confirm a positive association
between middle class shares and education, they do not allow us to make any statements
about the direction of causality. The first reason is the potential presence of omitted
variable bias. The second reason is that reverse causality might distort the OLS results.
More explicitly, observational units that are characterised by higher levels of education
might be fertile breeding grounds for middle class households. To overcome this problem,
we expand our empirical analysis to the extent that we construct a novel instrument for
the share of middle class households. Exploiting India’s unique Hinduistic society, we
use the share of members of the two castes that lie between the spiritual and intellectual
elite of the Hinduistic society, the Brahmans, and the untouchable lowest caste, Dalits as
an instrument for middle class shares per village. Applying this instrument, we find a
positive and significant eﬀect of middle class shares on average educational attainment.
Furthermore, we show that the eﬀect is especially pronounced in rural areas and when
focussing on female education. The strong positive eﬀect of the share of the middle
class on the educational attainment of women is particularly interesting because there
is widespread consent that the empowerment of women is highly eﬀective in promoting
economic development (Diebolt & Perrin, 2013; Prettner & Strulik, 2017; Bloom, Kuhn,
& Prettner, 2017).
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains the theoretical motivation and
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derives the optimal investment of households in the education level of their children. In
Section 3.3, we analyse the relation between education and the size of the middle class
from an empirical point of view, and in Section 3.4 we draw our conclusions.
3.2 The Size of the Middle Class and Economic
Growth: Theoretical Motivation
In the following, we provide a stylised theoretical consideration to motivate the empirical
analysis of the potential impact of inequality in terms of the population share of the
middle class on educational attainment.
3.2.1 Basic Assumptions
Consider a developing economy populated by households who have the possibility to
consume three diﬀerent types of goods: i) necessary goods such as food, clothing, and
basic shelter without which it is impossible to survive, ii) investments in the human capital
of the next generation such as spending on education, and iii) luxury goods such as large
housing, vacations abroad, expensive jewellery, etc., which might become desirable once
that incomes are high enough and the basic needs are largely fulfilled. This structure
implies a hierarchy of needs in the sense that households strive to fulfil their basic needs
before they start to invest in education. The lowest priority is attached to luxury goods
that households will only start to consume if their incomes surpass the threshold above
which the diminishing marginal utility from spending on basic consumption goods and on
education renders the consumption of luxury goods to be desirable.
3.2.2 Optimal Choices of the Households
We conceptualize the described hierarchy of needs by the following household utility
function:
U(cs,t, et, cl,t) = !s log(cs,t   c¯s) + !h log(ht) + !l log(cl,t + c¯l), (3.2.1)
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where U(·) is the utility level of the household, cs,t refers to consumption of basic goods at
time t, ht denotes expenditures on educating children, cl,t is consumption of luxury goods,
!i for i = s, h, l refers to the weights of the corresponding goods in the utility function
with !s > !e > !l, c¯s denotes the subsistence consumption level of basic goods that is
necessary for survival of period t, and log(c¯l) defines a lower bound on felicity derived
from luxury goods for the case in which no income is spent on this item, i.e., cl,t = 0. A
reasonable assumption would be log(c¯l) = 0 such that, without any spending on luxury
goods, the utility derived from this component is zero. The short-cut formulation of
altruism in this model is the well-known “warm-glow” motive of giving (Andreoni, 1989)
that usually leads to qualitatively similar results as the more complicated formulation of
a dynastic utility function. Note that we could also introduce other standard goods that
do not belong to the basket of basic goods or luxury goods and would therefore exhibit a
similar utility eﬀect as ht. However, this would merely complicate the exposition without
changing the results and without adding new insights.
The budget constraint of a household implies that expenditures on the diﬀerent types of
consumption and on education must not exceed income. Formally, it is given by
wt   cs,t + ht + pl,tcl,t, (3.2.2)
where wt is the income level of the household at time t, the price of the basic consumption
goods (cs,t) is normalized to unity, the price of education is measured in terms of foregone
basic consumption, and the price of luxury goods (cl,t) is given by pl,t > 1. Note that,
due to the local non-satiation implied by our utility function, the budget constraint will
always hold with equality at any optimal allocation for wt > 0. We can therefore solve
the optimization problem by means of the method of Lagrange (see Appendix 3.4 for the
derivations). From now on we assume that the income level is high enough to guarantee
that the subsistence consumption needs are fulfilled, i.e., wt > c¯s and people do not starve
to death.
The set of optimal choices can be split into two parts depending on the level of household
income (see Appendix 3.4). For a high income level wt > pl,t(!h + !s)c¯l/!l + c¯s ⌘ wˆt, the
CHAPTER 3. THE MIDDLE CLASS AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 82
demand functions are given by
cs,t =
!s(wt + pl,tc¯l) + (!h + !l)c¯s
!s + !h + !l
, (3.2.3)
ht =
!h(wt + pl,tc¯l   c¯s)
!s + !h + !l
, (3.2.4)
cl,t =
!l(wt   c¯s)  pl,t(!h + !s)c¯l
pl,t(!s + !h + !l)
, (3.2.5)
which are all positive as long as wt > wˆt. However, for wt  wˆt, households find themselves
in the corner solution at which the demand for luxury goods is zero and the other two
demand functions are given by
cs,t =
!swt + !hc¯s
!s + !h
, (3.2.6)
ht =
!h(wt   c¯s)
!s + !h
. (3.2.7)
To summarize, we have the following set of (non-homothetic) demand functions for the
whole range of allowed income levels wt > c¯s
cs,t =
8><>:
!swt+!hc¯s
!s+!h
for c¯s < wt < wˆt,
!s(wt+pl,tc¯l)+(!h+!l)c¯s
!s+!h+!l
for wˆt < wt,
ht =
8><>:
!h(wt c¯s)
!s+!h
for c¯s < wt < wˆt,
!h(wt+pl,tc¯l c¯s)
!s+!h+!l
for wˆt < wt,
cl,t =
8><>:0 for c¯s < wt < wˆt,!l(wt c¯s) pl,t(!h+!s)c¯l
pl,t(!s+!h+!l)
for wˆt < wt.
For a comparatively low income level, households spend most of their income on basic
consumption goods and do not consume luxury goods at all. As incomes rise, the share of
income spent on basic consumption goods decreases, while the share of income spent on
education increases. Once that household income surpasses the level of wˆt, consumption of
luxury goods becomes positive and the share of income spent on education of the children
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starts to decrease again.
3.2.3 The Income-Based Stratification of the Society
Now we assume that the society consists of three income groups i) the rich (indexed by
r) with an income level of wr,t > wˆt, ii) the middle class (indexed by m) with an income
level of wm,t < wr,t, and iii) the poor (indexed by p) with an income level of wp,t < wm,t.
We normalize the total population size to unity and denote the share of the rich by ✓r and
the share of the poor by ✓p such that the share of the middle class is given by 1  ✓r   ✓p.
With these assumptions, the share of education expenditures in the economy determines
the average human capital stock of the next generation as
h¯ =
✓php,t + (1  ✓p   ✓r)hm,t + ✓rhr,t
✓pwp,t + (1  ✓p   ✓r)wm,t + ✓rwr,t
=
!e
h
✓r(plc¯l c¯s+wr,t)
!e+!l+!s
+ (1 ✓p ✓r)(wm,t c¯s)!e+!s +
✓p(wp,t c¯s)
!e+!s
i
wm,t (1  ✓p   ✓r) + ✓pwp,t + ✓rwr,t . (3.2.8)
The appropriate interpretation of this expression is the following. The cost of education
rises with the weighted average of the incomes in an economy which is reflected by the
denominator. The reason is that education is labour-intensive such that the salaries of
teachers, instructors, and professors rise with the average salary level of a country. Thus,
a nominal increase in the expenditures of households on education does not necessarily
lead to an increase in the human capital stock of the next generation because the increase
could just compensate for a given increase in the nominal wages of teachers, instructors,
and professors. What is needed to increase the average human capital stock of the next
generation is an increase in the share of expenditures that are devoted to education.
It remains to be shown how the average human capital stock depends on the income-
specific stratification of the society. To this end, we show how the average human capital
stock depends on the population shares of the poor and the rich. Taking the derivatives
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of Equation (3.2.8) with respect to ✓r and ✓p yields
@h¯
@✓p
=
(wm,t   wp,t) {✓r [plc¯l (!e + !s)  !lwr,t]  c¯s [!e + !l (1  ✓r) + !s]}
! 1e (!e + !s) (!e + !l + !s) [wm,t (1  ✓p   ✓r) + ✓pwp,t + ✓rwr,t] 2
, (3.2.9)
@h¯
@✓r
=
[wm,t (✓p   1)  ✓pwp,t] [!lwr,t   plc¯l (!e + !s)]
! 1e (!e + !s) (!e + !l + !s) [wm,t (1  ✓p   ✓r) + ✓pwp,t + ✓rwr,t] 2
+
c¯s [wr,t (!e + !l + !s)  wm,t (!e + !l✓p + !s) + !l✓pwp,t]
! 1e (!e + !s) (!e + !l + !s) [wm,t (1  ✓p   ✓r) + ✓pwp,t + ✓rwr,t] 2
. (3.2.10)
Inspecting Equation (3.2.10), we observe that i) the common denominator of the terms
in both lines is always positive; ii) the numerator of the term in the second line is always
positive because wm,t (!e + !l✓p + !s) < wr,t (!e + !l + !s) due to wr,t > wm,t and because
✓p < 1; iii) as a consequence of i) and ii) the term in the second line is always positive;
iv) the sign of the term in the first line is ambiguous and depends on the sign of the
expression !lwr,t  plc¯l (!e + !s). If this expression is positive, the term in the first line of
Equation (3.2.10) is negative such that a reduction in the population share of the middle
class that is due to an increase in the population share of the rich has a negative eﬀect
on average human capital. The intuition is that the rich spend a portion of their income
on luxury goods such that the share that they spend on educating their children is lower
in comparison to the middle class. An overall increase of the population share of the rich
could therefore reduce the overall ratio of spending on human capital accumulation. Note
that the expression !lwr,t   plc¯l (!e + !s) is more likely to be positive if the rich have a
strong preference for luxury goods, i.e., if !l is relatively large in comparison to !e and
!s.
Inspecting Equation (3.2.9), we observe that i) the denominator is again always positive;
ii) the sign of the numerator is a priori ambiguous; iii) the term ✓r [plc¯l (!e + !s)  !lwr,t]
has a similar eﬀect as in Equation (3.2.10) but it is weighted with the population share of
the rich (✓r); iii) the term  c¯s[!e+!l (1  ✓r)+!s] is always negative. This implies that a
larger subsistence need c¯s reduces the fraction of income that the poor spend on education
because a higher c¯s means that it is more diﬃcult to fulfil the subsistence consumption
needs. Therefore, it is again possible that an increase in the population share of the poor
reduces average education expenditures.
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Altogether, we have a plausible mechanism by which the population share of the middle
class raises the share of resources that a society devotes to education. If the fraction of
education spending of the middle class is larger than the corresponding fractions of the
poor and the rich, then an increase in the relative size of the middle class raises overall
human capital accumulation. This is the implication that we test in Section 3.3.
3.3 The Size of the Middle Class and Educational
Attainment: Empirical Results
In the following, we present the empirical investigation of the eﬀects of the relative size
of the middle class on education. The subsequent analysis is based on household data
from the Indian subcontinent. While we are aware of the usual concerns about accuracy of
household income data for developing countries, we also emphasise the advantages of using
Indian villages as the unit of analysis for our project. Not only is India the second most
populous country in the world. It also displays a vast heterogeneity with respect to ethno-
linguistic and other societal criteria. All subject to a relatively homogeneous legislative
landscape. Furthermore, India is characterised by substantial cross- as well as within-state
income inequality (see Vannemann & Dubey, 2013, for a comprehensive description). In
addition, the data published by the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) provides
a sound basis for empirical analysis both from a coverage and a quality perspective. The
strongest argument for basing our choice of the research subject, however, is the Indian
caste system. It is unique regarding its impact on social life and its persistence over
centuries, which enables us to use it as a novel instrument for the size of the middle class.
This in turn allows us to shed light on the causal eﬀect of the size of the middle class
on educational outcomes. Many other attempts to empirically investigate the question at
hand are hampered by the lack of a valid instrument for the share of the middle class.
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3.3.1 Measuring the Size of the Middle Class in India
The term middle class in social sciences is of ambivalent nature. There exists a wide
array of potential characteristics on which the employed definition could be based on.
They range from income-based measures to metrics based on occupational functions such
as the tier in management hierarchies (Chauvel, 2013). In economics, scholars mostly rely
on some income-based variant, where members of the middle class are those whose incomes
lie within some interval including the median/mean. This interval is often symmetric with
an early example being the study by Thorow (1987) in which the interval ranges from
75% to 125% of the mean (Ravallion, 2010).
While it appears that Thorow’s measure has become somewhat of a standard in the
literature on aﬄuent economies, there is less consensus on developing economies. The
measures used vary widely with the scope of the respective contribution. According to
Ravallion (2010), we can identify the following groups: Birdsall, Graham & Pettinato
(2000), among others, stick closely to the widely used relative measure spanning the
aforementioned interval in a study assessing potential changes in size and income shares
of the middle class and their relationship to increased integration in global markets.
The second group of scholars rely on absolute measures to quantify the middle class.
A prominent example is Banerjee & Duflo (2008) who rely on a measure that defines
the middle class as households with daily PPP per capita expenditures between $2 and
$10. In justifying their measure, they argue that it produces similar results with respect
to population shares as the income quantiles covered by Thorow’s median based relative
measure. The third group is represented by Milanovic & Yitzhaki (2002). Those authors’
definition of a global middle class includes all persons living on incomes between the mean
incomes of Brazil and Italy.
This leaves us with the task of deciding which households we should consider as the
middle class in the Indian case. As Figure 3.3.1 shows, India is characterised by an
income distribution that is strongly skewed to the left. Daily household incomes per
capita in PPP US dollars range from 0.0003 to 303.55 with a mean of 2.91. Clearly,
the above mentioned absolute middle class measures are not applicable in the underlying
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Figure 3.3.1. Histogram of Indian Household Incomes.
analysis focussing on Indian villages. Following Vannemann & Dubey (2013), we therefore
assign all households with incomes between 75% and 250% of the district median income
to the middle class. We base our middle class measure on the district median instead of
the country median due to the substantial cross-district income diﬀerences illustrated in
Figure 3.3.3. In the presence of a standard deviation that is about half of the mean of
this measure, taking the national or even state-level median as a reference would lead to
a highly biased measure of the middle class.
By following this strategy, we arrive at a mean share of middle class households per village
of 36%. This is comparable to the share of middle class households in the United States
in 2010 as reported by the OECD. Furthermore, as Figure 3.3.2 indicates, the skewness
of the distribution of the middle class shares per village is rather low.
One potential concern with our measure could be that higher shares of middle class
households per village coincide with higher mean household incomes in the respective
village. Comparing Figures 3.3.3 and 3.3.5, one can see that a high mean income seldom
coincides with a large share of middle class households. The unconditional correlation
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Figure 3.3.2. Histogram of Middle Class per Village.
between mean village income and the middle class share is 0.03. This is strong evidence
against this potentially problematic correlation.
3.3.2 Data
Our analysis is based on household, individual, and village level data sets from the Indian
Household Survey (IHDS) 2005. The IHDS provides nationally representative data on
a multitude of topics sampled from 41,554 households in 1503 villages and 971 urban
neighbourhoods for the years 2005 and 20112. The village units are derived from the
IHDS’ primary sampling units (PSU). They are the lowest level of aggregation unit above
the household level for which the IHDS data structure allows. With its extensive coverage
both in terms of the representativity and the span of covered topics, it is, to our knowledge,
the premier survey covering India. In what follows, we will provide a brief discussion of
the key variables and their construction.
The 2005 wave of the IHDS is comprised of 8 data sets of which we utilise the individual
2 The data are available here: https://ihds.umd.edu.
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Figure 3.3.3. Heatmap of Annual Median Household Incomes per District.
file, the household file, and the village file.3 Our left-hand side variables are created
from the individual file, while we construct our key variable of interest and the employed
instrumental variable from the household file and the village file, respectively.
The key dependent variable in our empirical setup is the average educational attainment
per PSU. In order to construct this measure, we use the mean years of schooling reported
by PSU. Following Castelló-Climent, Chaudhary & Mukhopadhyay (2017), we restrict
our sample to the survey population aged 25 years and above to ensure that the upper
end of the education distribution is not censored by age. In order to identify potentially
diﬀerent eﬀects on the educational outcomes of men and women, we run the regression
using three diﬀerent dependent variables: the plain average years of formal schooling per
PSU as well as mean male and female education separately. While the cross-PSU mean of
our main education measure is 4.8 years, it varies from 0 to 13.8 years4. A brief look at the
3 The further 5 files cover: medical facilities, non-resident family members, primary school, birth
history, and crop production.
4 The cross-PSU mean for male education is 6.2 with a range from 0 to 14.7. The cross-PSU mean
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Table 3.3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Sampling Units
Standard
Mean Deviation
Log Educational Attainment
Full Sample 1961 1.733 0.553
Male 1987 1.932 0.467
Female 1987 1.357 1.103
Log Share of Middle-Class Households 1961 -1.017 1.054
Log Household Income 1961 5.303 0.800
Urban dummy 1961 0.324 0.468
Log Distance to Bus Station 1937 -4.573 3.676
respective summary statistics for the split sample justifies our strategy to additionally run
the regression on dependent variables based on gender. Indian women on average spend
roughly half the time in the formal education system as compared to men. Furthermore,
this gender diﬀerence is more pronounced in rural PSUs as compared to urban areas5.
Figure 3.3.4 displays the district means of educational attainment for the full sample.
The darker the blue, the higher is average years of schooling. One can easily observe that
Indian districts exhibit considerable spatial heterogeneity in education. This holds both
across and within states, which are indicated by red outlines. For the female sample, the
cross-district heterogeneity is roughly 10% higher6.
While the within-state heterogeneity with regards to educational attainment is already
striking, within district heterogeneity is even more pronounced. We are unable to graph-
ically depict this heterogeneity at the lower aggregation level due to location-censoring
in the underlying survey. Table 3.3.1 shows that it appears to be even more pronounced
within districts. Hence, in our further analysis, we will empirically assess in how far those
diﬀerences in educational attainment may be driven by diﬀerences in the share of middle
class households at the PSU level.
The key variable of interest is the proportion of households per sampling unit that belong
for female education is 3.4 with a range from 0 to 13.6.
5 In rural areas, women report about 44% of the educational attainment relative to males. In urban
areas, the fraction is about 67%.
6 Figures 3.B.1 and 3.B.2 in the appendix display the spatial distribution of average years of schooling
per district for the male and female samples.
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Figure 3.3.4. District-Level Mean of Education in Years (Full Sample).
to the middle class. We use it to estimate the eﬀect of the size of the middle class on
educational attainment. In so doing, we define a household as belonging to the middle
class if household income lies between 75% and 250% of its respective district. We chose
the district mean over the state or even country mean due to the vast cross-state and
cross-district inequality in household per capita incomes7. As figure 3.3.5 illustrates,
there is vast heterogeneity in the middle class household shares at the district level. This
holds – as with the two previously presented measures – for both the within-state and the
cross-state perspective and is also observable comparing adjacent districts.
In Section 4.1 we discussed the presence of a positive unconditional correlation between the
share of middle class households per PSU and our three diﬀerent education measures. Still,
it might be the case that this basic relationship is distorted by potentially confounding
factors. In order to purge our specification from those eﬀects, we include an array of
control variables in our baseline specification. This includes measures for mean income
7 Figure 3.B.3 in the appendix illustrates this considerable heterogeneity at the district level.
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Figure 3.3.5. District-Level Mean Share of Middle Class Households.
per PSU (Income), the distance to the closest middle school (Dist. School), the distance
to the closest bus station (Dist. Bus), and a binary indicator for urban status (Urban).
In addition, all specifications include district-level fixed eﬀects.
3.3.3 Baseline Econometric Specification & Empirical Results
We commence our empirical investigation by a simple OLS estimation of the following
equation
ln (Educationc) =   ⇥ ln(MiddleClassc) + Controls+ ✏c (3.3.1)
where Educationc is average educational attainment, c indexes villages, our independent
variable of interest is the share of middle-class households in a PSU (MiddleClassc), ✏c
is the error term, and   is the parameter that we aim to estimate. We run the regression
thrice, using the three diﬀerent measures of educational attainment as dependent variable.
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We take the logarithm of all employed variables except for the urban dummy.8 Potentially
unobservable confounders are being accounted for by the inclusion of district-specific
dummy variables. In all cases, we report robust standard errors. The results of this
baseline OLS specification are reported in Tables 3.3.3 to 3.3.4.
Table 3.3.2. Baseline Regression Results (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Education (full) Education (full) Education (full) Education (full) Education (full)
Middle Class 0.081*** 0.036** 0.040** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Income 0.405*** 0.396*** 0.328*** 0.323***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Dist. School -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Urban 0.357*** 0.335***
(0.038) (0.039)
Dist. Bus -0.010*
(0.005)
Observations 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937
R-squared 0.447 0.534 0.540 0.557 0.558
Note: The table reports estimates of Equation (3.3.1) with Education (all) as dependent variable. All specifi-
cations include district fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *, **, and ***
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Comparing columns (1) through (5), we observe that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of
interest remains fairly constant after adding the logarithm of mean PSU income. This
indicates that the mean income level appears to be the most important factor to correct
for within district diﬀerences in PSU-level average educational attainment. All further
controls, while being statistically significant and in cases of considerable magnitude, have
hardly any noticeable impact on the strength of the relationship between the size of a PSUs
middle class and the associated levels of education. Accordingly, a one standard deviation
increase in the share of middle-class households is associated with a 4.2% increase in
average years of formal education of the respective PSU’s population. Absent the full
set of controls, this eﬀect is about twice as large. It is noteworthy that, while being
substantially smaller than the strength of the correlation between education and income
as well as between education and urbanity, the size of the middle class plays a considerably
8 Since it is the case that variables take on the value 0, we add a small number (0.001) to all non-binary
variables in the regression.
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larger role than the two variables that we included to catch PSU-level diﬀerences in the
indirect cost of schooling caused by higher commuting costs (Dist. School andDist. Bus).
Table 3.3.3. Baseline Regression Results (Male Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Education (full) Education (full) Education (full) Education (full) Education (full)
Middle Class 0.081*** 0.036** 0.040** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Income 0.405*** 0.396*** 0.328*** 0.323***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Dist. School -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Urban 0.357*** 0.335***
(0.038) (0.039)
Dist. Bus -0.010*
(0.005)
Observations 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937
R-squared 0.447 0.534 0.540 0.557 0.558
Note: The table reports estimates of Equation (3.3.1) with Education (male) as a dependent variable. All
specifications include district fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *, **,
and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Comparing the results from the two alternative regression specifications focussing on
male and female educational attainment reported in Tables ?? and 3.3.4 yields valuable
additional insights. It appears that the magnitude of the relation between the dependent
variable and the independent variables is smaller in the male sample, whereas it becomes
substantially larger in the female sample. A first conclusion that we can draw from this
fact is that, unsurprisingly, women fare much better education-wise in better-oﬀ and
urban areas. Similarly, female education exhibits a stronger negative relationship with
higher travel costs to school than male education. In addition, it is worth noting that,
while the coeﬃcients on the controls such as income or urbanity double or triple relative
to the male sample, the magnitude of the relationship to the share of the middle class in
the female sample is about seven times as large as compared to the male sample. This
can be taken as first evidence for the share of the middle class not only being important
for male and overall education but that it is especially strongly correlated with higher
educational outcomes for Indian women.
The results from our baseline empirical examination so far suggest a sizeable positive
correlation between the share of middle class households and educational attainment.
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Table 3.3.4. Baseline Regression Results (Female Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Education (fem) Education (fem) Education (fem) Education (fem) Education (fem)
Middle Class 0.297*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 0.220***
(0.067) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Income 0.742*** 0.725*** 0.578*** 0.571***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062)
Dist. School -0.037*** -0.029** -0.027**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Urban 0.772*** 0.739***
(0.104) (0.111)
Dist. Bus -0.014
(0.016)
Observations 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937
R-squared 0.431 0.479 0.482 0.495 0.496
Note: The table reports estimates of Equation (3.3.1) with Education (fem) as a dependent variable. All speci-
fications include district fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where *, **, and ***
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The relationship is robust to the inclusion of a broad set of controls. Furthermore, the
relationship is more pronounced if the sample is restricted to women. Due to the likely
existence of endogeneity in the underlying relation, these insights do not yield any infor-
mation on the direction of causality. To address this issue, we turn to an instrumental
variable approach in the subsequent sections.
3.3.4 Using the Share of OBC Households as an Instrument
The Indian caste system is an ancient system of societal stratification that is unique to
the Hinduistic culture of the Indian subcontinent. It provides a strictly defined hierar-
chical order of the society that has been in place for thousands of years and remained
largely unchanged until today. This persistence makes it the ideal candidate for a his-
torical instrument for middle class shares. In this section, we describe the historical and
sociological characteristics of the Hinduistic caste system that enables the subsequent
empirical specification. It is based on Ghurye (1932) which is – until today – one of the
most influential contributions on the topic.
The oldest obtainable records about the Indian caste system can be attributed to the
Indo-Aryan culture and date back as far as 1500 BCE. While the Indo-Aryan culture
was stemming from and in its early times was mostly restricted to the Gangetic Plain,
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Figure 3.3.6. District-Level Mean Share of OBC Households.
followers of Brahmanism diﬀused it across the Indian subcontinent. It was first mentioned
by a non-local source around 300 BCE. The Greek explorer Megasthenes described it in
the following words: ”it is not permitted to contract marriage with a person of another
caste, nor to change from one profession or trade to another [...]”.
Ghurye (1932) lists the following basic characteristics that make the Hinduistic culture a
perfect candidate for our IV strategy:
Segmentation of Society. The caste system in the Hinduistic culture was omnipresent.
It consisted of five main groups, so-called varnas, which were again organised in diﬀerent
subgroups.9 While most of the Western cultures linked societal status mainly to wealth,
caste membership was solely determined by birth. Accordingly, two soldiers (a profession
open to most of the castes) could exhibit the same rank in the military and similar
9 The jati -system was rather functional than hierarchical. Mainly, it indicated the occupation of its
bearer and also is the basis of Indian surnames. So, basically, two diﬀerent jatis could lie within the
same varna.
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Figure 3.3.7. Cross Sectional Plot of Share of Middle-Class Households Versus Share of OBC Caste
Households.
personal wealth, while the hierarchy defined by the varna-system would still determine
their relative social status in civil life. In contrast to classes in the Weberian sense, which
do not exhibit standing councils or explicit codes of conduct, the majority of the Indian
castes had standing committees. Those were ruling on far more issues than, for example,
guilds or similar organisations.
The pronounced division of society as a consequence of this system resulted in millennia-
old patterns of caste-wise endogamy as well as a clear separation of them within villages.
Hierarchical Structure of Society. In addition to the clear separation, there was also
a strict hierarchical order with the Brahmans on top. In the hinduistic context, dharma
describes the notion that each individual has a certain role to play or a function to fill
to ensure the upholding of spiritual and social order. The brahmans being born into the
highest caste exercise priestly and religious tasks. The kshatriyas formed the second class
which was tasked with administrative and military duties. The third class, the vaishyas
can be seen as a caste of commoners. Their tasks included agriculture and trading. The
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lowest of the four varnas are the shudras. Their duty is to work in all trades that serve
the three superior castes which are considered to be twice-born. They would work as
farmhands, be shop-owners, etc. The lowest-status group in the hinduistic society are
the dalits, often also referred to as untouchables. While opinions vary whether they can
actually be seen as part of the varnas, they undoubtedly are the absolutely lowest group
tasked with everything that is considered as unclean such as tanning or cleaning latrines.
Figure 3.3.8. Hierarchical Order of the varnas (own depiction based on Ghurye, 1932).
The hierarchical system as a whole is strongly related with the notion that spiritual
pollution is transmitted from lower towards upper castes. In theory, physical contact
between members of a superior and an inferior caste soils the body of the member of
the relatively high caste. In some regions of modern India this goes so far that even the
shadow of a dalit overlapping with the body of a member of a higher caste results in
the defiling of the superiors body. This further aggravated the lack of social intercourse
between members of diﬀerent castes and with it also the strong caste-endogamous mating
patterns, keeping the caste-principle alive and highly present until today.
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The IHDS reports caste membership in the following categories: Brahmin, High Caste,
Other Backward Caste (OBC), Dalit. Furthermore, there are four other categories com-
prising the non-hindu members of the modern Indian society.10 The OBC definition in
the IHDS is very closely linked to the castes of Vaishyas and Shudras. As the histori-
cal functions of those castes most closely resembles the modern image of a middle-class
household, we suggest the proportion of OBC households per village as an instrument for
middle class shares at the village level in the subsequent instrumental variable analysis.
Figure 3.3.7 clearly indicates that there exists a positive relationship between the shares
of middle-class households and the share of OBC households at the village level.
3.3.5 Instrumental Variable Specification and Empirical Results
In this section, we present the instrumental variable specification and the results from
running the cross-section model presented in Subsection 3.3.3. In particular, we modify
Equation (3.3.1) such that we use the share of OBC -households per village as an instru-
ment for the share of middle-class households. The set of employed control variables and
fixed eﬀects remains the same.
Table 3.3.5 presents the results from the IV regression. Panel A indicates a positive and
significant coeﬃcient for the share of OBC households. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient
is slightly diminishing with the inclusion of additional controls moving from column (1) to
(5). In presence of the full set of control variables displayed in column (5), a one standard
deviation increase in the share of OBC households is associated with a 27,7% increase in
the share of middle-class households in the respective PSU. This estimate is significant
at the 1%-level. As indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap statistic and the F-statistic across
panels B through D, our specification is not aﬀected by weak identification issues.11
Panel B in Table 3.3.5 reports the second-stage results for average PSU education as
10 Those categories are: Adivasi (mostly animistic tribes), Muslim, Sikh/Jain and Christian. As we
exclude all these categories from the empirical analysis because the focus is on hinduistic India, we
do not go further into the details at this point.
11 The critical values of the test provided by Stock & Yogo (2005) are 16.38, 8.96, 6.66, and 5.53
for a 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% bias of the obtained estimator, respectively. Accordingly, the null
hypothesis of the underlying estimators being biased due to weak instrumentation are rejected in all
cases.
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Table 3.3.5. Instrumental Variables Results: Diﬀerent Dependent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: First Stage - Share of MC Households on Share of OBC Households
OBC Share 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.122***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Panel B: Second Stage - Education (full)
Middle Class 0.411*** 0.370*** 0.360*** 0.363*** 0.358***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098)
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 30.32 30.41 30.94 30.94 30.70
ARW F Stat. 20.87 17.13 17.10 17.68 17.38
Observations 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937
Panel C: Second Stage - Education (male)
Middle Class 0.374*** 0.342*** 0.333*** 0.335*** 0.330***
(0.098) (0.100) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096)
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 29.89 29.98 30.50 30.50 30.26
ARW F Stat. 17.67 14.23 14.18 14.51 14.30
Observations 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965
Panel D: Second Stage - Education (female)
Middle Class 0.947*** 0.874*** 0.857*** 0.863*** 0.855***
(0.229) (0.227) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222)
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 29.89 29.98 30.50 30.50 30.26
ARW F Stat. 19.48 18.19 17.98 18.30 17.94
Observations 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965
Controls
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
Income NO YES YES YES YES
Dist. School NO NO YES YES YES
Urban NO NO NO YES YES
Dist. Bus NO NO NO NO YES
Note: The table reports IV estimates of Equation (3.3.1) with alternating education
variables as a dependent variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses,
where *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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dependent variable. The IV coeﬃcient on the share of middle-class households as reported
in column (5) is 0.358 and it is significant at the 1%-level. This implies that a one percent
increase in the share of the middle class induces an 0.358% increase in average years
of schooling. Accordingly, the results obtained from the IV specification support the
findings of the above OLS specification. Moreover, in the IV specification it appears that
the obtained coeﬃcients on the share of middle-class households are far less sensitive to
the inclusion of additional controls as compared to the baseline OLS results.
Turning to panels C and D, we now discuss the insights obtained from the sample split
into men and women. As with the overall education measure as dependent variable, there
is no indication of weak instrument bias in any of the specifications. While the coeﬃcient
on the middle-class share is slightly smaller for the male sample as compared to the overall
sample, with a magnitude of 0.855 in column (5), the impact of an increase in the share
of middle-class households is more than twice as high in the female sample. This suggests
that the eﬀect of a larger middle class on female education is far higher as compared to the
eﬀect on male education. One potential explanation is that middle class households not
only put a special emphasis on education in general but on female education specifically.
Keeping in mind the paternalistic structure of the Indian society, another potentially
important channel comes to mind: assortative mating, a well-researched regularity found
throughout most of the western developed countries. The basic finding of this strand of the
literature is that individuals are likely to marry spouses who carry similar characteristics
across a wide variety of aspects (Lefgren & McIntyre, 2006). With regards to labour
market characteristics and educational attainment, Hout (1982) finds a strong association
between husbands’ and wifes’ occupational statuses. In addition, Cancian, Danziger &
Gottschalk (1993) and Juhn & Murphy (1997) find that women with promising labour
market characteristics are more likely to marry men with high wages, while Pencavel
(1999) shows that those trends appear to have intensified over the second half of the last
century in the developed world. This notion is supported with updated data for the time
span from 1962 to 2003 in a more recent contribution by Schwartz & Mare (2005).
While the assortative mating channel is of large importance in the western world, the
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evidence regarding the Indian sub-continent remains relatively scarce. In a case study
focussing on the Tamil Brahman subcaste of the ”Eighteen Village Vattimas”, Fuller &
Narasimhan (2008) find that education and employment have become the crucial criteria
for the arrangement of marriages in recent decades. They claim that for men who usually
marry in their late twenties to early thirties, education and current or prospective labour
market outcomes are by far the most crucial factors determining the assortative mat-
ing potential. With regards to women they find that the factors impacting the prestige
ranking are basically the same. The main diﬀerences the authors report are that this
is less a question of potentially higher expected incomes than rather focussed on match-
ing the spouse’s education. Namely, women with higher educational attainment are seen
as “more congenial partners for educated men” (Fuller & Narasimhan, 2008). Also, the
authors conclude that women may actively participate in the labour market until they
give birth to children and thereby at least temporarily contribute to household (market)
income. In addition, more educated women are seen as better qualified to assist in their
children’s education. To sum up, Fuller & Narasimhan (2008) conclude the every Vat-
tima interviewee inevitably discusses individual education and career perspectives when
discussing grown-up children and their marriage prospects. Pache-Huber (2004) describes
similar findings for the middle-class Maheshwaris in Rajasthan. Our results support all
these findings.
In order to provide some insights on how our results might diﬀer once we compare rural to
urban India, we present the results obtained from running the IV regression of Equation
(3.3.1) on rural and urban sub-samples in Tables 3.3.6 and 3.3.7, respectively.
The first-stage results for the rural sample reported in Panel A of Table 3.3.6 indicate
that the impact of the share of OBC households on the share of middle-class households
is of similar magnitude as compared to the full sample. As before, it appears that there
is no weak instrument bias in this specification as both the Kleibergen-Paap statistic as
well as the F-statistic are above the critical values.
Comparing the second-stage results as reported in columns (1) through (3) to their coun-
terparts in Table 3.3.5, we observe that the causal eﬀect of increasing the size of the middle
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Table 3.3.6. Instrumental Variables Results: Rural Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: Education (full) Education (male) Education (female)
Panel A: First Stage - Share of MC Households on Share of OBC Households
OBC Share 0.105*** 0.154*** 0.154***
(0.023) (0.056) (0.056)
Panel B: Second Stage - Education
Middle Class 0.517*** 0.486*** 1.171***
(0.169) (0.167) (0.369)
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 19.97 19.97 19.97
ARW F Stat. 13.05 11.06 12.34
Observations 1,320 1,320 1,320
Controls
District FE YES YES YES
Income YES YES YES
Dist. School YES YES YES
Dist. Bus YES YES YES
Note: The table reports IV estimates of Equation (3.3.1) with alternating education
variables as a dependent variable. Urban districts are excluded. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses, Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
class by 1% is to increase average years of formal schooling in rural India by 0.517%. This
implies that the eﬀect of middle-class shares in a rural setting is about 44% larger as com-
pared to the full sample. Comparing the coeﬃcients on middle class size obtained from
running the rural regression taking the male and female education as dependent variable
as reported in columns (2) and (3), we observe a similar pattern as on the full sample.
While the coeﬃcient obtained when focussing on male education is slightly smaller than
in the average education case, the coeﬃcient in the female education scenario is more than
twice as large in magnitude as the coeﬃcient obtained from the male sample. We take
those findings as evidence that the motives that drive the diﬀerences between men and
women are stronger in rural parts of India. This is hardly surprising taking the realistic
assumption that urban areas are characterised by a less traditional and a more egalitarian
society relative to their rural counterparts.
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Table 3.3.7. Instrumental Variables Results: Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var.: Education (full) Education (male) Education (female)
First Stage - Share of MC Households on Share of OBC Households
OBC Share 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Middle Class 0.137** 0.124** 0.194*
(0.059) (0.051) (0.102)
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 7.645 7.645 7.645
ARW F Stat. 3.917 4.271 2.842
Observations 645 645 645
Controls
District FE YES YES YES
Income YES YES YES
Dist. School YES YES YES
Dist. Bus YES YES YES
Note: The table reports IV estimates of Equation (3.3.1) with alternating education
variables as a dependent variable. Rural districts are excluded. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Summing up our findings from the diﬀerent instrumental variable estimations, we find that
the share of middle-class households in Indian villages has a sizeable and robust positive
eﬀect on educational outcomes. This eﬀect is especially pronounced when focussing on
female educational attainment. In addition, we find that the size of the middle class
appears to have a stronger impact on educational outcomes in rural India.
3.4 Conclusion
We present a stylised household consumption model in which heterogeneous individuals
can chose between three diﬀerent categories of goods: subsistence consumption needs,
education of children, and luxury goods. We show that the poor spend most of their
income on subsistence consumption needs and the rich spend a positive (and potentially
large) part of their budget on luxury goods such that the middle class has the highest
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expenditure share on education. Depending on class-specific diﬀerences, this provides a
plausible pathway by which a rise in the relative size of the middle class raises the share of
spending on education to the extent that educational outcomes depend positively on the
share of the middle class. To test this hypothesis empirically, we use detailed survey data
on Indian household incomes, educational attainment, and important control variables
drawn from the household survey and village surveys.
In order to test the causal eﬀect of the share of middle-class households on average ed-
ucational attainment per village, we use detailed information on the shares of diﬀerent
castes according to the Varna-system. We use those shares in a – to our knowledge –
novel instrumental variable specification. Our empirical analysis shows that larger shares
of middle-class households in Indian villages indeed have a sizeable positive eﬀect on av-
erage educational outcomes. Our results suggest that this eﬀect is more pronounced in
rural settings as compared to urban areas and for women as compared to men.
Altogether our results emphasize the importance of a sizeable middle class for education,
and, via this pathway, potentially on other socioeconomic outcomes such as income growth
and democratization. Therefore, it appears to be a warning sign if the share of the middle
class shrinks and a larger part of the population belongs to the poor or to the rich.
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Appendix
3.A The First-Order Conditions
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem is
L = !s log(cs,t   c¯s) + !h log(ht) + !l log(cl,t + c¯l) +  t(wt   cs,t   ht   pl,tcl,t).
The associated necessary first-order conditions for an interior optimum are given by
@L
@cs,t
=
!s
cs,t   c¯s    t
!
= 0, (3.4.1)
@L
@ht
=
!e
ht
   t != 0, (3.4.2)
@L
@cl,t
=
!l
cl,t   c¯l    tpl,t
!
= 0 (3.4.3)
and the budget constraint wt = cs,t + ht + pl,tcl,t. In this case, we have four equations
to solve for the four unknowns cs,t, ht, cl,t, and  t. Solving the corresponding system of
equations for cs,t, ht, and cl,t yields
cs,t =
!s(wt + pl,tc¯l) + (!h + !l)c¯s
!s + !h + !l
, (3.4.4)
ht =
!h(wt + pl,tc¯l   c¯s)
!s + !h + !l
, (3.4.5)
cl,t =
!l(wt   c¯s)  pl,t(!h + !s)c¯l
pl,t(!s + !h + !l)
. (3.4.6)
These results hold for an income level wt for which the numerator of Equation (3.4.6) is
positive which is the case as long as wt > pl,t(!h + !s)c¯l/!l + c¯s. In the following, we
denote the income level for which this expression is fulfilled with equality by wˆt. In case
of a lower income level than wˆt, households do not consume luxury goods and face the
following Lagrangian:
L = !s log(cs,t   c¯s) + !h log(ht) +  t(wt   cs,t   ht).
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The necessary first-order conditions for this optimization problem are given by
@L
@cs,t
=
!s
cs,t   c¯s    t
!
= 0, (3.4.7)
@L
@ht
=
!e
ht
   t != 0 (3.4.8)
and the modified budget constraint wt = cs,t + ht. In this case, we have three equations
to solve for the three unknowns cs,t, ht, and  t. Solving the corresponding system of
equations for cs,t and ht yields
cs,t =
!swt + !hc¯s
!s + !h
, (3.4.9)
ht =
!h(wt   c¯s)
!s + !h
. (3.4.10)
We assume that incomes are suﬃciently high so as to fulfil the basic subsistence con-
sumption needs, i.e., it holds that wt > c¯s. Altogether, we can therefore summarize our
findings by means of the following system of demand functions
cs,t =
8><>:
!swt+!hc¯s
!s+!h
for c¯s < wt < wˆt,
!s(wt+pl,tc¯l)+(!h+!l)c¯s
!s+!h+!l
for wˆt < wt,
ht =
8><>:
!h(wt c¯s)
!s+!h
for c¯s < wt < wˆt,
!h(wt+pl,tc¯l c¯s)
!s+!h+!l
for wˆt < wt,
cl,t =
8><>:0 for c¯s < wt < wˆt,!l(wt c¯s) pl,t(!h+!s)c¯l
pl,t(!s+!h+!l)
for wˆt < wt.
Since the Lagrangian is strictly concave because the utility function is strictly concave in
all three arguments and the budget constraint is linear, the first-order conditions are not
only necessary but also suﬃcient. Thus, they identify the global unique optimal choice.
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3.B Data Appendix
Figure 3.B.1. District-Level Mean of Education in Years (Male Sample).
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Figure 3.B.2. District-Level Mean of Education in Years (Female Sample).
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Figure 3.B.3. District-Level Mean of Household Income per capita (in INR).
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Chapter 4
Go East: On the Impact of the Transsiberian
Railway on the Economic Development of
Eastern Russia1
4.1 Introduction
A sizeable amount of the annual World Bank budget is being allocated towards transport
infrastructure improvements year by year. High trade costs are seen as key impediment
to local economic development. It has been shown by a large range of theoretical con-
tributions that reductions in trade costs result in higher levels of real income in trading
as well as alleviate the impact of shocks (Donaldson, 2018). But can such investments
in infrastructure be seen as the go-to method in order to foster local development? Is it
not likely that also contexts, i.e. the specific local circumstances such as existing spatial
equilibria or local natural endowments also matter? It is much likely that the impact of
local measures is aﬀected by the level of local attributes such as resource availability or
the suitability for agriculture. While we have a good understanding of the theoretical
mechanisms behind the nexus of trade costs and economic development, the empirical
literature to this day remains quite sparse.
The historically most prominent and wide-spread strategy in order to reduce transport
costs is the construction of railroad networks. It has been widely used in both the transfor-
1 Single-authored. Published as Seiﬀert (2019)
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mation of western countries towards industrialised economies as well as in the annexation
and exploitation of countries in the era of colonialism. This opens the question if the
spatial distribution of economic activity in such contexts is entirely determined by local
natural advantages or if lower costs faced in accessing larger markets play decisive role.
The main challenge in order to empirically assess the existence of said transport cost
advantages is to separate the eﬀects of state dependence which is the local availability of
factors of production from those of local diﬀerences in trade costs and with it diﬀerences
in the accessibility of remote markets.
In the underlying paper, I investigate the long-run causal eﬀect of the construction of the
Trans-Siberian Railway (henceforth: TSR) and the implied reduction in local transport
costs on the level and spatial organisation of economic activity in Asian Russia. The
assessment is based on data nocturnal lights emission, the historical and current network
of railways in Eastern Russia as well as a wide array of control variables.
In order empirically disentangle the eﬀects of local natural endowments from the eﬀect of
the TSR, I suggest to solve this endogeneity problem by employing data on historical tea
trade in Tsarist Russia. The so-called Tea Road connected European Russia with first
Nerchensk in Manchuria and later Kyaktha located on what is now the border between
Russia and Mongolia. As there were hardly any local markets east of the Ural mountains
at the time and the fact that the route was not suitable for the transport of large amounts
of heavy goods as well as persons, the route was a mere transit route. its main purpose
was to link the Chinese tea production sites with the tea markets in European Russia.
This route was later extended to Vladivostok and used as a post route in addition to its
original purpose. While the area which today constitutes the districts of Ural (in parts),
Siberia and the Far East came under Russian control as early as the late 17th century,
the population remained below 300.000 until the early 20th century. The construction
of the TSR set in motion a large-scale settling process which lead to an increase in the
population up to about 36 million in current times2. Accordingly, upon its completion the
TSR facilitated both the colonisation of Eastern Russia as well as created a strong focal
2 This implies an about 10 times stronger increase in the population of Eastern Russia as compared
to European Russia over the same time period.
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line for economic activity due to an early change in transport costs along its course. Hence,
Asian Russia oﬀers a research setting which - to my knowledge - is unique. Using this
historical trade route as an instrument, I show that being located further away from the
TSR has a causal and negative impact on contemporary economic activity as recorded by
nocturnal lights emission. I further create a new data set linking information on railroads,
historical (trade) routes, economic activity and local natural endowments at a high spatial
granularity of 132,843 grid cells with the size of 0.1x0.1 decimal degrees which is equivalent
to 11x11km.
I show how the construction of the TSR and the associated reduction in transport costs
facilitated the colonisation of the Russian East. Until its construction the area it now
transects was very scarcely populated and did not exhibit any noteworthy economic ac-
tivity. Within the following 100 years the population in its vicinity highly increased and
today there exists sizeable economic activity. By providing a novel instrumental variable
estimation framework, I am able to demonstrate the causal eﬀects of the reduction in
transport costs.
In doing so, I contribute to the ongoing scientific discussion about the causal impact of
large-scale infrastructure projects. Namely, to answering the question whether a large-
scale transport infrastructure project and the implied reduction in trade costs have a
causal impact on local economic growth. This is possible since with the underlying setup
I am able disentangle the eﬀects of such an investment from the ones of local endowments
in a context of non-existing scale eﬀects. Choosing the TSR is mainly driven by the fact
that its specific location was chosen exogenously to local natural endowments. Further,
it was built in an area lacking significant pre-existing populations which mattered at the
time of its construction. As it appears, its location was solely determined by the course
of the already existing tea and postal routes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: I will start-oﬀ with summarising
the related literature. Then, I will present a detailed description of the underlying data,
the history of the TSR as well as the historical trade and post routes linking Europe and
China. Third, I will present the empirical models and the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Related Literature
With the underlying paper I combine findings from the literature on natural endowments,
path dependence and transport infrastructure. I contribute to a deeper understanding
of the question to which extend large scale transport infrastructure investments have a
causal impact on subsequent development as well as the spatial organisation of economic
activity. Scholars attributable to the former two branches investigate whether increasing
returns or locational fundamentals determine the spatial equilibria of economies. Loca-
tional fundamentals being the sole determinant of where economic activity is concentrated
would imply that (transitory) localised shocks, e.g. transport cost reductions, do only have
short-run consequences which are set oﬀ in the long run.
In a recent article, Miguel & Roland (2011) assess the impact of the US bombings during
the Vietnam War on subsequent economic activity and find no long-run eﬀect. Their
findings support the results of a closely related contribution by Davis & Weinstein (2002)
who examine the eﬀects of WW2 bombings in Japan. Another contribution coming to a
similar conclusion is Davis & Weinstein (2008). On the other hand, there is a considerable
range of contributions which find evidence for transitory localised shocks to persistently
define spatial equilibria in the presence of increasing returns. In a recent contribution,
Rauch & Michaels (2013) show that many French towns are still situated in Roman-Age
town locations in spite of the fact that those locations often exhibit locational properties
inferior to alternatives. Using the construction and the later demise of colonial railroads in
Africa, Jedwab & Moradi (2016) show that the associated regional reduction in transport
costs had a significant eﬀect on the spatial equilibria during the operation of the railroads.
This eﬀect also persisted after their demise. Analysing the spatial equilibrium of the US,
Bleakley & Lin (2012) find that modern US cities are often still located close to waterfalls
which in the past either caused the foundation of portage cities or provided electricity.
Despite the fact that those locational advantages are now obsolete, those cities persisted.
Further studies in support of the existence multiple spatial equilibria are among others:
Bosker, Brakman, Garretsen & Schramm (2007, 2008), Redding, Sturm & Wolf (2011),
Bleakley & Lin (2012), Rauch & Michaels (2013) and Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm & Wolf
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(2015).
While both local endowments as well as transitory shocks have been found to have sig-
nificant eﬀects on local development, there also exists a growing literature which puts
these two forces into contrast with large scale infrastructure projects and their lasting
eﬀects. Fogel (1964) pioneered this field of research in being one of the first to apply the
social savings methodology to the transport infrastructure field by assessing the impact of
railroads on local economic dynamics in the US. Hurd (1983) applied a similar framework
to India (Donaldson (2018)). The empirical literature regarding the issue was pioneered
by Aschauer (1989). The author was one the first to estimate the relationship between
aggregate productivity and stock and flow government spending. Among other things, his
findings suggest decisive explanatory power of what he calls core infrastructure projects
like highways or mass transit. Duflo & Pande (2007) show that the construction of dams
in India increases the agricultural output of downstream districts3. In a recent contri-
bution, Donaldson (2018) shows that the construction of the colonial railroad during the
British Raj decreased trade costs and increased interregional as well as international trade
in India.
In the identification of the causal eﬀects of transport infrastructure on economic develop-
ment, researchers face a serious problem in the light of the findings which have been laid
out previously: the fact that oftentimes locations which are characterised by either strong
localised natural advantages or the presence of increasing returns often exhibit better
access to transport networks relative to their counterparts (Duranton et al. (2014)). This
opens the issue of endogeneity in econometric models. I contribute to the understanding
of the eﬀects of local infrastructure investments by introducing a novel instrumental vari-
able strategy and thereby solving the problem of endogeneity for the underlying empirical
model. This allows me to clearly identify the causal impact of the construction of the
TSR on local economic development in Russia.
3 Further contributions assessing the eﬀects of infrastructure projects in diﬀerent context are: Jensen
(2007), Michaels (2008), Dinkelman (2011) and Duranton, Morrow & Turner (2014).
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4.3 Data and Historical Background
Due to the unavailability of data on economic activity in Eastern Russia, I employ data
on nocturnal lights emission as provided by the US Airforce’s Defence Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP). Previous studies have established this data as a valid source
of information about economic activity (see, among others: Michalopoulos & Papaioannou
(2013b), Storeygard (2016) and Sala-i-Martin & Pinkovskiy (2010)). I combine this data
with information on the contemporary rail network of Russia as well as with historical
data on the tea trade and post routes of Tsarist Russia prior to 1830. My analysis is
focused on the part of modern Russia which lies east of the Ural mountains4. The reason
for that is the fact that this part of modern Russia was - while being largely controlled
by Russia - home to less than 300,000 inhabitants until the early 20th century. The data
is pre-processed in the following steps:
4.3.1 Lights Data and Local Economic Activity:
As there is hardly any reliable information on the location and population of settlements
except for the major cities in the Russian East, I follow Jedwab & Moradi (2016) and
construct a new data set based on a 0.1x0.1 decimal degree cell grid which covers the entire
Russian East. I chose to focus on the area east of the Ural mountains5 since this area
remained largely untouched until the construction of the TSR. Second, as I am interested
in the causal eﬀect of the TSR, I further drop all grid cells outside a 500km buﬀer around
the contemporary TSR network and the historical TSR main line, respectively. This leaves
me with a data set consisting of about 133,000 grid cells in the contemporary TSR case
and roughly 45,000 grid cells in the TSR main line scenario, respectively. As a measure of
local economic activity, I extract the mean level nocturnal lights emission per grid cell6.
As a measure for the local spatial organisation I use the standard deviation in illumination
intensity between the 0.1 decimal degree cells which are coded from 0 (no lights) to 63
4 More specifically, I focus on the area east of the 60.5 longitude line.
5 This is approximated by dropping all grid cells west of 60.5 degrees longitude.
6 Please refer to appendix 4.5 for a detailed description of the underlying data.
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(sensor satiation) within a 11x11km grid cell.
4.3.2 Contemporary and Historical Russian Railroad Network:
The - to my knowledge - most comprehensive and accurate as well as freely obtainable
shapefile of the Russian Railroad network is provided by diva-gis.org. This shapefile is
used in order to compute the shortest distance from each grid cell centroid to the network
using ESRI’s NEAR tool in arcpy in the full network scenario. Figure 4.3.1 illustrates the
underlying algorithm7. In order to identify the historical mainline of the TSR, I use the
stops summarised in the TSR Wikipedia article8. Figures 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 illustrate the
respective railroad networks.
4.3.3 Local (Natural) Advantages:
The empirical model laid out in section 4.4 encompasses several controls for initial local
advantages which may act as potential confounding factors. As with the light intensity
figures, these data have been extracted for the aforementioned grid cells. These are:
Caloric potential:
the mean local average caloric potential according to the Calorics Suitability Index9 (CSI)
introduced by Galor & Özak (2016) in order to control for local advantages in crop produc-
tion. This data has been established as valid measure for long run locational advantages
by a large number of studies attributable to the Unified Growth Theory spearheaded by
Galor (2011)10. As with the night lights data, it is provided in form of raster file out of
which I extracted the mean optimal caloric potential per grid cell 11.
7 For a detailed description, visit http://pro.arcgis.com/en/pro-app/tool-reference/analysis/near.h
tm.
8 The article can be accessed here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Siberian_Railway.
9 The CSI data can be obtained from https://ozak.github.io/Caloric-Suitability-Index/.
10 Prominent examples are: Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b), Michalopoulos & Papaioannou
(2013a) and Alesina, Giuliano & Nunn (2013).
11 ”Optimal” meaning the caloric yield of cultivating the crop which is best suited for the agro-climtatic
properties of the underlying area.
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Figure 4.3.1. Illustration of the NEAR Algorithm by ESRI.
Flare Distance:
The minimum distance to the main areas of crude oil and natural gas extraction12 in order
to control for advantages in resource exploitation.
Precipitation:
While the average level of precipitation per year usually positively aﬀects the local condi-
tions for crop production on the northern hemisphere, the standard deviation might have
adverse eﬀects on both crop production as well settlement suitability due to flooding.
12 There is no reliable data on the exact location of crude oil and gas extraction sites in Russia available.
So I use shapefiles provided by DMSP which encompass the area of gas flares to approximate their
position. The shapefiles were obtained from https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/interest/gas_flares.html.
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Figure 4.3.2. The contemporary TSR network.
The data is extracted from rasters of annual data averaged over 1900-200813. Hence, both
measures are included as controls.
Road density:
Since local transport infrastructure other than access to the TSR might distort the mea-
surement of the causal eﬀect on economic activity, I include the contemporary road density
per grid cell as a control variable for local transport costs. This measure is derived from
a shapefile encompassing the contemporary road network in Russia14.
Population density:
Aiming to isolate the eﬀect of TSR proximity on economic activity and agglomeration, I
control for the population density per grid cell. This measure is derived from the Gridded
13 The data is provided http://climate.geog.udel.edu/~climate/html_pages/download.html.
14 The data is provided here: http://www.diva-gis.org/gdata. I create a density raster based on the
shapefile using the Calculate-Density-tool in arcpy. Then I extract the mean road density per grid
cell from this raster.
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Figure 4.3.3. The historical TSR mainline.
Population of the World raster data15.
The Russian Tea Road
Tea is one if not the main historical commonality between Russia, China and Central
Asia. One of the historically most important trade ports in general and the most im-
portant one for the trade between Russia and China instead of being located at the sea
shore - as one would intuitively assume taking the more prominent British tea trade as
a reference - was located at the Sino-Russian border. The town of Kyakhta was defined
as the exclusive border market by the Kyakhta treaty of 1727. Until the outbreak of
the Opium War in 1840, Kyakhta and the seaport of Canton were the most prominent
Chinese foreign markets (Lee, 2014). In this period, tea was distinguished into two dif-
ferent varieties: Overland Tea which was the one transported via the Russian Tea Route
and Canton Tea which was transported by ship from Canton to Europe via the Indian
Ocean. The Russian consumers considered the Overland quality to be far superior com-
pared to the sea-borne Canton Tea. This had two reasons. On the one hand, Canton
15 The data is provided here: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4.
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Tea was exposed to hot climate throughout the travel across the Indian Ocean which
was said to cause the tea develop an aroma much diﬀerent to the Overland quality. The
transport route via the cold and dry deserts of the Russian Tea Route on the other
hand was held to be enhancing the taste of the Overland alternative. Lee (2014) states:
“The unpleasant taste from firing (bei) is removed (from tea) by transit through
the cold dry climate of Mongolia and Siberia, and at the same time tea, which is
nightly unloaded from the camel’s back and placed upon the snow-covered steppes,
is found to acquire, from light moisture it then absorbs, a delicacy of flavour ob-
tainable in no other way, and it brings, in consequence, a much more lucrative
price in the markets of Russia.”
Accordingly, there was a strong preference for Overland Tea in the Russian markets where
tea was usually consumed without adding milk. While the tea exported to Russia was
produced in diﬀerent provinces throughout China, its entirety was transported to Kyakhta
by Chinese traders from where it then was transported to European Russia by camels and
oxen cars operated by Russian merchants (Lee (2014)).
A second function the Russian Tea Route had was serving as a postal road which should
ensure communication across the Russian sphere of influence in the east. It extended the
Tea Route further east to Vladivostok. The Post Road travelled by Wenyon (1896) is
depicted in figure 4.3.416. Wenyon who travelled the Russian Post Route in 1893, makes
a telling reference to his homeland England in the preface of his book:
“The old post-roads of England have been superseded by the railway, and the same
fate will soon befall the great post-road of Siberia.”
The author describes the Siberian Route as a cordon of post-horse stations which were
sixteen to twenty miles apart. They were installed by the Russian government for military
16 The basis for this simplified digitised version is the hand-drawn map by the author which can be
found as figure 4.B.2 in appendix 4.5.
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Figure 4.3.4. The Tea Route in 19th Century Russia. (Own Depiction based on Avery (2003))
purposes. Besides those stations he names only a few very scarcely populated places as
sources of supply for his travel. He emphasises the notion of the route not being a
properly built-up road but at best being a dirt track only defined by the post-horse
stations. The author further emphasises his notion of the Route being by far not suitable
for the transport of heavy goods or people.
The historical facts which have been laid out in this paragraph strongly support the
appropriateness of using the Siberian Route in an instrumental variable approach in the
context of my strategy to assess the causal long-run impact of the Russian Railroad on
economic activity in Eastern Russia.
4.4 Econometric Specifications, Identification
Strategies and Results
In this section, I will first lay out the basic empirical model used to give a first impression
of the positive correlation between TSR proximity and economic activity using simple
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Figure 4.3.5. The Post Route in 19th Century Russia. (Own Depiction based on Wenyon (1896))
OLS. Second, I follow Jedwab & Moradi (2016) and use a spatial discontinuity framework
to show that the eﬀect found using OLS decrease in the distance to the TSR network. In
a third and final step, I propose a novel instrumental variable approach in order to show
the causal eﬀect of TSR proximity on local economic development and agglomeration.
4.4.1 Baseline OLS Regression
The baseline regression model is defined in equations (4.4.1) through (4.4.4):
ln(Lightsi) =  ln(DistRaili) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.1)
ln(Lightsi) =  ln(DistMaini) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.2)
ln(Aggloi) =  ln(DistRaili) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.3)
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ln(Aggloi) =  ln(DistMaini) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.4)
where Lightsi is the mean nocturnal lights emission per location or grid cell and agglom-
eration which is measured by the standard deviation in illumination within each grid cell,
respectively. DistRaili is the variable of interest. It is measured as the geodesic distance
between the closest segment of the TSR and the centroid of the location or grid cell,
respectively. Xi is a vector of control variables for both local natural advantages as well
as current factors which might distort the identification of the local impact of the vicinity
to a TSR segment. DistMaini is the analogue variable of interest in the scenario which
focusses on the impact of the distance to the historical TSR mainline. ✏i is the error term.
Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 give an overview of the employed variables as well as their summary
statistics. All variables are in logs with a small number added (0.001) to prevent grid
cells with zero lights emission from dropping out of the sample17.
Table 4.4.1. Summary Statistics (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max
DistRail 139,871 178.513 146.850 0.000 500.000
DistTea 139,871 1,089.965 881.771 0.004 3,432.420
DistPost 139,871 713.107 605.914 0.001 2,458.482
DistFlare 139,871 543.522 440.308 0.000 1,933.627
Lights 134,878 0.385 2.703 0.000 62.000
CalPot 137,930 1,378.965 1,921.020 0.000 10,827.360
PopDens 139,325 3.833 46.288 0.014 3,121.014
Precip 137,930 446.120 124.803 126.500 1,317.000
PrecipSD 137,930 0.397 1.126 0.000 27.290
DensRoa 139,695 1.962 2.076 0.000 10.282
Tables 4.4.3 through 4.4.6 report the results from the estimation of equations (4.4.1)
through (4.4.4) using OLS with alternating the dependent variable from mean noctur-
nal lights emission to the nocturnal lights agglomeration. In both cases, the coeﬃcient
while decreasing in magnitude is smaller than zero as expected. The negative conditional
correlation between the level of economic activity and the distance to the TSR exhibits
17 This procedure has - among others - been used in Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b) and is
widely accepted in the night lights literature.
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Table 4.4.2. Summary Statistics (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max
DistMain 46,140 236.053 143.524 0.001 499.991
DistTea 46,140 277.914 215.171 0.004 1,021.221
DistPost 46,140 207.084 136.814 0.001 672.323
DistFlare 46,140 475.086 279.277 0.000 1,174.234
Lights 45,283 0.744 3.513 0.000 61.618
CalPot 45,773 2,853.748 1,832.917 0.000 8,701.440
PopDens 45,806 8.755 74.513 0.022 3,121.014
Precip 45,773 453.260 103.088 238.000 1,029.000
PrecipSD 45,773 0.565 1.575 0.000 27.290
DensRoa 46,114 3.523 2.473 0.000 10.098
Table 4.4.3. OLS Results (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights
DistRail -0.543*** -0.540*** -0.524*** -0.477*** -0.471***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
CalPot 0.039*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PopDens 0.231*** 0.249*** 0.245***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Precip -0.086*** -0.095***
(0.012) (0.012)
PrecipSD 0.001
(0.002)
RoadDens 0.026***
(0.001)
Observations 134,878 133,167 132,843 132,843 132,843
R-squared 0.917 0.919 0.921 0.921 0.921
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of equation (4.4.1). All variables are
in logs with 0.001 added. The specification includes all grid cell within a 500
km buﬀer around the contemporary TSR network.
only slight changes in magnitude as a response to consecutively including additional con-
trols. The change in magnitude of the coeﬃcient of interest when comparing columns
(1) through (6) of table 4.4.3 is below 15 percent. While varying in absolute values, all
control variables exhibit the expected negative sign. Comparing the magnitude of the
respective coeﬃcients, it is obvious that the negative conditional correlation between the
level of nocturnal lights emission and remoteness is the most pronounced. This strong
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persistence is not observable for the second variant using agglomeration as dependent
variable. The coeﬃcient on TSR remoteness decreases by roughly 85 percent comparing
(1) through (6). This change is mainly triggered by the inclusion of the precipitation
variable. While it does not break the correlation between agglomeration and TSR access,
it strongly diminishes its absolute value. Further it appears that there exists a strong
negative relationship between the level of precipitation and agglomeration per grid cell.
Table 4.4.4. OLS Results (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo
DistRail -0.525*** -0.523*** -0.504*** -0.154*** -0.141***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
CalPot 0.026*** -0.019*** 0.004*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PopDens 0.292*** 0.422*** 0.417***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Precip -0.651*** -0.662***
(0.010) (0.010)
PrecipSD 0.011***
(0.002)
RoadDens 0.057***
(0.001)
Observations 139,325 137,606 137,606 137,606 137,606
R-squared 0.892 0.895 0.899 0.903 0.903
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of equation (4.4.3). All variables are
in logs with 0.001 added. The specification includes all grid cell within a 500
km buﬀer around the contemporary TSR network.
As previously shown, the OLS results suggest a strong negative conditional correlation
between the distance to the closest railroad segment and mean nocturnal lights emission as
well as their spatial concentration. Tables 4.4.5 and 4.4.6 show the results which I receive
from conducting the same OLS regression as above but changing the variable of interest to
the distance to the TSR mainline. Comparing the coeﬃcients on the variables of interest
between the network scenario and the mainline scenario, we observe that changing the
specification towards picking up the long run impact of the change in transport costs,
they do not considerably change in magnitude if we focus on average night light emission
per grid cell. This can be taken as evidence for a stable long run correlation between
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Table 4.4.5. OLS Results (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights
DistMain -0.456*** -0.504*** -0.490*** -0.382*** -0.375***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017)
CalPot 0.106*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
PopDens 0.811*** 0.846*** 0.836***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Precip -0.221*** -0.227***
(0.034) (0.034)
PrecipSD 0.012***
(0.004)
RoadDens 0.026***
(0.007)
Observations 45,283 44,944 44,636 44,636 44,636
R-squared 0.794 0.803 0.830 0.830 0.831
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of equation (4.4.2). All variables are
in logs with 0.001 added. The specification includes all grid cell within a 500
km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
Table 4.4.6. OLS Results (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo
DistMain -0.432*** -0.451*** -0.437*** -0.060*** -0.072***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017)
CalPot 0.038*** -0.069*** -0.058*** -0.054***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PopDens 0.841*** 0.960*** 0.981***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Precip -0.769*** -0.742***
(0.034) (0.035)
PrecipSD 0.004
(0.004)
RoadDens -0.056***
(0.010)
Observations 45,806 45,465 45,465 45,465 45,465
R-squared 0.758 0.763 0.795 0.798 0.799
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of equation (4.4.4). All variables are
in logs with 0.001 added. The specification includes all grid cell within a 500
km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
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low transport costs and aggregate economic activity per unit of observation. Looking
at the two last columns of table 4.4.6, we observe that while diminishing in magnitude,
the conditional correlation between vicinity to the TSR mainline and agglomeration of
economic activity is negative in the mainline scenario but much less pronounced.
4.4.2 Further Assessment of the Spatial Equilibrium
After having established a negative conditional correlation between TSR remoteness and
economic activity as well as its spatial organisation, I follow Jedwab & Moradi (2016) and
estimate equations (4.4.5) through (4.4.8) in order to assess in how far the installation
of the TSR established a specific spatial equilibrium. More specifically, I will lay out the
diminishing eﬀect of TSR as one moves further and further away from it.
ln(Lightsi) =  RailDui +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.5)
ln(Aggloi) =  RailDui +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.6)
ln(Lightsi) =  MainDui +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.7)
ln(Aggloi) =  MainDui +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.8)
while the dependent variables and the included controls are the same as in the baseline
OLS specifications, RailDui and MainDui are cell dummies which capture the vicinity
to the TSR and the TSR mainline, respectively. Those dummies are equal to one if the
respective cell lies within 0-10, 10-20, 20-30 or 30-40km distance to the TSR or the TSR
mainline, respectively.
Table 4.4.7 presents the results obtained from estimating equations (4.4.5) through (4.4.8).
Columns (1) and (3) indicate a strong positive and significant eﬀect on the level economic
activity of a cell being located relatively close to the TSR or TSR mainline, respectively.
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Table 4.4.7. OLS Results (Vicinity Dummies)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Lights Agglo Lights Agglo
0-10km Dummy (TSR) 2.5055*** 6.9259***
(0.0688) (0.7506)
10-20km Dummy (TSR) 0.3875*** -0.3789
(0.0378) (0.2426)
20-30km Dummy (TSR) 0.1394*** -1.1176***
(0.0301) (0.1176)
30-40km Dummy (TSR) 0.0728*** -1.0330***
(0.0247) (0.0868)
CalPot 0.0000*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0002*
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
PopDens 0.0295*** 0.4894*** 0.0300*** 0.5021***
(0.0012) (0.0402) (0.0013) (0.0448)
Precip 0.0002*** -0.0015*** -0.0006*** -0.0032***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008)
PrecipSD -0.0020 0.0936 0.0175** 0.1148
(0.0050) (0.0615) (0.0070) (0.0939)
DistFlare -0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0001* 0.0011***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004)
0-10km Dummy (Main) 2.3608*** 13.6747***
(0.2043) (3.6104)
10-20km Dummy (Main) 1.5268*** 6.9187***
(0.0624) (1.1122)
20-30km Dummy (Main) -0.0579 -1.4132
(0.0558) (0.8698)
30-40km Dummy (Main) -0.2619*** -2.0304***
(0.0419) (0.5446)
Observations 132,843 137,606 44,636 45,465
R-squared 0.3734 0.5350 0.5291 0.5462
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of equations (4.4.5) through (4.4.8). All
variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specification includes all grid cell
within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR network or the historical TSR mainline,
respectively.
This eﬀect diminishes strongly moving towards cells located further away from the TSR.
Same holds true for the eﬀect on spatial agglomeration of economic activity within cells
as illustrated in columns (2) and (4).
The results presented in this section further substantiate my findings from section 4.4.1.
Still, these results cannot be seen as proof of a causal impact of the closeness to the
railroad on economic activity and its spatial organisation within a grid cell as there remains
a possibility for the existence of endogeneity. Hence, I propose a novel instrumental
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variable specification in order to verify the existence of such a relationship. As laid out
in section 4.3, the Transsiberian Routes existed long before the construction of the TSR
mainline. And even though, there clearly would have been feasible alternative routes
for the TSR since prior to it starting its services the area which is now fairly densely
populated was basically empty of people there has been no attempt to relocate it. While
the TSR (mainline) was clearly constructed in order to colonise the Russian East, the
Transsiberian Routes’ locations were not based on existing populations or local natural
advantages. This makes them ideal candidates for an IV approach which will be presented
in section 4.4.3.
4.4.3 Instrumental Variable Approach
Equations (4.4.9) through (4.4.12) are equivalent to equations (4.4.1) through (4.4.4) with
regards to the included control variables. The specification is estimated using a Two Step
Least Squares model where the log of the distance to the nearest Transsiberian Route
segment is used as an instrument for the distance to closest TSR (mainline) segment.
ln(Lightsi) =  (ln(DistRaili) = ln(DistTeai)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.9)
ln(Lightsi) =  (ln(DistRaili) = ln(DistPosti)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.10)
ln(Lightsi) =  (ln(DistMaini) = ln(DistTeai)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.11)
ln(Lightsi) =  ln(DistMaini) = ln(DistPosti)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.12)
Table 4.4.8 shows the results for estimating the impact on the mean nocturnal lights
emission. The first stage results listed in Panel A show a positive and significant corre-
lation between the logs of the respective distances which while diminishing in magnitude
remains positive. This relationship is significant at the 1%-level across all columns. The
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Kleinbergen-Papp and the Anderson-Rubin-Wald F statistics both indicate that the pro-
posed IV model is not suﬀering from weak instrument issues18. Comparing columns (1)
through (7) in panel B, we observe while almost tripling in absolute value, the coeﬃcient
on the instrumented variable remains negative and significant.
Table 4.4.8. IV Results (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistTea 0.448*** 0.445*** 0.160*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights
DistRail -1.067*** -1.076*** -1.512*** -2.490*** -2.076*** -2.069*** -3.027***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.048) (0.205) (0.167) (0.166) (0.344)
DistFlare 0.017*** 0.016*** -0.013** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
CalPot -0.056*** -0.072*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.051***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
PopDens -0.499*** -0.328*** -0.325*** -0.616***
(0.077) (0.062) (0.062) (0.118)
Precip -1.167*** -1.171*** -1.717***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.146)
PrecipSD 0.008*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.003)
RoadDens -0.206***
(0.030)
Observations 134,878 134,878 133,167 132,843 132,843 132,843 132,843
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 13228 12665 1783 183.2 228 227.9 84.56
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 20848 20013 1929 186.7 233.9 233.9 85.83
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.9). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specification
includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the contemporary TSR network.
Panel B of table 4.4.9 reports the second stage results for mean nocturnal lights emission
as dependent variable and using the Post Route as instrument. The coeﬃcients obtained
by IV estimation are all smaller than zero and significant at the 1%-level. Comparing
columns (1) through (7), one observes that the coeﬃcient’s absolute value decreases by
18 The critical values of the test provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) are 16.38, 8.96, 6.66, and 5.53
for a 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% bias of the obtained estimator, respectively. Accordingly, the null
hypothesis of the underlying estimators being biased due to weak instrumentation are rejected in all
cases.
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Table 4.4.9. IV Results (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistPost 0.627*** 0.628*** 0.436*** 0.309*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.276***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights
DistRail -0.778*** -0.778*** -0.537*** -0.219*** -0.334*** -0.333*** -0.293***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
DistFlare 0.003 0.005 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CalPot 0.040*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PopDens 0.351*** 0.317*** 0.318*** 0.323***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Precip -0.673*** -0.679*** -0.628***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
PrecipSD 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
RoadDens 0.030***
(0.003)
Observations 134,878 134,878 133,167 132,843 132,843 132,843 132,843
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 25945 25897 9577 5814 5253 5252 4216
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 41664 41889 12938 7059 6314 6313 5173
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.10). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
roughly 70 percent. The second stage coeﬃcients are much smaller than in the Tea
Route case. This diﬀerence stems from a diﬀerent underlying relationship between the
instrument and the instrumented variable due to the fact that the Post Route extends
much further east as observable in figure 4.3.5.
While reacting more strongly to the inclusion of additional controls, the results obtained
by instrumental variable estimation suggest a sizeable, significantly negative impact of
remoteness to the TSR. All control variables exhibit the expected signs. Further their
magnitudes do not change noticeably compared to the OLS results. The picture somewhat
changes when we turn to the results from estimating equations (4.4.11) and (4.4.12). Here
I focus on the impact of remoteness relative to the historical TSR mainline. Comparing
the first stage results from tables 4.4.10 and 4.4.11 to the ones from the respective TSR
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scenarios presented earlier, we observe a stronger and more robust relationship between
the instrument and the instrumented variable. This is mainly due to the fact that the
historical mainline is closer to the historical routes which is also mirrored in the fact
that the diﬀerences in the second stage results are by far not as pronounced as in the
TSR scenario. Contrasting the insights from both scenarios, we can summarise that there
exists a causal negative impact of TSR (mainline) remoteness on local economic activity
in Eastern Russia.
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Table 4.4.10. IV Results (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistTea 0.456*** 0.464*** 0.426*** 0.381*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.382***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights
DistMain -1.039*** -1.043*** -0.697*** -0.400*** -0.398*** -0.397*** -0.384***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
DistFlare 0.019*** 0.096*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
CalPot 0.097*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PopDens 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.832***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Precip 0.076 0.062 0.048
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066)
PrecipSD 0.009** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004)
RoadDens 0.022***
(0.008)
Observations 45,283 45,283 44,944 44,636 44,636 44,636 44,636
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 5882 6062 4954 4683 5110 5106 4794
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 6928 7075 5538 5106 5529 5527 4997
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.11). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
ln(Aggloi) =  (ln(DistRaili) = ln(DistTeai)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.13)
ln(Aggloi) =  (ln(DistRaili) = ln(DistPosti)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.14)
ln(Aggloi) =  (ln(DistMaini) = ln(DistTeai)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.15)
ln(Aggloi) =  (ln(DistMaini) = ln(DistPosti)) +  Xi + ✏i (4.4.16)
Turning to the IV results when using spatial agglomeration as dependent variable as I
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Table 4.4.11. IV Results (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistPost 0.507*** 0.503*** 0.473*** 0.441*** 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.420***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights Lights
DistMain -0.599*** -0.591*** -0.410*** -0.232*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.223***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
DistFlare 0.054*** 0.127*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
CalPot 0.112*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PopDens 0.890*** 0.892*** 0.891*** 0.874***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Precip -0.083 -0.097 -0.105
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
PrecipSD 0.010** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
RoadDens 0.044***
(0.008)
Observations 45,283 45,283 44,944 44,636 44,636 44,636 44,636
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 5837 5812 5598 5570 5461 5461 5537
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 6058 6019 5599 5410 5167 5166 5145
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.12). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
estimate equations (4.4.13) through (4.4.16), a similar picture arises. As expected, there
is no significant diﬀerence between the first stage coeﬃcients reported in panel A of table
4.4.13 and the ones in table 4.4.9. Comparing the coeﬃcients of TSR remoteness from
columns (1) through (7), we observe that they are all negative and significant at the 1%-
level. Other than the results from estimating the model using the level nocturnal lights
emission as dependent variable, the impact of TSR remoteness on lights agglomeration
loses only about 30% of its magnitude. The diﬀerences between the two instruments in
the first stage relationships in the TSR and the mainline scenario diﬀer by similar mag-
nitude as compared to the light emission case. Same holds for the mainline scenario. An
interesting insight emerges once comparing the second stage results of the agglomeration
specification in both scenarios. Looking at columns 7 in tables 4.4.14 and 4.4.15, we ob-
CHAPTER 4. THE TRANSSIBERIAN RAILWAY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 139
Table 4.4.12. IV Results (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistTea 0.445*** 0.441*** 0.162*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo
DistRail -0.949*** -0.996*** -1.464*** -1.824*** -1.633*** -1.630*** -2.187***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.054) (0.209) (0.183) (0.183) (0.314)
DistFlare 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
CalPot -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
PopDens -0.186** -0.104 -0.103 -0.274**
(0.079) (0.068) (0.068) (0.110)
Precip -0.649*** -0.651*** -0.994***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.134)
PrecipSD 0.003 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003)
RoadDens -0.129***
(0.025)
Observations 139,325 139,325 137,606 137,606 137,606 137,606 137,606
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 13223 12673 1843 181.9 217.9 217.7 96.38
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 20653 20034 1991 185.3 223.3 223.1 97.89
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.13). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR.
serve that the coeﬃcient on remoteness shows no statistical significance. While it appears
that there is a pronounced causal impact of remoteness on economic activity when focus-
ing on the long run relationship mirrored by the mainline case, agglomeration appears
not to be causally impacted by mainline remoteness. Regarding the coeﬃcients obtained
for the control variables the picture is highly similar compared to IV results using mean
lights emission as dependent variable.
Taking all the above presented results from instrumental variable estimation into account,
we can clearly state that there is sizeable positive and highly significant causal eﬀect of
being closer to the contemporary TSR network on both the level as well as the concen-
tration of economic activity. While the impact of mainline remoteness on the level of
economic activity remains negative and highly significant when focussing on the mainline
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Table 4.4.13. IV Results (TSR Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistPost 0.622*** 0.627*** 0.439*** 0.311*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.280***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo
DistRail -0.816*** -0.800*** -0.723*** -0.407*** -0.460*** -0.459*** -0.446***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
DistFlare 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.072***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CalPot 0.010*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PopDens 0.347*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.335***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Precip -0.322*** -0.325*** -0.307***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
PrecipSD 0.004* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
RoadDens 0.010***
(0.003)
Observations 139,325 139,325 137,606 137,606 137,606 137,606 137,606
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 25612 25814 9788 5922 5365 5363 4408
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 41067 41868 13259 7225 6495 6492 5425
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.14). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR.
scenario, this changes when estimate the impact on spatial agglomeration within the re-
spective grid cells. My results suggest that TSR mainline remoteness has no significant
impact on agglomeration. A potential explanation for this is that it is possible that in the
long run centrifugal forces such as congestion economies break the relationship. These
results are in line with the theoretical predictions presented in section 4.1. Further, they
support previous empirical research on the topic.
4.4.4 Validity of the Suggested IV Approach
In order to justify the utilisation of the distance to the historical Transsiberian Route as
a valid instrument, the instrument needs to satisfy two conditions according to Cameron
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Table 4.4.14. IV Results (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistTea 0.458*** 0.457*** 0.420*** 0.380*** 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.381***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo
DistMain -0.468*** -0.463*** -0.311*** 0.017 0.022 0.022 -0.014
(0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
DistFlare 0.072*** 0.089*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CalPot 0.049*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.052***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PopDens 0.973*** 0.975*** 0.975*** 0.990***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Precip 0.150** 0.159** 0.198***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.071)
PrecipSD -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
RoadDens -0.062***
(0.011)
Observations 45,806 45,806 45,465 45,465 45,465 45,465 45,465
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 5878 5920 4822 4707 5136 5132 4809
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 6962 6951 5403 5124 5548 5546 5015
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.15). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
& Trivedi (2005): First, it must show a suﬃcient correlation with the variable of interest
X which is to be instrumented. Second, the instrumental variable Z must be exogenous.
This means it must not be aﬀected by other variables in the system or in other words:
the impact of the instrument on the dependant variable must only be exerted via the
instruments impact on the variable which is to be instrumented. The first condition in
our case, namely a suﬃcient (conditional) correlation between the proximity to the TSR
(mainline) and the proximity to the Transsiberian Routes is fulfilled as shown by the first
stage results as well as the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics reported in tables 4.4.8 through
4.4.15. The null of no correlation between the endogenous regressors and the excluded
instruments is rejected in all cases. Further the test statistics suggest no presence of
bias due to weak instruments. This is indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics. As
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Table 4.4.15. IV Results (Mainline Scenario)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: First Stage Results
DistPost 0.510*** 0.500*** 0.471*** 0.443*** 0.426*** 0.426*** 0.421***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Panel B: Second Stage Results
VARIABLES Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo Agglo
DistMain -0.262*** -0.216*** -0.164*** 0.032 0.024 0.024 0.019
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
DistFlare 0.085*** 0.099*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CalPot 0.056*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.052***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PopDens 0.978*** 0.975*** 0.975*** 0.998***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Precip 0.148** 0.157** 0.167**
(0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
PrecipSD -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
RoadDens -0.058***
(0.011)
Observations 45,806 45,806 45,465 45,465 45,465 45,465 45,465
Kleibergen-Papp LM Stat. 5931 5787 5567 5630 5510 5510 5587
Kleibergen-Papp F Stat. 6117 5946 5529 5448 5196 5195 5174
Hansen J Stat. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports IV estimates of equation (4.4.16). All variables are in logs with 0.001 added. The specifi-
cation includes all grid cell within a 500 km buﬀer around the TSR mainline.
with the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics they all are decisively larger than the critical
values suggested by Stock & Yogo (2005)19. The final potential flaw which is testable,
is the failure to fulfill the overidentifying restrictions. As every endogenous regressor is
instrumented by exactly one instrument, the equation is exactly identified. Therefore the
overidentification restriction is fulfilled. This is also mirrored by the Hansen J statistics
reported in tables 4.4.8 through 4.4.15.
The exogeneity condition can not be tested directly. Still, there are key aspects about
the underlying setup in this contribution which strongly support the notion of exogeneity.
19 The critical values of the test provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) are 16.38, 8.96, 6.66, and 5.53
for a 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% bias of the obtained estimator, respectively. Accordingly, the null
hypothesis of the underlying estimators being biased due to weak instrumentation are rejected in all
cases.
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Table 4.4.16. Summary Statistics (Mean) for Treated and Control Cells (Tea
Road)
Group of Cells 0-10 km 10-20 km 10-40 km t-test (means)
0-10km vs. 10-40km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CalPot 3663.119 3637.006 3610.04 0.120
(30.075) (29.188) (16.947)
DistFla 411.470 411.144 409.958 0.850
(6.902) (6.928) (4.017)
Precip 454.985 456.071 455.353 0.862
(1.741) (1.788) (1.080)
PrecipSD 0.554 0.639 0.605 0.349
(0.044) (0.049) (0.028)
Number of Cells 1,001 1,001 2991
Note: The table reports the means and standard deviations (in parentheses)
for the respective cell groups. Column 4 reports Pr(|T| > |t|) for H0! = 0.
The first aspect is the considerable time span between the implementation of the Transsi-
berian Route and the construction of the TSR mainline which amounts to about 180 years
as well as the historical contexts of the two events. When the Route was implemented,
the Russians subsequently wiped out large parts of the small indigenous population which
led to a situation in which Eastern Russia was basically unpopulated until the settlement
promoted by the TSR took up. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the location of the
Route was determined by existing local populations. A second potential concern regard-
ing the exogeneity of the Route’s location is the existence of local natural advantages
which determined the Route’s course. In other words: it could be that the route devel-
oped from connecting advantageous places. While theoretically possible, this argument
is undermined by two factors. First, as both the Tea Road as well as the Transsiberian
Route were mere transport routes for goods and information it appears not logical that
local advantages might have played a roll in determining it’s location. This is further
supported by the results presented in tables 4.4.16 and 4.4.17. If the assumption that the
course of the routes was not determined by diﬀerences in observables, we should not find
any once we move further away from the Tea Road or the Post Route, repsectively. This
is illustrated by the absence of significant diﬀerences in the means of observable controls
included in the IV specification as reported in tables 4.4.16 and 4.4.17.
Column 4 reports the results from performing t tests on the equality of the means of
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Table 4.4.17. Summary Statistics (Mean) for Treated and Control Cells
(Transsiberian Route)
Group of Cells 0-10 km 10-20 km 10-40 km t-test (means)
0-10km vs. 10-40km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CalPot 3764.791 3724.435 3666.457 0.092
(52.873) (50.541) (28.730)
DistFla 580.640 576.656 579.912 0.931
(7.230) (7.235) (4.224)
Precip 470.179 468.786 468.866 0.649
(2.510) (2.504) ( 1.441)
PrecipSD 0.438 0.475 0.464 0.419
(0.025) (0.026) (0.016)
Number of Cells 1,596 1,591 4,849
Note: The table reports the means and standard deviations (in parentheses)
for the respective cell groups. Column 4 reports Pr(|T| > |t|) for H0! = 0.
the respective control variables. I compare the means of the cells which are closer than
10 kilometres to the Tea Road (treated cells) to the ones which are between 10 and 40
kilometres away. As we can see, the null of no diﬀerences in the means is rejected in all
cases. This can be seen as strong support for the assumption that local advantages did
not play decisive role in the Tea Road’s location. Table 4.4.17 reports the means and test
statistics for the Transsiberian Route. While diﬀerences in the means are slightly diﬀerent
in magnitude as compared to the Tea Road scenario, they still do not exhibit statistically
significant diﬀerences. Accordingly, this supports the notion of appropriateness of both
of the suggested instrumental variable approaches.
Summarising the above explained aspects, all testable conditions of suﬃcient correlation
between the proximity to the TSR (mainline) and the respective instrument variables
is fulfilled as shown by the first stage results and the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics.
Potential issues stemming from the failure to fulfill the weak identification as well as the
overidentification restrictions are absent as suggested by the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
and the Hansen J statistic. There is ample historical as well as descriptive support for
the second, non-testable condition of exogeneity to be fulfilled. Taking all those insights
together, there is strong support for the validity of the underlying IV approach.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper has aimed to contribute to the ongoing scientific debate about the impact of
infrastructure projects on local economic development and the local spatial organisation of
economic activity. Further, it aimed to empirically disentangle those eﬀects from the ones
of existing local natural advantages as well as localised returns to scale by including most
controls for both aspects. In doing so, I provide novel cross-section of gridded nightlight
emission data, local agro-climatic, resource exploitation in combination with historical
data on Tsarist trade and post routes. Due to the (historical) context in which the
Transsiberian Railroad was built, I am able to empirically demonstrate a causal negative
eﬀect of remoteness to transport infrastructure on local economic activity in Eastern
Russia. This eﬀect - while varying in magnitude - is persistent to focussing on either
the contemporary TSR network or the historical mainline. In addition to that, I show
that this negative causal eﬀect also impacts the local spatial organisation of economic
activity when focussing on the contemporary TSR network. This eﬀect vanishes when
centering the analysis around the historical mainline which could potentially be explained
by centrifugal forces which emerge over time. As a more thorough examination of this
question would go beyond the scope of this paper, I relegate it to future research.
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Appendix
4.A Data Appendix Nightlights
One of the main challenges in the underlying project is the lack of reliable sub-national
GDP figures for Russia. In their seminal contribution, Henderson, Storeygard & Weil
(2012) suggest to use the amount of light that can be observed from outer space as proxy
for economic activity. While they show that nightlight emission are a viable proxy for
economic activity at the national level, the authors further stress that nightlights data is
of even greater value in a sub-national setting since it is available at a great geographic
fineness of about a 1 square-kilometre resolution. Using this data together with geo-
spatial data on for example administrative divisions this data can then be aggregated and
be used to construct city or regional-level indices on economic activity. In the following,
I will summarise Henderson et al. (2012)’s technical remarks on the data.
The nightlights data is recorded and provided to the public by the United States Air Force
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). The program’s satellites complete
14 orbits per day since the 1970s. The data is being digitally processed, archived and
published since 1992. Originally, the data was being recorded in order to detect clouds
and was meant to be used to improve operational accuracy of air strikes and the like.
In the process also nocturnal light emissions of human settlements are being recorded as
well. The operational pattern of the program ensures that every satellite records every
given point on the earth’s surface at somewhen between 20:30 and 22:00 o’clock local
time. After being transmitted to the program’s headquarters, the data is processed by
members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National
Geophysical Data Center (NGDC). This process entails the removal of unwanted lights
emissions like for example forest fires, solar flares or extreme cloud cover with the aim to
filter out all natural light emissions or obstructions of of the same. In the end, the cleaned
data is aggregated to one composite raster file in order to produce a satellite-year data
set which is then made publicly available.
As aforementioned every final product is a raster file which consists of a grid with a
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30 arc-second cell size. Such a grid cell approximately covers an area of 0.86 square-
kilometres at the equator. The grid extends between 65 degrees south and 75 degrees
north latitude. Every grid cell / pixel reports the intensity of nocturnal light on an
integer scale from 0 (no lights recorded) to 63 (sensor satiation). While the exclusion
of the extreme north and south latitudes clearly means leaving a sizeable portion of the
earth’s surface uncovered, it is stressed by Henderson et al. (2012) that this area is only
inhabited by roughly 10.000 people which is equivalent to 0.0002 percent of the world’s
population. Accordingly, for the underlying project this means that parts of Russia are
left out of the analysis. Still, it is highly unlikely that this significantly distorts the
findings. The author’s further stress that the recorded night lights reflect all indoor and
outdoor use of man-made light. Accordingly, both the use of light in production as well
as consumption is recorded and cannot be abstracted. Still, there is a stable relationship
between night lights and economic activity which is more than what has been available at
this high spatial granularity for Russia. This raw data is then used in order to aggregate
the light emission data to less granular grid as described in section 4.3.
4.B Appendix: The Russian Routes Across Siberia
The instrumental variable approaches suggested in this contribution is based on two his-
torical sources. The source used in order to retrace the course and the historical facts
regarding the Russian Tea Route is Avery (2003). In her contribution, the author provides
a detailed picture about both the known stations of the Tea Route as well its political
foundations. Figure 4.B.1 presents the original map which I used in order create a sim-
plified and digitised map. While still being in use, the Tea Route has been extended both
its sphere of influence as well as its function after the first operations have been taken up
around 1730. As the Russian Tsardom aimed at extending its influence further east, more
and more post stations have been installed east of Ulan-Ude. When Wenyon travelled
what he then called the Russian Post Route in around 1894, it extended to the most
eastern point of the Russian empire, Vladivostok. Figure 4.B.2 presents the original scan
of the hand-drawn map published in Wenyon (1896). I used this original map in order to
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create a simplified and digitised version. This version has been used in order to compute
the grid centroid distances to the Post Route which I then used in order to instrument
the actual distances to the respective rail networks.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis aimed at oﬀering a comprehensive analysis of a multitude of factors impact-
ing the well-being of individuals in the spirit of Samuelson & Nordhaus (1998). The
motivation was to identify core factors impacting individual well-being both directly or
indirectly via various transmission channels. Chapter 2 was devoted to the assessment of
the correlates and causes of US gun violence. It comprised a stylised model of economic
crime in which assailants decide between using or not using a firearm while committing
a crime. This model implicates that the utilisation of firearms is increasing in the avail-
ability of illegal guns and decreasing in both the level of social capital as well as in police
intensity. The second part of chapter 2 focussed on empirically testing the hypotheses
derived from the theoretical model. Using a detailed panel data set on the county level
which was created by combining data published by the FBI, we found empirical support
for our main hypotheses. In order to be able to make a statement about the magnitude
and direction of the causal eﬀect of the availability of illegal guns, we used the plausibly
exogenous variation in the number of stolen guns in neighbouring states. The empirical
evidence presented in chapter 2 suggests that the higher prevalence of illegal guns causally
increases the rate at which oﬀenders use firearms in order to achieve their criminal goals.
From our insights, we could derive a number of policy recommendations. First, a possible
tool in order to reduce gun-related crime could be to impose higher penalties for armed
crime. Secondly, another area in which lawmakers could coerce criminals is by introducing
more strict legislation regarding the possession of illegal firearms. Finally, gun violence
could be lowered by strengthening social cohesion. Such increased cohesion could lower
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criminal inclinations in the respective society. This suggestion was derived from the fact
that we show that associational density as measured by the prevalence of civic, social and
religious societies has a robust negative eﬀect on gun oﬀenses. Developing new strategies
in capacity-building with regards to social cohesion might prove a useful tool in order
to combat gun crime. As laid out in chapter 1, gun-related violence is a factor severely
impeding physical well-being. By contributing to the development of a better understand-
ing of the correlates and causes of gun-crime in the US, we tried and help to improve the
situation in this context.
Chapter 3 focussed on the assessment of the impact of a society’s class structure with
regards to income on educational outcomes. Namely, we presented a simple model of
household consumption in which households can decide between subsistence consumption,
investing in the next generation’s education, and luxury goods. Assuming that the society
is stratified into three income classes, we demonstrated that while the poor use most of
their income in order to secure their basic consumption, the rich spend a considerable
fraction of their budget on luxury goods. From that we derived that the middle income
stratum devotes the largest share to education as compared to the other two groups.
Based on those considerations, it is corollary that the relative size of the middle class in a
society positively impacts their average educational outcomes. Chapter 3 further provided
an empirical test of the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model. Using detailed
survey data from the Indian Household Development Survey regarding household incomes,
educational attainment as well as wide range of important controls, we empirically showed
that higher shares of middle class households in Indian districts are associated with higher
average educational outcomes. Further, since the underlying relationship is potentially
aﬀected by reverse causality, we proposed a novel instrumental variable approach in order
to identify the causal eﬀect. The specific situation in the predominantly Hinduistic society
of the Indian subcontinent enabled us to do so. More specifically, we made use of the fact
that the ancient caste system unique to Hinduistic cultures divides them into diﬀerent
strata. In the implementation of the IV approach presented in chapter 3, the district share
of the middle class was instrumented by the share of people belonging to the middle two
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castes. This allows us to identify a causal positive eﬀect of a larger share of the middle
class on educational outcomes per district. Accordingly, strengthening the middle income
stratum is recommendable if policymakers aim at fostering average educational outcomes.
Thereby, individual well-being is not only fostered directly by better education but also
indirectly since higher educational attainment has been shown to usually translate into
higher incomes by a multitude of scientific contributions.
In the 4th chapter, I addressed the question if and how large-scale transport-infrastructure
projects influence local economic development and the spatial organisation of economic
activity. Namely, I investigated in how far the construction of the Transsiberian Railway
and the associated reduction in transport costs had a positive impact on economic activity
in Eastern Russia. While there is ample theoretical work which suggests a positive eﬀect of
such projects, empirical contributions remain rather scarce. I contributed to the existing
literature in several ways. First, utilising satellite data on nocturnal lights emissions I was
able to construct a novel data set. This data set entails detailed information on economic
activity in Eastern Russia with a high spatial resolution. To my knowledge, there exists no
reliable sub-national accounts data for said region. For this reason, chapter 4 is possibly
the first economic research project which focusses on such a large part of Eastern Russia.
Secondly, the specific history of the planning and construction of the Railroad enabled
me to suggest a novel instrumental variable approach. This approach is based on the fact
that the Transsiberian Railway follows the course of historical trade and postal routes.
Those routes are plausibly exogenous with regards to local natural endowments as well
as the local availability of production factors. By instrumenting the distance of specific
locations in Eastern Russia with their distance to those historical routes, I was able to
empirically isolate the causal impact of the transport cost reductions brought along by the
Transsiberian Railway from the two previously mentioned confounding factors. In doing
so, I was able to empirically prove a causal and negative eﬀect of remoteness from the
railway on economic activity as well as local spatial agglomeration of the same. Since lower
transport costs usually imply lower barriers to accessing distant markets, being closer to
the railway translates into higher economic activity and with it higher incomes which
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in turn translates into improved well-being of the local population. Hence based on the
insights presented in chapter 4, investments in transport-infrastructure projects commend
themselves if one aims at fostering regional development and economic well-being.
The chapters included in this thesis contributed new insights into three very heterogenous
topics. This was achieved by using novel data and constructing new data sets often
employing data wrangling techniques which extend beyond the usual computer-science
skillset of economic scholars. Hoping to have made some people wiser, I also want to
encourage scholars to dig more deeply into the touched areas and relegate such endeavours
to future research.
